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VII. Constitutional Law
In This Section:
New Case: New York State Rifle & Pistol Association Inc. v. City of New York, New York
“SUPREME COURT ACCEPTS FIRST GUN CASE IN NEARLY A DECADE”
Jess Bravin
“FEARING SUPREME COURT LOSS, NEW YORK TRIED TO MAKE GUN CASE VANISH”
Adam Liptak
“NEW YORK EASED GUN LAW HOPEFUL SUPREME COURT WOULD DROP SECOND
AMENDMENT CASE – BUT THAT HASN’T HAPPENED YET”
Robert Barnes
“NRA, GUN RIGHTS GROUP USING NEW YORK CITY RULE TO SEEK EXPANSION OF SECOND
AMENDMENT IN SUPREME COURT”
Richard Wolf
“A CALL TO ARMS AT THE SUPREME COURT: CONSERVATIVE JUDGES WORRY THAT THE
SECOND AMENDMENT HAS BECOME ‘A SECOND-CLASS RIGHT.’”
Linda Greenhouse
“TRUMP SAYS NRA IS ‘UNDER SIEGE BY CUOMO’ AFTER NEW YORK AG OPENS
INVESTIGATION INTO GUN GROUP”
Tucker Higgins
“NEW YORK CITY LAW SURVIVES GUN RIGHTS GROUP’S LEGAL CHALLENGE”
Jonathan Stempel
New Case: Espinoza v. Montana Department of Revenue
“SUPREME COURT TO HEAR SCHOOL CHOICE CASE”
Lauren Camera
“RELIGIOUS-SCHOOL SCHOLARSHIPS DRAW U.S. SUPREME COURT REVIEW”
Greg Stohr
“IF THE SUPREME COURT HEARS THIS CASE, IT COULD CHANGE THE FACE OF PUBLIC
EDUCATION”
PETER GREENE
“THE SUPREME COURT HAS A CHANCE TO UPHOLD SCHOOL CHOICE AND RELIGIOUS
LIBERTY”
Jamie Gass and Ben Degrow
“MONTANA SUPREME COURT STRIKES DOWN TAX-CREDIT PROGRAM FOR PRIVATE
SCHOOLS”
Mark Walsh
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New Case: June Medical Services v. Gee
“SUPREME COURT ON 5-TO-4 VOTE BLOCKS RESTRICTIVE LOUISIANA ABORTION LAW”
Robert Barnes
“SUPREME COURT BLOCKS LOUISIANA ABORTION LAW”
Adam Liptak
“ABORTION CASE PROVIDES AN UNEXPECTED QUICK TEST FOR SUPREME COURT
CONSERVATIVES”
Robert Barnes
“A TEMPORARY WIN FOR ABORTION RIGHTS”
Garrett Epps
“WHEN JUDGES DEFY THE SUPREME COURT”
Linda Greenhouse
“SUPREME COURT ISSUES A GO-SLOW SIGNAL IN ITS FIRST ABORTION DECISION OF THE
YEAR”
David Savage
“NEW LOUISIANA ANTI-ABORTION LAW ON HOLD AS DOCTORS CHALLENGE RECENT COURT
RULING”
Mark Ballard
“SUPREME COURT WILL NOT HEAR BID TO REVIVE ALABAMA ABORTION BAN”
Adam Liptak
“SUPREME COURT SIDESTEPS ABORTION QUESTION IN RULING ON INDIANA LAW”
Adam Liptak
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New York State Rifle & Pistol Association Inc. v. City of New York, New York
Ruling Below: New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. City of New York, 883 F.3d 45 (2d Cir.
2018)
Overview: The plaintiffs were prohibited from transporting their handguns for shooting
competitions by New York State Rule. The plaintiffs sought a declaration that the restrictions
imposed by the rule was unconstitutional and an injunction against its enforcement. The plaintiffs
also claim that the rule violates their Second Amendment rights, Commerce Clause, First
Amendment right of expressive association, and fundamental right to travel.
Issue: Whether New York City’s ban on transporting a licensed, locked and unloaded handgun to
a home or shooting range outside city limits is consistent with the Second Amendment, the
commerce clause and the constitutional right to travel.
THE NEW YORK STATE RIFLE & PISTOL ASSOCIATION, INC., ROMOLO
COLANTONE, EFRAIN ALVAREZ, and JOSE ANTHONY IRIZARRY, PlaintiffsAppellants
v.
THE CITY OF NEW YORK and THE NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENTLICENSE DIVISION, Defendants-Appellees
United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit
Decided on February 23, 2018
[Excerpt; some citations and footnotes omitted]
York ("RCNY"), under which an individual
with a "premises license" for a handgun
may ot remove the handgun "from the
address specified on the license except as
otherwise
provided
in
this
chapter." Under Rule 5-23 ("the Rule"), the
licensee "may transport her/his handgun(s)
directly to and from an authorized small arms
range/shooting club, unloaded, in a locked
container, the ammunition to be carried
separately."

Gerard E. LYNCH, Circuit Judge:
Plaintiffs New York State Rifle & Pistol
Association, Romolo Colantone, Efrain
Alvarez, and Jose Anthony Irizarry
(collectively, "the Plaintiffs") brought suit
against Defendants City of New York and the
New York Police Department-License
Division
(collectively,
"the
City"),
challenging a provision of a New York City
licensing scheme, Title 38, Chapter Five,
Section 23 of the Rules of the City of New
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The New York Police Department-License
Division ("License Division") has defined
"authorized" facilities,
among other
requirements, to be "those located in New
York City." App. 38. The Plaintiffs sought to
remove handguns from the licensed premises
for the purposes of going to shooting ranges
and engaging in target practice outside New
York City as well as, in the case of one
Plaintiff, transporting the handgun to a
second home in upstate NewYork. The
United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York denied the Plaintiffs'
motions for summary judgment and for a
preliminary injunction, and granted the City's
cross-motion for summary judgment. The
district court held that the restrictions in
premises licenses do not violate the Second
Amendment, the Commerce Clause, the
fundamental right to travel, or the First
Amendment. The Plaintiffs appeal that
judgment.

officer. "The application process for a license
is rigorous and administered locally. Every
application triggers a local investigation by
police into the applicant's mental health
history, criminal history, [and] moral
character." The licensing officers "are vested
with considerable discretion in deciding
whether to grant a license application,
particularly in determining whether proper
cause exists for the issuance of a carry
license." The New York Penal Law specifies
that in New York City, the licensing officer
is the City's Police Commissioner The
License
Division
exercises
the
Commissioner's authority to
review
applications for licenses, and issues handgun
licenses.
The Penal Law establishes two primary types
of handgun licenses: "carry" licenses and
"premises" licenses. A carry license allows
an individual to "have and carry [a]
concealed" handgun "without regard to
employment or place of possession . . . when
proper cause exists" for the license to be
issued.

For the reasons that follow, we AFFIRM.
BACKGROUND
New York State law prohibits possession of
"firearms" absent a license. Section 400.00 of
the Penal Law establishes the "exclusive
statutory mechanism for the licensing of
firearms in New York State." Licenses can be
held by individuals at least twenty-one years
of age, of good moral character, and
"concerning whom no good cause exists for
the denial of the license," among other
requirements.

"Proper cause" is not defined by the
Penal Law, but New York State
courts have defined the term to
include carrying a handgun for target
practice, hunting, or self-defense.
When an applicant demonstrates
proper cause to carry a handgun for
target practice or hunting, the
licensing officer may restrict a carry
license "to the purposes that justified
the issuance."

To obtain a handgun license, an individual
must apply to his or her local licensing
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Generally, a carry license is valid throughout
the state except that it is not valid within New
York City "unless a special permit granting
validity is issued by the police
commissioner" of New York City.

Under Rule 5-23(a)(3), an "authorized small
arms range/shooting club" is one that, among
other requirements, is located in New York
City, as the License Division notified
Plaintiff Colantone in a letter dated May 15,
2012. When this challenge was brought, there
were seven such facilities in New York City,
including at least one in each of the City's five
boroughs. The New York Police Department
("NYPD") also previously issued "target
licenses" that allowed the licensee to
take his or her handgun to shooting ranges
and competitions outside New York City.
These target licenses were not mandated by
state law, but were issued by the NYPD in its
discretion as the licensing agency for New
York City. The NYPD received reports that
licensees were using target licenses to carry
weapons to many other locations, and not in
the requisite unloaded and enclosed
condition. In part because of these issues, the
NYPD eliminated the target license in 2001.

A premises license is specific to the premises
for which it is issued. The type of license at
issue in this case allows a licensee to "have
and possess in his dwelling" a pistol or
revolver. Under the RCNY, a "premises
license - residence" issued to a New York
City resident is specific to a particular
address, and "[t]he handguns listed on th[e]
license may not be removed from the address
specified on the license except" in limited
circumstances, including the following:
(3) To maintain proficiency in the use
of the handgun, the licensee may
transport her/his handgun(s) directly
to and from an authorized small arms
range/shooting club, unloaded, and in
a locked container, the ammunition to
be carried separately.

Plaintiffs Colantone, Irizarry, and Alvarez
hold premises licenses issued by the License
Division that allow them to possess handguns
in their residences in New York City. They
seek to transport their handguns outside the
premises for purposes other than the ones
authorized by Rule 5-23. All three Plaintiffs
seek to transport their handguns to shooting
ranges and competitions outside New York
City. In addition, Colantone, who owns a
second home in Hancock, New York, seeks
to transport his handgun between the
premises for which it is licensed in New York
City and his Hancock house. These plaintiffs,
along with the New York State Rifle & Pistol
Association, filed suit in the Southern District
of New York, seeking a declaration that the

(4) A licensee may transport her/his
handgun(s) directly to and from an
authorized area designated by the
New York State Fish and Wildlife
Law and in compliance with all
pertinent
hunting
regulations,
unloaded, in a locked container, the
ammunition to be carried separately,
after the licensee has requested and
received a "Police Department - City
of New York Hunting Authorization"
Amendment attached to her/his
license.
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restrictions imposed by the Rule were
unconstitutional and an injunction against its
enforcement.

genuine dispute as to any material fact and
the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law.” For the reasons explained below, we
reject each of the Plaintiffs' arguments.

The Plaintiffs moved for summary judgment
and for a preliminary injunction, and the City
cross moved for summary judgment. The
district court granted the City's cross-motion
for summary judgment and dismissed the
complaint. The district court determined that
the Rule "merely regulates rather than
restricts the right to possess a firearm in the
home and is a minimal, or at most, modest
burden on the right." Accordingly, the
district court held that the Rule did not violate
the Plaintiffs' Second Amendment rights.
The district court also found that the Rule did
not violate the dormant Commerce Clause,
the First Amendment right of expressive
association, or the fundamental right to
travel.

I. Rule 5-23 Does Not Violate the Second
Amendment.
The Second Amendment provides: "A well
regulated Militia, being necessary to the
security of a free State, the right of the people
to keep and bear Arms, shall not be
infringed." In District of Columbia v. Heller,
the
Supreme
Court
announced
that the Second Amendment "guarantee[s]
the individual right to possess and carry
weapons
in
case
of
confrontation.” In McDonald v. City of
Chicago, the Court held that this right is
incorporated within the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment, and therefore
binds the States as well as the Federal
Government. However, the Court remarked
that its holding should not "be taken to cast
doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the
possession of firearms by felons and the
mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying
of firearms in sensitive places such as schools
and government buildings, or laws imposing
conditions and qualifications on the
commercial
sale
of
arms."
"Neither Heller nor McDonald . . . delineated
the
precise
scope
of
the Second
Amendment or the standards by which lower
courts should assess the constitutionality of
firearms restrictions.

DISCUSSION
The Plaintiffs argue on appeal, as they did
below, that by restricting their ability to
transport firearms outside the City, Rule 523 violates the Second Amendment, the
dormant Commerce
Clause,
the First
Amendment right of expressive association,
and the fundamental right to travel. We
review a district court's decision on summary
judgment de novo, construing the evidence in
the light most favorable to the non-moving
party. "We also review de novo the district
court's legal conclusions, including those
interpreting
and
determining
the
constitutionality of a statute." Pursuant to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary
judgment is appropriate where "there is no

A. Analytical Framework
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Following Heller, this Circuit adopted a
"two-step inquiry" for "determining the
constitutionality
of
firearm
restrictions." First, we "determine whether
the challenged legislation impinges upon
conduct
protected
by
the Second
Amendment," and second, if we "conclude[]
that the statute[] impinge[s] upon Second
Amendment rights, we must next determine
and apply the appropriate level of scrutiny."
1. First Step: Whether
Amendment Applies

basis review, or whether some form of nonheightened scrutiny exists that is more
exacting than rational basis review. As
explained below, we find that the Rule does
not trigger strict scrutiny and that it survives
intermediate scrutiny.
In determining whether some form of
heightened scrutiny applies, we consider two
factors: "(1) 'how close the law comes to the
core of the Second Amendment right' and (2)
'the severity of the law's burden on the right.'
Laws that neither implicate the core
protections of the Second Amendment nor
substantially burden their exercise do not
receive heightened scrutiny." As relevant to
the individual right to possess a firearm
recognized in Heller, a statute can "implicate
the core of the Second Amendment's
protections by extending into the home,
'where the need for defense of self, family
and property is most acute.'" Thus, in Heller,
the Supreme Court struck down the District
of Columbia's ban on handgun possession in
the home because it completely prohibited
"an entire class of 'arms' that is
overwhelmingly chosen by American society
for th[e] lawful purpose [of selfdefense].” The Court found that this
prohibition, which extended into the home,
would fail constitutional muster under any
standard of scrutiny.

the Second

At the first step, the Plaintiffs argue that Rule
5-23 impinges on conduct protected by
the Second Amendment. We need not decide
whether that is so, because, as explained
below, the Rule "pass[es] constitutional
muster" under intermediate scrutiny. Thus, as
in New York State Rifle, we "proceed on the
assumption that [the Rule restricts activity]
protected by the Second Amendment."
2. Second Step: Level of Scrutiny
At the second step, we consider whether to
apply
heightened
scrutiny. In Second
Amendment cases,
our
Circuit
has
recognized at least two forms of heightened
scrutiny — strict and intermediate. Our
Circuit has also recognized that a form of
non-heightened scrutiny may be applied in
some Second
Amendment cases. This
recognition is limited by the Supreme Court's
indication in Heller that rational basis review
may be inappropriate for certain regulations
involving Second Amendment rights. But we
need not determine here which types of
regulations may be subject only to rational

As to the second factor, we have held that
"heightened scrutiny is triggered only by
those restrictions that (like the complete
prohibition on handguns struck down
in Heller) operate as a substantial burden on
the ability of law-abiding citizens to possess
and use a firearm for self-defense (or for
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other lawful purposes)." "The scope of the
legislative restriction and the availability of
alternatives factor into our analysis of the
degree to which the challenged law burdens
the right." For example, since Heller, we
have found New York's and Connecticut's
prohibitions of semiautomatic assault
weapons to be distinguishable from the ban
struck down in Heller, because under those
statutes, "citizens may continue to arm
themselves
with
non-semiautomatic
weapons or with any semiautomatic gun that
does not contain any of the enumerated
military-style features." Even where
heightened scrutiny is triggered by a
substantial burden, however, strict scrutiny
may not be required if that burden "does not
constrain the Amendment's 'core' area of
protection." Thus, the two factors interact to
dictate the proper level of scrutiny.

comparison to the regulation considered
in Kachalsky, the restrictions complained of
by the Plaintiffs here impose at most trivial
limitations on the ability of law-abiding
citizens to possess and use firearms for selfdefense. New York has licensed the
ownership and possession of firearms in their
residences,
where
"Second
Amendment guarantees
are
at
their
zenith," and does nothing to limit their
lawful use of those weapons "in defense of
hearth and home"—the "core" protection of
the Second Amendment.
Strict scrutiny does not attach to Rule 5-23 as
a result of Colantone's desire to transport the
handgun licensed to his New York City
residence to his second home in Hancock,
New York. Even if the Rule relates to "core"
rights under the Second Amendment by
prohibiting Colantone from taking his
licensed firearm to his second home, the Rule
does not substantially burden his ability to
obtain a firearm for that home, because an
"adequate alternative[] remain[s] for
[Colantone] to acquire a firearm for selfdefense." This case is easily distinguished
from Heller, in which the Supreme Court
considered, and deemed unconstitutional, an
outright ban on the possession of handguns in
the home. Here, New York City imposes no
limit on Colantone's ability to obtain a license
to have a handgun at his second residence in
Hancock; if he wants to keep a handgun at his
Hancock house, he can apply to the licensing
officers in Delaware County. The Rule
restricts only his ability to remove the
handgun licensed by New York City
authorities from the City premises for which
it is specifically licensed.

The Plaintiffs argue that the Rule violates
the Second Amendment in two ways: first,
by preventing Plaintiff Colantone from
taking the handgun licensed to his New York
City residence and transporting it to his
second home in Hancock, New York, and
second, by preventing the Plaintiffs from
taking their handguns licensed to New York
City premises to firing ranges and shooting
competitions outside the City. We address
these arguments in turn.
In Kachalsky, we applied intermediate
scrutiny and affirmed New York's "proper
cause" requirement for the issuance of a carry
license, despite finding that such a
requirement "places substantial limits on the
ability of law-abiding citizens to possess
firearms for self-defense in public."In
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Colantone presents no evidence that the
costs, either financial or administrative,
associated with obtaining a premises license
for his house in Hancock, or acquiring a
second gun to keep at that location, would be
so high as to be exclusionary or
prohibitive. In Kwong v. Bloomberg, we
assumed that intermediate scrutiny applied to
New York City's $340 application fee for
a premises license and upheld that fee. We
noted that otherwise-proper costs associated
with a state's regulation of firearms could be
impermissible "if [they] were so high as to be
exclusionary or prohibitive.” But "the fact
that the licensing regime makes the exercise
of one's Second Amendment rights more
expensive does not necessarily mean that it
substantially burdens that right." Here,
Colantone does not even estimate the amount
of money or time potentially at issue by the
requirement of obtaining a premises license
and second firearm for his second home, and
he does not allege that the Rule restricts in
any way his ability to obtain such a firearm.

home, "wouldn't mean much without the
training and practice that make it effective."
To the extent that the Plaintiffs argue that
firearms practice is itself a core Second
Amendment right, and that even minimal
regulation of firearms training must survive
heightened scrutiny to pass constitutional
muster, we reject that argument. It is
reasonable to argue as did the plaintiffs
in Ezell I, that restrictions that limit the
ability of firearms owners to acquire and
maintain proficiency in the use of their
weapons can rise to a level that significantly
burdens
core Second
Amendment protections. Possession of
firearms without adequate training and skill
does nothing to protect, and much to
endanger, the gun owner, his or her family,
and the general public. Accordingly, we may
assume that the ability to obtain firearms
training and engage in firearm practice is
sufficiently
close
to
core Second
Amendment concerns that regulations that
sharply restrict that ability to obtain such
training could impose substantial burdens on
core Second Amendment rights. Some form
of heightened scrutiny would be warranted in
such cases, however, not because live-fire
target shooting is itself a core Second
Amendment right, but rather because, and
only to the extent that, regulations amounting
to a ban (either explicit or functional) on
obtaining firearms training and practice
substantially burden the core right to keep
and use firearms in selfdefense in the home.
Indeed, if the Plaintiffs' broader argument
were accepted, every regulation that applied
to businesses that provide firearms training or
firing-range use would itself require

Next, the Plaintiffs argue that the Rule
imposes a substantial burden on their
core Second
Amendment
rights
by
prohibiting them from taking their licensed
handguns to firing ranges and shooting
competitions outside the City. The Plaintiffs'
primary argument is that the right to possess
and use guns in self-defense suggests a
corresponding right to engage in training and
target shooting, and thus restrictions on the
latter right must themselves be subject to
heightened scrutiny. Their argument relies on
the Seventh Circuit's observation that the
core right of the Second Amendment to use
firearms in self-defense, particularly in the
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heightened scrutiny, a result far from
anything the Supreme Court has required.

this case, that the imposition of such a burden
comes close to prohibiting gun training and
practice altogether. Particularly when
coupled with a training requirement, such a
limitation would impose a considerable
obstacle to gun ownership in the home. New
York's rule, however, imposes no such
limitations. Rule 5-23 allows a holder of a
premises license to take the handgun licensed
for his or her New York City premises to an
authorized firing range in the City to engage
in practice, training exercises, and shooting
competitions.

Our analysis puts the focus where it belongs:
on the core right of self-defense in the
home. Rule 5-23 imposes no direct restriction
at all on the right of the Plaintiffs, or of any
other eligible New Yorker, to obtain a
handgun and maintain it at their residences
for self-protection. All of the individual
Plaintiffs hold licenses to maintain handguns
for that purpose. The Plaintiffs do not allege
that the City's regulatory scheme imposes any
undue burden, expense, or difficulty that
impedes their ability to possess a handgun for
self-protection, or even their ability to engage
in sufficient practice to acquire and maintain
the skills necessary to keep firearms safely
and use them effectively.

Nor does the City take away with one hand
what it gives with the other, by using its
power to regulate firing ranges so
restrictively that as a practical matter, firing
ranges are unavailable. That was the route
taken by Chicago in response to the Ezell
I ruling. In Ezell v. City of Chicago ("Ezell
II"), the Seventh Circuit confronted zoning
restrictions that "severely limit[ed] where
shooting ranges may locate," and which were
justified by nothing more than "sheer
speculation about accidents and theft." In
finding that the restrictions acted as a
functional ban on firing ranges, the Ezell
II Court cited calculations produced by the
plaintiffs showing that only about 2.2% of the
city's acreage could even theoretically be
used to site a shooting range. Additionally,
the court referenced testimony from two
experts, presented by the plaintiffs, indicating
that other jurisdictions made available
significantly more land for use by shooting
ranges.

We are further unpersuaded by the Plaintiffs'
attempts to analogize the Rule to the
restrictions held unconstitutional in Ezell I, as
those restrictions are easily distinguishable
from the ones at issue in this case. Ezell
I concerned a Chicago ordinance that flatly
banned firing ranges within city limits. We
can assume, without deciding, that the
Seventh Circuit correctly concluded that such
a dramatic ban on target shooting
substantially limits the right of law-abiding
citizens to engage in the training and practice
that would enable them to safely and
effectively make use of firearms for
defensive purposes in the home. Under the
Chicago ordinance, residents could not
engage in firearms activities without leaving
the city. At a minimum, such a limitation
imposes significant inconvenience, and we
can accept, for purposes of the argument in

In this case, by contrast, the Plaintiffs present
no evidence demonstrating that the Rule
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serves to functionally bar their use of firing
ranges or their attendance at shooting
competitions. In fact, the Plaintiffs concede
that seven authorized ranges are available to
them, including at least one in each of the
City's five boroughs. What the Plaintiffs seek
is the inverse of what the Ezell I plaintiffs
sought: they do not complain that they are
required to undertake burdensome journeys
away from the city in which they live in order
to maintain their skills, but rather they
demand the right to take their handguns to
ranges and competitions outside their city of
residence. While the Plaintiffs make passing
reference to the possibility that some New
York City residents might find a firing range
located outside the City more convenient to
use, or closer to their residence, than the
nearest facility within their home borough or
an adjoining borough, they offer no evidence
that the burden imposed by having to use a
range within the City is in any way
substantial.

adequate alternatives remain for law-abiding
citizens to acquire a firearm for selfdefense." An analysis of the evidence in this
case reveals that, contrary to the Plaintiffs'
assertions, the Plaintiffs have sufficient
opportunities to train with their firearms
without violating the Rule.
The record evidence demonstrates that seven
firing ranges in New York City are available
to any premises license-holder. One range,
Olinville Arms in the Bronx, is open to any
member of the public for an hourly fee. Six
of the firing ranges require payment of a
membership fee, although at least one of
those six is open to non-members for weekly
shooting competitions. The Plaintiffs argue
that they should not be relegated to joining
"private clubs" in order to engage in firearms
competitions, Appellants' Br. 51, but the
record does not support any claim that these
"clubs" are exclusionary in any way. Like
privately owned gyms and other athletic
facilities, they are places of public
accommodation, open to anyone who pays
their fees. The Plaintiffs do not argue that the
fees charged by the available firing ranges are
prohibitively expensive, still less that their
cost is driven up by any burdensome or
unreasonable City regulations. That some
portion of the fee is charged in the form of an
annual or monthly "membership," rather than
a per-hour usage fee, does not put the
facilities out of reach for license holders. Nor
does it warrant a conclusion that New York
City has imposed an unreasonable burden on
a resident's ability to pursue firearms training
— which may be a somewhat costly pursuit
in any event — thereby raising constitutional
concerns.

As with absolute limitations on the ability to
engage in firearms training, laws that limit
such opportunities by imposing excessive
costs could in principle impose a substantial
burden entailing heightened scrutiny. But the
test, again, is whether core rights are
substantially burdened. As we noted
in Kwong, a "hypothetical licensing fee could
be so high as to constitute a 'substantial
burden,'" nevertheless, we concluded that the
permit fee charged by New York City did not
impose such a substantial burden.
Furthermore, a law that "regulates the
availability of firearms is not a substantial
burden on the right to keep and bear arms if
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Moreover, the Plaintiffs do not argue that the
facilities located within the City are
inadequate to provide the necessary
opportunities for practice shooting. Indeed,
the record reflects that some of these facilities
are quite substantial. For example, the
Richmond Boro Gun Club advertises a "100yard rifle range with 30 covered and enclosed
stations for Benchrest, Prone, and Bench
shooting, [and an] outdoor 24 station 50-yard
pistol range with covered and enclosed
shooting bench with turning targets at 25
yards" among its many shooting facilities.
"Various rifle and pistol matches are held
each week all year," according to their
website, and these matches are open to nonmembers.

operates as a substantial burden on the right
to keep and use firearms for self-defense in
the home. Assuming arguendo that a total
ban on firing ranges within the limits of a
large city (as was at issue in Ezell I) or a
functional ban on firing ranges through
onerous zoning regulations (along the lines
of Ezell II) would impose a substantial
burden on the core Second Amendment right
of residents to maintain firearms for selfdefense in the home, we are not confronted
with such a case here. Unlike the plaintiffs
in Ezell II, the Plaintiffs here do not allege
that any of the City's regulations,
including Rule 5-23, serve to deter the
construction or existence of firing ranges
within city limits. Furthermore, given the
existence of ample facilities for live-fire
training and practice available at market
prices within reasonable commuting distance
from the homes of all City residents, the
restrictions imposed by the Rule do not
impose a substantial burden on the
core Second Amendment right to own and
possess handguns for self-defense.

Finally, nothing in the Rule precludes the
Plaintiffs from utilizing gun ranges or
attending competitions outside New York
City, since guns can be rented or borrowed at
most such venues for practice purposes. New
York state law expressly allows individuals
to use a gun that is not their own at a shooting
range if the license holder is present. We
recognize that the Plaintiffs may prefer to
practice with their own weapon — something
that the Rule makes fully possible within the
City. That the Rule restricts practicing with
their own firearms to ranges within the City
does not make practicing outside the City or
with their own firearms impossible, just not
the two together.

It is clear, based on the essentially undisputed
facts recited above, that strict scrutiny is not
triggered by the Rule, either as applied to
Colantone's second home or to the Plaintiffs'
desire to take their handguns outside the City
for shooting competitions or target practice.
However, some form of heightened scrutiny
may still be required. We have applied
intermediate scrutiny when analyzing
regulations
that
substantially
burdened Second Amendment rights or that
encroached on the core of Second
Amendment rights by extending into the
home.

In short, nothing in this record suggests that
the limitations challenged by the
Plaintiffs significantly inhibit their ability to
utilize training facilities to obtain and
maintain firearm skills, let alone that the Rule
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other constitutional rights. So long as
the defendants produce evidence that
fairly supports their rationale, the
laws will pass constitutional muster.

Because we assume, arguendo, that the Rule
approaches the Second Amendment's core
area of protection as applied to Colantone's
second home, though it does not impose a
substantial burden, we find that intermediate
scrutiny is appropriate to assess the Rule in
that instance. As to the Plaintiffs' access to
firing ranges and shooting competitions, the
Rule does not approach the core area of
protection, and we find it difficult to say that
the Rule substantially burdens any protected
rights. "But we need not definitively decide
that applying heightened scrutiny is
unwarranted here," because we find that the
Rule would survive even under intermediate
scrutiny. Accordingly, we proceed to assess
the Rule by applying intermediate scrutiny.

The Rule seeks to protect public safety and
prevent crime, and "New York has
substantial,
indeed
compelling,
governmental interests in public safety and
crime prevention." "[W]hile the Second
Amendment's core concerns are strongest
inside hearth and home, states have long
recognized a countervailing and competing
set of concerns with regard to handgun
ownership and use in public." "There is a
longstanding tradition of states regulating
firearm possession and use in public because
of the dangers posed to public safety."

B. Application of Intermediate Scrutiny

The City has presented evidence supporting
its contention that the Rule serves to protect
the public safety of both license-holding and
non-license-holding citizens of New York
City. In a detailed affidavit, the former
Commander of the License Division, Andrew
Lunetta, discussed why taking a licensed
handgun to a second home or a shooting
competition outside the City, even under the
restrictions imposed by the Rule for
permitted transportation, constitutes a
potential threat to public safety. He explained
that premises license holders "are just as
susceptible as anyone else to stressful
situations," including driving situations that
can lead to road rage, "crowd situations,
demonstrations, family disputes," and other
situations "where it would be better to not
have the presence of a firearm." Accordingly,
he stated, the City has a legitimate need to
control the presence of firearms in public,

When applying intermediate scrutiny under
the Second Amendment, "the key question is
whether the statute[] at issue [is] substantially
related to the achievement of an important
governmental interest.
To survive intermediate scrutiny, the
fit between the challenged regulation
[and the government interest] need
only be substantial, not perfect.
Unlike strict scrutiny analysis, we
need not ensure that the statute is
narrowly tailored or the least
restrictive available means to serve
the
stated
governmental
interest. Moreover, we have observed
that state regulation of the right to
bear arms has always been more
robust than analogous regulation of
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especially those held by individuals who
have only a premises license, and not a carry
license. He went on to discuss how "public
safety will be compromised" unless the
regulations concerning when and where
premises licensees can transport their
firearms "can be effectively monitored and
enforced, and are not easily ignored or
susceptible to being violated."

Based on that specific experience, the
License Division restricted the scope of the
premises license to allow for the
transportation of the licensed handgun only
to a firing range within New York City (or,
with the proper additional authorization, to a
designated hunting area). Lunetta explained
the reasoning for the License Division's
decision: "When target practice and shooting
competitions are limited to locations in New
York City the ability to create . . . a fiction[al
legal purpose] is limited." Thus, the City
asserts, limiting the geographic range in
which firearms can be carried allows the City
to promote public safety by better regulating
and minimizing the instances of unlicensed
transport of firearms on city streets.

Indeed, the City produces evidence that it
has, in the past, had difficulty monitoring and
enforcing the limits of the premises license.
Lunetta's affidavit documented "abuses" that
occurred when, prior to adoption of the
current Rule, the City did allow licensees to
carry their handguns to shooting ranges out
of the City. "Examples included, licensees
travel[]ing with loaded firearms, licensees
found with firearms nowhere near the
vicinity of an authorized range, licensees
taking their firearms on airplanes, and
licensees travel[]ing with their firearms
during hours where no authorized range was
open." Based on these abuses, Lunetta
explained, the New York Police Department
was concerned that allowing premises
licensees to transport their firearms anywhere
outside of the City for target practice or
shooting competitions made it "too easy for
them to possess a licensed firearm while
traveling in public, and then if discovered
create an explanation about traveling for
target practice or shooting competition."

In contrast to the City's evidence supporting
the Rule's rationale, the Plaintiffs have
produced scant evidence demonstrating any
burden placed on their protected rights, and
nothing which describes a substantial burden
on those rights. The Plaintiffs have submitted
individual affidavits expressing their desire
to travel to additional locations with their
handguns, and their decision not to
participate in certain shooting competitions
outside of the City. But, as we have stated,
the Plaintiffs are still free to participate in
those shooting competitions with a rented
firearm, and to obtain licenses for handguns
in their second homes, and the Plaintiffs have
presented no evidence indicating that this
understanding is mistaken. Additionally, the
Plaintiffs present no evidence that the firing
ranges that they wish to access outside the
City are significantly less expensive or more
accessible than those in the City. Even if the
Plaintiffs did provide this evidence, they

According to Lunetta's affidavit, the New
York Police Department concluded that
officers cannot be expected to verify whether
a licensee stopped with a firearm was, in fact,
traveling to a firing range outside of the City.
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would still need to demonstrate that
practicing with one's own handgun provides
better training than practicing with a rented
gun of like model, and the Plaintiffs fail to
even assert this fact.

The Plaintiffs next argue that Rule 523 violates
the
dormant Commerce
Clause because
it
hinders
interstate
commerce. However, the Supreme Court has
"recogniz[ed] that incidental burdens on
interstate commerce may be unavoidable
when a State legislates to safeguard the health
and safety of its people." Our inquiry "must
be directed to determining whether [the
challenged statute] is basically a protectionist
measure, or whether it can fairly be viewed
as a law directed to legitimate local concerns,
with effects upon interstate commerce that
are only incidental." We laid out the
framework for this inquiry in Town of
Southold v. Town of East Hampton:

In light of the City's evidence that the Rule
was specifically created to protect public
safety and to limit the presence of firearms,
licensed only to specific premises, on City
streets, and the dearth of evidence presented
by the Plaintiffs in support of their arguments
that the Rule imposes substantial burdens on
their protected rights, we find that the City
has met its burden of showing a substantial fit
between the Rule and the City's interest in
promoting public safety.
Constitutional review of state and local gun
control will often involve difficult balancing
of the individual's constitutional right to keep
and bear arms against the states' obligation to
"prevent armed mayhem in public places."
This is not such a case. The City has a clear
interest in protecting public safety through
regulating the possession of firearms in
public, and has adduced "evidence that fairly
supports [the] rationale" behind the Rule. The
burdens imposed by the Rule do not
substantially affect the exercise of
core Second Amendment rights, and the Rule
makes a contribution to an important state
interest in public safety substantial enough to
easily justify the insignificant and indirect
costs
it
imposes
on Second
Amendment interests. Accordingly, Rule 523 survives intermediate scrutiny.
II. Rule
5-23 Does
the Commerce Clause.

Not

In analyzing a challenged local law
under
the
dormant Commerce
Clause, we first determine whether it
clearly
discriminates
against
interstate commerce in favor of
intrastate commerce, or whether it
regulates evenhandedly with only
incidental effects on interstate
commerce. . . . We then apply the
appropriate level of scrutiny. A law
that clearly discriminates against
interstate commerce in favor of
intrastate commerce is virtually
invalid per se and will survive only if
it is demonstrably justified by a valid
factor unrelated to economic
protectionism. A law that only
incidentally
burdens
interstate
commerce is subject to the more
permissive balancing test under Pike
v. Bruce Church, Inc., and will be
struck down if the burden imposed on

Violate
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interstate commerce clearly exceeds
the putative local gains.

Plaintiffs have offered no evidence of
discriminatory effect aside from their
statements that they, personally, have
"refrained from attending any shooting
events with [their] handgun[s] that take place
outside of the City of New York." They do
not assert, for example, that they have
refrained from attending all shooting events
outside the City; they aver only that (in
compliance with the Rule) they have
refrained from attending such events with
their premises-licensed handguns.
Even if we were to assume for the sake of
argument, however, that the Plaintiffs have
offered
sufficient
evidence
of
a
discriminatory effect to raise a substantial
dormant Commerce Clause question, we
would nonetheless conclude that the Rule is
"demonstrably justified by a valid factor
unrelated to economic protectionism." The
Plaintiffs themselves offer a useful
comparison, arguing that the Rule functions
in the same way as a law requiring New York
City residents to use their tennis rackets only
at in-City tennis courts. Of course, tennis
rackets present none of the public safety risks
that firearms do, and against which states
have a legitimate interest in protecting
themselves. Thus, there could be no public
health justification for a law limiting the
transportation of tennis rackets, whereas here
the Rule clearly focuses on minimizing the
risks of gun violence and "prevent[ing]
armed mayhem in public places.” While such
a justification might theoretically be shown
to be pretextual, the Plaintiffs have provided
no evidence that the true intent or function of
the Rule was protectionist. Accordingly, we
conclude that the Rule does not discriminate
against interstate commerce.

The Plaintiffs argue that the Rule
discriminates against interstate commerce by
prohibiting them "from engaging in the
interstate commercial activity of traveling
with their handguns to patronize firing ranges
in states beyond the borders of New York
City." "A clearly discriminatory law may
operate in three ways: (1) by discriminating
against interstate commerce on its face; (2)
by harboring a discriminatory purpose; or (3)
by discriminating in its effect." In our view,
the Rule does not offend in any of these ways.
The Rule does not facially discriminate
against interstate commerce, as it does not
prohibit a premises licensee from patronizing
an out-of-state firing range or going to outof-state shooting competitions. The Plaintiffs
are free to patronize firing ranges outside of
New York City, and outside of New York
State; they simply cannot do so with their
premises-licensed firearm.
The Plaintiffs also present no evidence that
the purpose of the New York City rule was to
serve as a protectionist measure in favor of
the City's firing-range industry. To the
contrary, as discussed above, the Rule is
designed to protect the health and safety of
the City's residents. It is therefore directed to
legitimate local concerns, with only
incidental effects upon interstate commerce.
Finally, the Plaintiffs have not convinced us
that the Rule violates the dormant Commerce
Clause by creating a discriminatory effect on
interstate commerce. We note, first, that the
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Additionally, the Plaintiffs contend that Rule
5-23 has an impermissible extraterritorial
effect because it attempts to control
economic activity that is fully outside of New
York City. But Rule 5-23 does not govern
extraterritorial conduct in any way. As noted
above, the Plaintiffs are free to patronize outof-state firing ranges and to use firearms for
target practice or competitive sporting events
anywhere in the country or beyond; they
simply may not transport the firearm licensed
to them for possession at a particular New
York premises to such locations. To the
extent that the Rule has any effect on conduct
occurring outside the City, "[t]he mere fact
that state action may have repercussions
beyond state lines is of no judicial
significance so long as the action is not within
that domain which the Constitution
forbids." An
ordinance
may
be
unconstitutional when it regulates commerce
that takes place fully outside its borders. But
"the Commerce
Clause's
ban
on
extraterritorial regulation must be applied
carefully so as not to invalidate many state
laws that have permissible extraterritorial
effects." Here, the Rule directly governs only
activity within New York City, in order to
protect the safety of the City's residents. Any
extraterritorial impact is incidental to this
purpose and thus "is of no judicial
significance."

instrumentalities of interstate commerce in
doing so, occupies a position fundamental to
the concept of our Federal Union. It is a right
that has been firmly established and
repeatedly recognized." This Court has
"acknowledge[d] a correlative constitutional
right to travel within a state." However, that
local regulations "[m]erely hav[e] an effect
on travel is not sufficient to raise an issue of
constitutional
dimension."
The
constitutional right is implicated only when
the statute "actually deters such travel, or
when impedance of travel is its primary
objective, or when it uses any classification
which serves to penalize the exercise of that
right.”
The Plaintiffs' right to travel argument fails
for much the same reasons as does their
parallel invocation of the dormant Commerce
Clause. Nothing in the Rule prevents the
Plaintiffs from engaging in intrastate or
interstate travel as they wish. The Plaintiffs
may go where they like, and in particular may
attend and participate in shooting
tournaments or similar events held outside
the City of New York. The regulation
concerns only their ability to remove the
specific handgun licensed to their
residences from the premises for which they
hold the license. The Constitution protects
the right to travel, not the right to travel
armed.

III. Rule 5-23 Does Not Violate the Right
to Travel.

The Rule was not designed to impede
interstate travel and the history behind it
"demonstrates that its purpose was not to
impede travel but to protect the welfare of
[city] residents." Nor does the Rule impose a
significant disincentive to travel, any more

The Plaintiffs next invoke the constitutional
right to travel interstate. "The constitutional
right to travel from one State to another, and
necessarily to use the highways and other
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than any other regulation that limits the
possession in one jurisdiction of items that
may be more broadly permitted in
another. Any incidental impact on travel does
not create a constitutional violation because
"[i]f every infringement on interstate travel
violates
the
traveler's
fundamental
constitutional rights, any governmental act
that limits the ability to travel interstate, such
as placing a traffic light before an interstate
bridge, would raise a constitutional
issue." State and local regulations that have
an indirect effect on some travel impose
merely "minor restrictions on travel [that]
simply do not amount to the denial of a
fundamental right."

down the street or meeting one's friends at a
shopping mall - but such a kernel is not
sufficient to bring the activity within the
protection
of
the First
Amendment.” "Typically
a
person
possessing a gun has no intent to convey a
particular message, nor is any particular
message likely to be understood by those who
view it." The Plaintiffs fail to identify what
expressive activity they would engage in with
their guns and argue instead that they seek
"participation in recreational and competitive
shooting events." Gathering with others for a
purely social and recreational activity,
whether it is dancing, Sanitation & Recycling
Indus., or shooting guns, does not constitute
expressive association
under
the First
Amendment. Accordingly, the ability to join
a specific gun club is not protected
association under the First Amendment.

IV. Rule 5-23 Does Not Violate the First
Amendment.
The Plaintiffs argue that the Rule violates
their First Amendment right to expressive
association by (1) curtailing their ability
to join the gun club of their choice and (2)
forcing them to join a gun club in New York
City. We disagree.

Even if we were to assume that engaging in
firearms training or competition qualifies as
expressive association, as repeatedly
discussed above, the Plaintiffs are not
prevented from engaging in such activities,
wherever or with whomever they choose to
do so.

The Plaintiffs fail to demonstrate how the
ability to join a specific gun club, or the
ability to transport their licensed firearms to
a shooting club outside of New York City,
qualifies as expressive association. " The
Constitution does not recognize a generalized
right of social association. The right
generally will not apply, for example, to
business relationships; chance encounters in
dance halls; or paid rendezvous with
escorts." "It is possible to find some kernel
of expression in almost every activity a
person undertakes - for example, walking

First, nothing in the Rule forbids the
Plaintiffs from joining and associating with
gun clubs outside the City. The Plaintiffs
claim that the Rule "impedes their right to
associate with whom they choose," but the
Rule does nothing of the sort. The Plaintiffs
remain free to associate with whomever they
choose. They may join any club they like
outside of New York City. To the extent that
the gun clubs the Plaintiffs wish to join "take
positions on public questions or perform any

683

of the other similar activities" characteristic
of expressive association, the Plaintiffs are
not inhibited from joining in those activities.
The Rule limits only their ability to carry the
handgun that is licensed for a specific
premises outside of those premises.

expressive activity of any kind, let alone
activity to which the Plaintiffs object. Nor
have the Plaintiffs shown that these ranges
have selected their particular fee structures as
a byproduct of the Rule, or that their fee
structures reflect any ideological or
expressive content to which the Plaintiffs, by
utilizing the range, can be taken as assenting.

The Plaintiffs also contend that the Rule
constitutes "forced association" because it
"effectively coerce[s]" them to join clubs that
they "may prefer not to join." That "effective"
coercion is not coercion at all: the Rule does
not require the Plaintiffs to join a gun club in
New York City. The licensing scheme does
not require the Plaintiffs to complete firearms
training, and even if it did, they have access
to Olinville Arms, which is open to the
public, and the Richmond Boro Gun Club,
which is available to non-members for
weekly shooting competitions.

Accordingly, the Rule does not violate
the First Amendment.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the
district court's judgment.

Regardless, the Plaintiffs are incorrect that
there is any constitutional injury at stake in
the question of "membership" in a firing
range or gun club. As noted above, the
Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that their
firearms training is expressive association,
and actually concede that it is recreational
activity. Moreover, the decision of whether to
charge a membership fee or a fee based on
hourly usage is a business decision of the club
or range. The Plaintiffs have offered no
evidence that the firing ranges in New York
City that structure themselves as clubs
requiring "membership" either engage in (or
require their members to engage in)
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“Supreme Court Accepts First Gun Case in Nearly a Decade”
The Wall Street Journal
Jess Bravin
January 22, 2019
The Supreme Court waded into the debate
over gun rights for the first time in nearly a
decade, agreeing Tuesday to hear a case over
whether—and to what degree—lawmakers
can restrict the right to carry guns outside the
home.

in place as lower-court proceedings continue.
Separately, the court took no action for now
on
an
administration
appeal
of
rulings blocking
Republican
President
Trump’s planned cancellation of the
Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals
program, or DACA, an initiative of former
President Obama, a Democrat, that benefited
illegal immigrants who came to the U.S. as
children.

The case, a review of New York City
regulations that curtail the transportation of
guns, offers the court’s newly bolstered
conservative majority an opportunity to
expand the constitutional right to bear arms
beyond a pair of decisions that, beginning in
2008, found the Second Amendment allows
individuals to keep handguns in the home for
self-defense. Although New York City’s
ordinance is unusual—gun advocates behind
the suit call it an “extreme outlier”—the
implications could stretch beyond the city’s
five boroughs.

The gun case is expected to be heard in the
court’s next term, which begins in October as
the 2020 presidential campaign comes into
focus. The spotlight is expected to turn to Mr.
Trump’s two appointees, Justices Neil
Gorsuch and Brett Kavanaugh, who were
strongly backed by the National Rifle
Association and other gun advocacy groups.
These organizations have been frustrated as
the high court largely ignored lower court
rulings upholding the vast majority of state
and local gun regulations.

At issue is “the right to have a gun in public.
It’s the biggest open question in Second
Amendment law today,” said Adam Winkler,
a law professor at the University of
California, Los Angeles, and author of
“Gunfight,” a history of firearms regulations.

On a closely divided court, the pivotal vote
could rest with Chief Justice John Roberts,
who backed the expansion of gun rights in
prior opinions but kept silent as other
conservatives, including Justices Clarence
Thomas and Samuel Alito, fumed over the
court’s refusal in recent years to review other
weapons regulations upheld by lower courts.

In other court developments on Tuesday, the
justices intervened to allow Trump
administration restrictions
on
military
service by transgender individuals to be put
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But the spotlight may shine particularly
bright on Justice Kavanaugh, whose
expansive view of gun rights while a lowercourt judge came into play during
confirmation hearings last fall. In 2011, while
serving on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit, then-Judge
Kavanaugh dissented from an opinion
upholding a D.C. law prohibiting
semiautomatic rifles it classified as “assault
weapons” within city limits and barring
large-capacity ammunition magazines.

our right to protect our own people would
hurt this city deeply.”
Tom King, president of the New York Rifle
& Pistol Association, which brought the
appeal, characterized the city’s rules as
almost senseless. “This is more of a restraintof-travel case than it is a Second Amendment
case,” he said. “The city of New York will
not allow a licensed gun owner to travel
outside the five boroughs” with a pistol.
According to the petition, there are seven
shooting ranges in NYC available to the
public. Mr. King said hundreds more are
located in nearby New Jersey and New York
state.

The majority opinion by Judge Douglas
Ginsburg found the D.C. law a justifiable
policy for “protecting police officers and
controlling crime.” Judge Kavanaugh,
however, wrote that “the Constitution
disables the government from employing
certain means to prevent, deter, or detect
violent crime.”

Last year, the Second U.S. Circuit Court of
Appeals, in New York, upheld the city
ordinance from a challenge filed by several
gun owners and the state rifle group, which is
affiliated with the NRA.

New York City issues two kinds of gun
licenses, “carry” permits that allow
individuals to bring along their weapons, and
“premises” permits that are specific to a
location. Individuals with premises permits
can take their weapons from home only for
limited purposes, such as target practice at a
shooting range within city limits or to a
designated in-state hunting area.

The opinion, by Judge Gerard Lynch, said the
city provided evidence that its rules promote
public safety, including an affidavit from a
police commander that “premises license
holders ‘are just as susceptible as anyone else
to stressful situations,’ including driving
situations that can lead to road rage, ‘crowd
situations, demonstrations, family disputes,’
and other situations ‘where it would be better
to not have the presence of a firearm.’”

“We believe that our gun laws protect people
in this city, and law enforcement in this city
believes that, too, so we’ll fight vigorously to
protect what we have,” said New York City
Mayor Bill de Blasio, a Democrat, at a
Tuesday press conference. “I’m absolutely
concerned because anything that takes away

In their appeal to the Supreme Court, gun
owners argued that the city’s law, while
predating recent precedents expanding access
to weapons, exemplified state and local
efforts to restrict firearms beyond
constitutional limits.
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“Unable to flatly ban the possession of
handguns
in
the
home,
many
local governments have responded by
erecting obstacles to acquiring them,” they
said. The petition lists other measures they
consider improper, including a $25 tax on
firearms sales imposed in Chicago and
Seattle and a $5 fee California collects from
gun purchasers to fund police.

and local weapons regulations, filing more
than 1,000 lawsuits seeking to expand access
to guns and ammunition. But lower courts
found nearly all such measures fell within
Heller’s allowance for reasonable weapons
regulations. According to a study published
last year in the Duke Law Journal Online, less
than 10% of such challenges prevailed in
state and federal courts.

The Second Amendment was ratified in
1791, but it took more than two centuries
before
the
Supreme
Court,
with
conservatives prevailing in a 5-4 vote along
ideological lines, found that the right to “keep
and bear Arms” extended to individuals for
self-defense, rather than falling within
service in a state’s “well regulated Militia.”

A co-author of the study, Duke University
law professor Joseph Blocher, said lowercourt opinions display “a remarkable amount
of consistency in how they evaluate gun
regulations.” Typically, he said, they employ
a two-part test, first evaluating whether a rule
burdens a Second Amendment right and, if
so, whether that burden can be justified.

The 2008 opinion, District of Columbia v.
Heller, by the late Justice Antonin Scalia,
struck down an effective ban on handgun
possession within Washington’s city limits.
Two years later, in 2010, the court expanded
that holding beyond the federal enclave to
limit states’ power to regulate firearms.
Armed with the Heller precedent, gun-rights
advocates launched a fusillade against state

For jurists, the most important decision the
high court may make is whether that
approach passes muster. Justice Kavanaugh,
for one, has urged a different method,
focusing instead on whether a law is
consistent with the “text, history and
tradition” of American gun laws.
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“Fearing Supreme Court Loss, New York Tried to Make Gun Case Vanish”
The New York Times
Adam Liptak
May 27, 2019
A couple of weeks ago, the New York Police
Department held an unusual public hearing.
Its purpose was to make a Supreme Court
case disappear.

one of seven shooting ranges in the city. But
it prohibits them from taking their guns to
second homes and shooting ranges outside
the city, even when the guns are unloaded and
locked in containers separate from
ammunition.

In January, the court agreed to hear a Second
Amendment challenge to a New York City
gun regulation. The city, fearing a loss that
would endanger gun control laws across the
nation, responded by moving to change the
regulation. The idea was to make the case
moot.

The city’s proposed changes, likely to take
effect in a month or so, would remove those
restrictions. Whether they would also end the
case is another matter.
Until the Supreme Court agreed to hear the
dispute, the city had defended the regulation
vigorously and successfully, winning in two
lower courts. In inviting public comments on
the proposed changes, the Police Department
said it continued to believe the regulation
“furthers an important public-safety interest.”

The move required seeking comments from
the public, in writingand at the hearing. Gun
rights advocates were not happy.
“This law should not be changed,” Hallet
Bruestle wrote in a comment submitted
before the hearing. “Not because it is a good
law; it is blatantly unconstitutional. No, it
should not be changed since this is a clear
tactic to try to moot the Scotus case that is
specifically looking into this law.”

Still, the city seems determined to give the
plaintiffs — three city residents and the New
York State Rifle and Pistol Association —
everything they had sued for. The plaintiffs,
in turn, do not seem to want to take yes for an
answer.

David Enlow made a similar point. “This is a
very transparent attempt,” he wrote, “to move
the goal post in the recent Supreme Court
case.”

There is a precedent for the city’s strategy,
from a surprising source. The National Rifle
Association tried a similar tactic in
connection with the 2008 Supreme Court
case that ended up revolutionizing Second

The regulation allows residents with socalled premises licenses to take their guns to
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Amendment law, District of Columbia v.
Heller.

The court’s decision in the Heller case
established an individual right to own guns,
imperiling gun control laws around the
nation. But aside from one follow-up case in
2010, the court has not elaborated on the
scope of the right.

The N.R.A. was initially skittish about the
case, which was brought by a scrappy group
of libertarian lawyers led by Robert A. Levy.
“The N.R.A.’s interference in this process set
us back and almost killed the case,” Mr.
Levy said in 2007. “It was a very
acrimonious relationship.”

With the departure of Justice Anthony M.
Kennedy and the arrival of Justice Brett M.
Kavanaugh, the court seems ready to start. It
agreed to hear the New York case, New York
State Rifle and Pistol Association v. City of
New York, No. 18-280, just months after
Justice Kavanaugh joined the court. Unless
the case is dismissed, it will be argued in the
fall.

As Mr. Levy and his colleagues were
persuading a federal appeals court to strike
down part of Washington’s tough gun control
law, the N.R.A. tried to short-circuit the case.
“The N.R.A.’s next step was to renew its
lobbying effort in Congress to repeal the D.C.
gun ban,” Mr. Levy wrote in 2008 in a
Federalist Society publication. “Ordinarily
that would have been a good thing, but not
this time.”

The question of whether the changes to the
city’s gun regulation will make the case moot
is a hard one. The city lost an initial skirmish
at the court last month when the justices
turned down its request to suspend the filing
of briefs while changes to the regulation were
considered.

“Repealing D.C.’s ban would have rendered
the Heller litigation moot,” he wrote. “After
all, no one can challenge a law that no longer
exists.”

The plaintiffs opposed that request. “To state
the obvious, a proposed amendment is not
law,” they wrote.

Only an intensive countereffort kept the case
alive, Mr. Levy wrote.

The changes to the regulations will happen
soon enough, though, and the Supreme Court
will then have to consider whether there is
anything left to decide.

“After expending considerable time and
energy in the halls of Congress, we were able,
with help, to frustrate congressional
consideration of the N.R.A.-sponsored bill,”
he wrote.
The N.R.A. came around in the end. In the
Supreme Court, it supported the suit, working
closely with the lawyers who had brought it.

The court has said the “voluntary cessation”
of government policies does not make cases
moot if the government remains free to
reinstate them after the cases are dismissed.
But formal changes in laws may be a
different matter.
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To hear the plaintiffs tell it, the court should
not reward cynical gamesmanship.
“The proposed rule making,” they wrote,
“appears to be the product not of a change of
heart, but rather of a carefully calculated
effort to frustrate this court’s review.”
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“New York eased gun law hopeful Supreme Court would drop Second Amendment
case – but that hasn’t happened yet”
The Washington Post
Robert Barnes
August 11, 2019
As the nation renews debate over gun control,
the Supreme Court must decide whether to
press ahead with a Second Amendment case
it has accepted for the coming term, its first
in a decade.

New York City. He cited Chief Justice John
G. Roberts Jr.’s dissenting opinion on a
mootness question in an unrelated case in
2016, in which he said the court may not rule
on a plaintiff’s entitlement to relief simply
because he “won’t take ‘yes’ for an answer.’”

Gun-control groups operate under a no-newsis-good-news approach to the Supreme
Court, leery of giving what they view as a
strengthened conservative majority the
chance to expand gun rights and weaken
restrictive laws.

Those who brought the challenge said the city
should not be allowed to get rid of the case
and the constitutional questions it raises by
making a last-minute change after years of
resistance.

In New York State Rifle & Pistol Association
v. City of New York, which the court accepted
in January, the city and state of New York
appear to agree. They have essentially
surrendered, changing the restrictions at issue
even though the city successfully defended
them before a district judge and a federal
appeals court.

The court has told both sides to continue
filing briefs and that it will consider New
York’s request to dismiss the case on Oct. 1,
a week before the new term begins.
Any Supreme Court decision on guns will be
magnified in a presidential election year and
with the backdrop of the mass shootings that
have plagued the country. Whether the recent
attacks in El Paso and Dayton, Ohio, will
affect the justices’ decision is anyone’s
guess, experts say.

New York says it has given those who hold
licenses to have guns on their premises
exactly what they asked for — a greater
ability to transport their weapons through and
outside the city — and there no longer is a
controversy for the Supreme Court to settle.

“They’re human beings and this can’t help
but color a little bit how they see this case,”
said Adam Winkler, a UCLA law professor
who has written extensively about Second
Amendment litigation.

“New legislation or regulations giving
plaintiffs all they seek moots the case,” wrote
Zachary W. Carter, corporation counsel for
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On how to decide when a case is moot, he
said, “I think the Supreme Court has enough
wiggle room to go in either direction.”

that has been cited by lower courts in
upholding state and municipal restrictions.
Kavanaugh, by contrast, was strongly
endorsed by the National Rifle Association.
In 2011, as a judge on the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, he dissented
from a decision upholding the District’s ban
on some semiautomatic rifles and a gun
registration requirement.

The New York restrictions were unique — no
other jurisdiction has such strict rules on
transporting a weapon. But the case is
significant because it marked the first
accepted challenge since the Supreme Court
recognized an individual right to gun
ownership in 2008’s District of Columbia v.
Heller and ruled two years later that the
Second Amendment governed state and local
gun laws as well as those adopted by the
federal government.

He reasoned that while the Heller decision
agreed that government may prohibit
“dangerous and unusual” weapons not in
common use, the guns at issue did not meet
that definition.

Since then, the court has declined to hear
challenges to all manner of gun-control
measures, such as bans on certain militarystyle weapons and state restrictions that make
it extremely difficult to obtain a permit to
carry a gun outside the home.

“It follows from Heller’s protection of semiautomatic handguns that semi-automatic
rifles are also constitutionally protected and
that D.C.’s ban on them is unconstitutional,”
Kavanaugh wrote.
New York’s approach to get rid of the case is
similar to what some gun-control advocates
had hoped the city of Washington would have
done with its restrictive handgun policy that
led to the Heller decision. The District’s
mayor at the time, Adrian Fenty, decided to
press ahead after the D.C. Circuit ruled
against the city, resulting with the Supreme
Court finding an individual right to gun
ownership for protection in one’s home.

In some cases, it has upheld gun restrictions,
prompting complaints chiefly from Justice
Clarence Thomas about the way his
colleagues consider the Second Amendment.
“We treat no other constitutional right so
cavalierly,” he wrote in 2016.
Justice Neil M. Gorsuch has joined Thomas
in saying the court should take more Second
Amendment cases. But the momentum really
has increased since Justice Brett M.
Kavanaugh replaced Justice Anthony M.
Kennedy last year.

The gun violence reform movement thought
D.C. should amend the law rather than take it
to the Supreme Court, Winkler said. “The
result was disastrous for them,” he said.

Kennedy was part of the five-member Heller
majority, but his vote was a shaky one,
according to the late justice John Paul
Stevens’s memoir. Stevens said he believed
Kennedy insisted on language in the opinion

If the court proceeds with the New York case,
it could decide it very narrowly, or it could
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resolve long-standing questions about the
right to a gun outside the home.

If the court decides there is no longer a reason
to hear the New York case, there are others in
the wings.

The New York gun association, represented
by Paul D. Clement, who was solicitor
general during the George W. Bush
administration, said the city’s “undisguised
effort to avoid a precedent-setting loss and to
frustrate this court’s discretionary review
falls short by every measure.”

Some more clearly present the issue of the
right to carry a weapon outside the home.
There are still legal challenges to President
Trump’s
decision to ban bump stocks. There is a case
challenging California’s Unsafe Handgun
Act.

The city battled for years and relented only
when the Supreme Court took the case, the
association argues. New York officials said
the gun owners should simply acknowledge
that they won.

Recently, Remington Arms asked the court to
review a Connecticut Supreme Court ruling
that a lawsuit brought against the company by
a survivor and relatives of victims of the
Sandy Hook Elementary School shooting
could go forward. The company says it is
protected under federal law from such suits.

“A primary purpose of litigation like this [is]
to pressure the governmental actors to agree
to a demand,” the city wrote. “All that matters
is whether the plaintiffs’ purported injuries
have been redressed. If so, there is no longer
a case or controversy.”
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“NRA, gun rights group using New York City rule to seek expansion of Second
Amendment in Supreme Court”
USA Today
Richard Wolf
May 22, 2019
Gun rights groups are using New York City
restrictions that may be repealed as a rallying
cry to press the Supreme Court for a
major expansion of its Second Amendment
precedents.

justices," says Ilya Shapiro of the libertarian
Cato Institute.
It's been more than a decade since the
Supreme Court ruled that the Second
Amendment protects the right of citizens to
keep guns at home for self-defense. The
justices later extended that right to states and
localities.

The effort is based on the hope that the
court's new, five-member conservative
majority will be more sympathetic to gun
rights, in much the same way that antiabortion groups are hoping for a high court
crackdown on reproductive rights.

But Associate Justice Antonin Scalia's most
famous opinion in District of Columbia v.
Heller never defined the breadth of that right.
He acknowledged the ruling did not uphold
“a right to keep and carry any weapon
whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and
for whatever purpose."

Conservatives' efforts extend beyond guns
and abortion to other pet peeves, such as
affirmative action and immigrant rights. In all
of those areas, activists are pushing lawsuits
in the court's direction with renewed vigor.

Gun rights groups, led by the National Rifle
Association, have sought for years to win the
next battle: a broad right to carry weapons
outside the home. Forty-five states allow that
to some degree, though 15 require special
licenses or permits. But several large states,
including California, Florida, Illinois and
New York, have prohibitions.

While most of the legal action began before
President Donald Trump's thus far successful
effort to appoint conservative judges to
federal courts – including Associate Justices
Neil Gorsuch and Brett Kavanaugh to the
Supreme Court – the chances for victory have
vastly improved.
“People who want to have test cases and
advance a certain legal agenda were
definitely emboldened by Donald Trump's
election and his ability to appoint two

The high court has refused for nearly a
decade to jump back into the gun debate,
declining at least eight opportunities in recent
years. It let stand Chicago's semiautomatic
weapons ban and a variety of prohibitions
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against carrying guns in public, from New
Jersey to California. It refused to secondguess age limits for carrying guns in Texas
and rules for disabling or locking guns when
not in use in San Francisco.

last week on proposed changes that would
allow travel outside the city. A decision is
expected within weeks.
But gun rights groups argued in court papers
this month that the justices should not dismiss
the case even if the restrictions are lifted.
Instead, they urged an expansion of Second
Amendment rights.

Now gun rights groups hope Kavanaugh's
replacement of Associate Justice Anthony
Kennedy, the court's swing vote, could turn
the tide.

"The historical understanding of the right to
keep and bear arms removes any remaining
doubt that it extends outside the home,"
the NRA said.

"The NRA and the challengers won’t be
satisfied if New York repeals its law," says
Adam Winkler, a UCLA School of Law
professor and author of a book on the gun
rights battle. "They want the Supreme Court
to step in and announce stronger protections
for gun rights under the Second
Amendment."

"The primary need for self defense,
unquestionably protected by the Second and
Fourteenth Amendments, is typically not in
the home but outside of the home," attorneys
general from 24 Republican-led states said.
They noted that only about one in five violent
crimes occurs at home.

City moves to repeal rules
Already, the court has scheduled the New
York City case for next fall. The city's rules
generally block gun owners with possession
licenses from transporting their guns outside
the home, except to one of seven shooting
ranges inside city limits. The guns must be
unloaded and locked up, with ammunition
carried separately.

The New York State Rifle & Pistol
Association, which brought the case against
the city, accused it of a "nakedly transparent
effort to evade this court’s review" by
moving to ease the restrictions. The Cato
Institute warned that the rules could be
changed "just long enough for the case to be
dismissed."

Gun owners who sought to take their firearms
to second homes or shooting ranges outside
the city challenged the rules in federal court,
but they were upheld last year by the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.

But Winkler notes the challengers only
sought an injunction to stop New York's law
from being enforced. If it's repealed, he says,
"the case should be moot, because the
challengers will have effectively won."

Sensing a losing hand at the Supreme Court,
gun control groups urged the city to change
its rules in hopes a quick surrender would
prompt the justices to drop the case. The
city's police department held a public hearing

Trump administration takes stand
The Trump administration also urged the
court to strike down the New York City rules
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by following the "text, history and tradition"
of the Second Amendment and gun rights and
regulations. But in a more conciliatory pose,
Solicitor General Noel Francisco said
challengers "do not seek a right to transport
loaded handguns for self-defense in public."

justices avoid a broad constitutional ruling
that expands Second Amendment rights,
particularly since the city is moving to
change its rules.
"Our concern is that petitioners are asking the
court to issue a broad ruling that would entitle
people to carry loaded firearms in public to
use in armed confrontation," says Jonathan
Lowy, chief counsel at the Brady
Campaign to Prevent Gun Violence. "That
would have a broad effect on a wide array of
gun laws around the country."

Kavanaugh's addition to the court in October
may have given the other conservatives the
vote they need to win future cases. As a
federal appeals court judge, he dissented in
2011 from a decision upholding the District
of Columbia's ban on semi-automatic rifles,
insisting that courts should use the "text,
history and tradition" test.

The Giffords Law Center to Prevent Gun
Violence similarly sidestepped taking a
position on New York City's law. Instead, it
urged the justices to avoid "adopting a
standard that would preclude sensible
regulation and save lives."

Several gun control groups didn't wait for
New York City's response, due at the court in
August. Instead, they filed briefs this month
"in support of neither party" to urge that the
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“A Call to Arms at the Supreme Court: Conservative judges worry that the Second
Amendment has become ‘a second-class right.’”
The New York Times
Linda Greenhouse
January 3, 2019
A specter is haunting the Supreme Court —
disrespect for the Second Amendment.
Perhaps you haven’t realized that the
Supreme Court’s disinclination to expand on
its landmark 2008 decision creating an
individual right to gun ownership means that
the justices are treating the Second
Amendment as a “second-class right.” A
“watered-down right.” A “disfavored right.”

second-class right,” which he said the court
would not do.
But it is Justice Thomas who has taken up the
phrase as a weapon, using it in a series of
opinions over the past four years to accuse his
colleagues of failing in their duty to keep
pushing back against limitations on gun
ownership and use. The opinions were all
dissents from the court’s decisions not to hear
particular gun-rights appeals.

If you are unaware of these outlandish
claims, then you haven’t tuned into the rising
chorus of judicial voices demanding more
from the Supreme Court than gun fanciers
already won in that intensely disputed 5-to-4
decision a decade ago, District of Columbia
v. Heller.

In 2015, for example, he wrote that the
United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit had been wrong to uphold an
Illinois city’s ban on assault weapons, and
that by refusing to hear the appeal, his
colleagues had failed to “prevent the Seventh
Circuit from relegating the Second
Amendment to a second-class right.”

Why is this happening, and why now? To
understand why the “second-class right”
meme is suddenly penetrating the judicial
conversation, we have to begin with Justice
Clarence Thomas. He is not the first member
of the current Supreme Court to use the
phrase; Justice Samuel Alito Jr. used it in his
2010 opinion that extended the analysis of the
Heller decision, which had applied only to
Washington, D.C., as a federal enclave, to the
states. The court was being asked, Justice
Alito wrote in McDonald v. City of Chicago,
“to treat the right recognized in Heller as a

Last year, objecting to the court’s decision
not to hear a challenge to California’s 10-day
waiting period for gun purchases, Justice
Thomas mused that “I suspect that four
members of this court would vote to review a
10-day waiting period for abortions.” He
declared, “The right to keep and bear arms is
apparently this court’s constitutional
orphan.”
In another opinion, this time joined by Justice
Neil Gorsuch, Justice Thomas said it was
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“indefensible” and “untenable” for the Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit to have
upheld California’s ban on carrying
concealed weapons. By turning down the
appeal, he wrote, the justices were enabling
“the treatment of the Second Amendment as
a disfavored right.” And in a remarkable
concluding paragraph to his eight-page
opinion, he added:

majorities, probably Justice Anthony M.
Kennedy. Or maybe he was just kicking the
can down the road. In any event, it’s certainly
not the case that justices who decline to
overturn a 10-day waiting period can be
accurately labeled hypocrites who are content
to hide in their marble palace while leaving
the populace unprotected.
Nor is the Second Amendment absolutism
that Justice Thomas is calling for reflected in
the way the Supreme Court interprets most
other constitutional guarantees. Judge Bruce
Selya of the Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit made this point in a majority opinion
in November rejecting a challenge to a
provision of the Massachusetts gun licensing
statute. “Even though the Second
Amendment right is fundamental,” Judge
Selya, an appointee of President Ronald
Reagan, wrote in his opinion for a unanimous
panel, “the plaintiffs have offered us no valid
reason to treat it more deferentially than other
important constitutional rights.” That
decision, Gould v. Morgan, will shortly
be appealed to the Supreme Court.

“For those of us who work in marbled halls,
guarded constantly by a vigilant and
dedicated police force, the guarantees of the
Second Amendment might seem antiquated
and superfluous. But the Framers made a
clear choice: They reserved to all Americans
the right to bear arms for self-defense. I do
not think we should stand by idly while a
state denies its citizens that right, particularly
when their very lives may depend on it.”
By calling attention to Justice Thomas’s
Second Amendment crusade, I want to make
four points.
First, he’s simply wrong. The court decided
Heller to vindicate what the majority
described as a “core” Second Amendment
right — the right of an individual to keep a
handgun at home for self-defense. That’s all.
Whatever else the Second Amendment
enables people to do with their guns was left
open. As Justice Antonin Scalia observed in
his majority opinion, “It is not a right to keep
and carry any weapon whatsoever in any
manner whatsoever and for whatever
purpose.”

My second point is to underscore the role
Justice Thomas plays in creating this
rhetorical tidal wave. He is a Federalist
Society icon and a hero to many young
conservative lawyers, including the 10
former Thomas law clerks whom President
Trump has already appointed to federal
judgeships. (A dozen other former Thomas
clerks hold important nonjudicial positions in
the administration.) They and their
colleagues among the new Trump judges,
many of whom clerked for other conservative
justices, are the ones who are making the
“second-class right” mantra a standard

Maybe Justice Scalia included that and a few
other disclaimers in order to stay within the
comfort zone of a member of his narrowest of
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feature of any Second Amendment dissent —
in other words, not only that a particular
majority opinion is incorrect, but that it is part
of a dangerous trend that the Supreme Court,
by implication if not explicitly, needs to
address right now.

discrimination on the basis of race is to stop
discriminating on the basis of race.”
Judge Ho’s Fifth Circuit colleague Don R.
Willett, another new member of the court,
observed in his own dissenting opinion in the
same case, “The Second Amendment is
neither second class, nor second rate, nor
second tier.” An appeal in that case, Mance v.
Whitaker, is now pending at the Supreme
Court, and the justices will decide this month
or next whether to accept it.

For example, the full 15-member Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit recently refused
to reconsider a decision by a three-judge
panel to uphold the longstanding federal ban
on interstate sales of handguns. Dissenting
from that refusal, Judge James C. Ho, a
former Thomas clerk who joined the Fifth
Circuit last year, cited Justice Thomas’s
opinions in observing, “Yet the Second
Amendment continues to be treated as a
‘second-class’ right.”

Another new judge, Stephanos Bibas,
dissented last month from a decision by a
panel of the Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit that upheld a New Jersey law limiting
a firearm magazine to 10 rounds of
ammunition. He said the state had failed to
provide sufficient evidence that “specifically
links large magazines to mass-shooting
deaths.” Acknowledging that five other
federal circuit courts have also upheld limits
on magazine sizes, Judge Bibas observed that
while judges were understandably concerned
about gun violence, “they err in subjecting
the Second Amendment to different,
watered-down rules and demanding little if
any proof.”

His dissent included a subtle dig at Chief
Justice John Roberts, who notably has not
joined Justice Thomas’s Second Amendment
choir. The government rationale for the ban
on interstate handgun sales is that while
federally licensed firearm dealers can be
expected to know the laws of their own state,
they may not be familiar with laws of other
states and so may not know whether an outof-state purchaser is legally entitled to own a
gun.

“The Second Amendment is an equal part of
the Bill of Rights,” Judge Bibas wrote. “We
may not water it down and balance it away
based on our own sense of wise policy.” That
case is likely to be appealed to the Supreme
Court. The New Jersey affiliate of the
National Rifle Association, which brought
the case, is first seeking review by the full
Third Circuit.

That is not sufficient justification for the ban,
Judge Ho wrote; if dealers could learn their
own state’s laws, they could learn other
states’ laws as well. “Put simply, the way to
require compliance with state handgun laws
is to require compliance with state handgun
laws,” he wrote in a riff on the chief justice’s
much-discussed line in a 2007 school
integration case: “The way to stop
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The 49-year-old Judge Bibas, a former law
professor, won plauditsfor his dissenting
opinion. “It is easy to see why President
Trump chose to appoint him,” said an article
on the website ammoland.com that appeared
under the headline: “Third Circuit: Second
Amendment Is a Second Rate Right.” John O.
McGinnis, a well-known conservative
professor at Northwestern University Law
School, writing on the Law and Liberty
website, called Judge Bibas’s dissent “the
judicial equivalent of a perfect game, a firstround knockout, or a checkmate within 10
moves.” He added, “It will not be the last
opinion of the Trump appellate judges that
will shake the judiciary from its dogmatic
slumber.”

possession of assault rifles to the right to free
speech is a provocative move.

My third point is this: Professor McGinniss
may well be right, at least when it comes to
the Second Amendment. The substitution of
Brett Kavanaugh for Justice Kennedy may do
the trick. On his former court, the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit,
Justice Kavanaugh took an aggressive gunrights position, dissenting in 2011 from a
decision that upheld the district’s ban on
certain assault rifles.

Justice Thomas himself has cited Judge
Kavanaugh’s dissenting opinion favorably. It
would hardly be surprising for Justice
Kavanaugh to return the favor and join the
crusade.

The two conservative judges who made up
the majority on the three-judge panel,
Douglas Ginsburg and Karen LeCraft
Henderson, were sufficiently provoked by
Judge Kavanaugh’s 52-page dissent that they
added to their own opinion an unusual sixpage “appendix” for the specific purpose of
contesting his arguments. “The dissent
mischaracterizes the question before us,”
Judge Ginsburg wrote for himself and Judge
Henderson. “We simply do not read Heller as
foreclosing every ban on every possible subclass of handguns or, for that matter, a ban on
a sub-class of rifles.”

And that brings me to my final point. The
Supreme Court’s appetite for expanding the
Second Amendment, if such an appetite
develops, will be wildly out of sync with the
mood of the country. As The Times reported
last month, based on data compiled by a guncontrol advocacy group, public support for
gun-control measures is surging. State
legislatures passed 69 gun-control measures
in 2018, more than three times the number in
the previous year. More than half the states
enacted at least one, while 90 percent of bills
the National Rifle Association backed at the
state level were defeated.

Calling the majority’s analytical approach to
the case “especially inappropriate,” thenJudge Kavanaugh wrote: “A ban on a class of
arms is not an ‘incidental’ regulation. It is
equivalent to a ban on a category of speech.”
As a matter of constitutional doctrine, I
understand his argument: that a right deemed
by the Supreme Court to be fundamental,
whether under the First Amendment or the
Second, is entitled to the highest level of
judicial protection. Nonetheless, to analogize

Even the Trump administration has caught
the trend, with its announcement last month
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of a ban on bump stocks, the cheap
attachments that turn ordinary rifles into
something close to machine guns and that the
Las Vegas killer used to commit mass murder
a year ago. The ban, to take effect in March,
has already drawn at least two lawsuits.
Perhaps these lawsuits will be a step too far
even for the Second Amendment newbies on
the federal bench. Or maybe not.

Does it matter if the public and the Supreme
Court are running in opposite directions? It’s
good news to anyone who would like to
accelerate the collapse of public confidence
in the one organ of government that at the
moment seems to stand between us and
disaster. For the rest of us, it’s one more thing
to worry about as the new year begins.
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“Trump says NRA is ‘under siege by Cuomo’ after New York AG opens
investigation into gun group”
CNBC
Tucker Higgins
April 29, 2019
President Donald Trump said Monday the
National Rifle Association is “under siege by
Cuomo,” days after New York’s attorney
general opened an inquiry into the gun rights
lobbying organization.

Shortly after Trump spoke to the group, The
Wall Street Journal reported that the NRA’s
longtime leader, Wayne LaPierre, had
informed the board that he was being extorted
and pressured to resign by retired Lt. Col.
Oliver North, another top NRA official.

The president also chided the group for a
leadership fight that has played out in public
in recent days, saying the NRA “must get its
act together quickly, stop the internal
fighting, & get back to GREATNESS FAST!”

LaPierre wrote in a letter to the
organization’s board that North was
threatening to make public “destructive”
embarrassing information about him and the
NRA’s financial dealings.

The president’s comments follow the news
that New York Attorney General Letitia
James opened an investigation into the group,
including ordering the preservation of
internal documents. James said during her
campaign that she intended to look into the
New York-chartered group’s nonprofit
status.

On Saturday, North announced that he will
not serve a second term as the group’s
president. The Iran-Contra figure wrote in a
letter to NRA members on Saturday that the
organization faced a “clear crisis” and that, if
the
allegations
about
financial
mismanagement were true, “the NRA’s
nonprofit status is threatened.”

“The NRA should leave and fight from the
outside of this very difficult to deal with
(unfair) State!” the president wrote in a
subsequent tweet.

James’ office has gone after the president’s
own nonprofit, the Donald J. Trump
Foundation. The foundation agreed to
dissolve under judicial supervision last year
after state’s previous attorney general,
Barbara Underwood, accused it of “a
shocking pattern of illegality,” and said her
office would pursue further investigations.

The chaos gripping the NRA spilled into
public view last week in the midst of its
annual convention in Indiana, where both
Trump and Vice President Mike Pence
delivered remarks.
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In a March filing, James wrote that the
foundation broke “some of the most basic
laws” related to private foundations. Her
office is seeking nearly $3 million in
restitution from the foundation.

in the primary race that will determine which
candidate faces off against Trump in 2020.

Trump foundation attorneys have denied the
allegations and accused officials in the
heavily Democratic state of having political
motivations.

“Unlike you, President Trump, New York is
not afraid to stand up to the NRA. I will
continue to fight for the children of this state.
As for the NRA, we’ll remember them in our
thoughts and prayers,” he said.

New York Gov. Andrew Cuomo, a
Democrat, recently opened up his formidable
financial support network to Democratic
presidential contender Joe Biden, the former
vice president, who is the early front runner

And James’s office said in a statement that
“we will follow the facts wherever they may
lead.”

In a statement, Cuomo fired back against the
president’s tweet.

“We wish the President would share our
respect for the law,” the statement said.

703

“New York City law survives gun rights group’s legal challenge”
Reuters
Jonathan Stempel
February 23, 2018
A federal appeals court on Friday rejected a
gun rights group’s constitutional challenge to
strict New York City limits on how licensed
handgun owners may use their weapons
outside the home.

preventing crime, by regulating firearms
possession in public.
Lynch said that was enough to “easily justify
the insignificant and indirect costs” imposed
on gun owners’ rights, despite a 2008 U.S.
Supreme Court decision that the Second
Amendment protects an individual right to
own guns.

By a 3-0 vote, the 2nd U.S. Circuit Court of
Appeals in Manhattan said the restrictions on
people who have licenses to have guns at
home, known as “premises” licenses, did not
violate the Second Amendment.

The appeals court also rejected claims that
the city impeded interstate commerce, and
violated the plaintiffs’ right to travel and First
Amendment
right
to
“expressive
association.”

Backed by the National Rifle Association,
three gun owners and the New York State
Rifle & Pistol Association had sought
permission for holders of premises licenses to
take guns to shooting ranges outside New
York City, or other homes in New York
state.

Neither the Rifle & Pistol Association nor its
lawyer immediately responded to requests for
comment.
“We are pleased the court upheld this
important rule,” said Nick Paolucci, a
spokesman for the city’s law department.
“Limiting public transport of handguns
licensed for home possession makes us all
safer.”

Though license holders could take unloaded
guns to seven ranges within the city, the
plaintiffs said the city’s restrictions amounted
to a “near-complete ban” on gun transport.
Premises licenses are different from “carry”
licenses, which give holders broader freedom
to take guns outside the home.

The decision was issued 1-1/2 years after oral
arguments.

Writing for the appeals court, Circuit Judge
Gerard Lynch said the restrictions advanced
the city’s “substantial, indeed compelling”
interests in protecting public safety and

It upheld a February 2015 ruling by U.S.
District Judge Robert Sweet in Manhattan.
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Sweet wrote that there were at the time more
than 40,000 active handgun licenses in the
city.
The case is New York State Rifle & Pistol
Association Inc et al v. City of New York et
al, 2nd U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, No. 15638.
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Espinoza v. Montana Department of Revenue
Ruling Below: Espinoza v. Mont. Dep’t of Revenue, 2018 MT 306 (Mont. 2018).
Overview: The Montana Supreme Court struck down a Montana law that created tax credits to
provide scholarships for families who sent their children to private schools, including religious
ones. The Court claimed that this violated the Constitution because it favored religious institutions.
This petition was filed by three low-income mothers who used the scholarships to send their
children to a Christian school.
Issue: Whether it violates the religion clauses or the equal protection clause of the United States
Constitution to invalidate a generally available and religiously neutral student-aid program simply
because the program affords students the choice of attending religious schools.
Kendra ESPINOZA, Jeri Ellen Anderson, and Jaime Schaefer, Plaintiffs- Appellees
v.
MONTANA DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, and Mike Kadas, in his official capacity as
Director of the Montana Department of Revenue, Defendants-Appellants
Supreme Court of the State of Montana
Decided on December 12, 2018
[Excerpt; some citations and footnotes omitted]
MCKINNON, Montana Supreme Court
Justice:

Organization (SSO). SSOs fund tuition
scholarships for students who attend private
schools meeting the definition of Qualified
Education Provider (QEP). The Legislature
instructed the Department to implement the
Tax Credit Program in compliance with
Article V, Section 11(5), and Article X,
Section 6, of the Montana Constitution.
Pursuant to that grant of authority, the
Department implemented Admin. R. M.
42.4.802 (Rule 1), which it believed was
necessary to constitutionally administer the
Tax Credit Program. Rule 1 adds to the
Legislature’s definition of QEP and excludes

The Montana Department of Revenue (the
Department) appeals from an order of the
Eleventh Judicial District Court, Flathead
County, granting Kendra Espinoza, Jeri Ellen
Anderson, and Jaime Schaefer (collectively,
Plaintiffs)
summary
judgment.
The
Department is responsible for administering
§ 15-30-3111, MCA (the Tax Credit
Program), which provides a taxpayer a
dollar-for-dollar tax credit based on the
taxpayer’s donation to a Student Scholarship
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religiously-affiliated private schools from
qualifying as QEPs.

taxpayers who donate to educational
programs in Montana. A taxpayer may
receive a tax credit for providing
supplemental funding to public schools, § 1530-3110, MCA, or for donating to the Tax
Credit Program, § 15-30-3111, MCA. The
only tax credit at issue in these proceedings is
the credit a taxpayer receives based on her
donation to the Tax Credit Program, § 15-303111, MCA. The Tax Credit Program
provides a taxpayer a dollar-for-dollar tax
credit of up to $150 based on her donation to
an SSO.

Plaintiffs are parents whose children attend a
religiously-affiliated private school. Because
Rule 1 precludes religiously-affiliated private
schools from the definition of QEP, SSOs
cannot fund tuition scholarships at the school
Plaintiffs’ children attend. Plaintiffs filed this
proceeding challenging Rule 1. The
Department responded, arguing Rule 1 was
necessary because the Tax Credit Program as
enacted by the Legislature violates
Montana’s Constitution. The District Court
determined the Tax Credit Program was
constitutional without Rule 1 and accordingly
granted Plaintiffs summary judgment. The 4
Department now appeals, arguing that the
Tax Credit Program is unconstitutional
absent Rule 1. We address the following
issue on appeal:

An SSO is a charitable organization in
Montana that is (1) “exempt from federal
income taxation under [I.R.C. § 501(c)(3)]”;
(2) “allocates not less than 90% of its annual
revenue for scholarships to allow students to
enroll with any [QEP]”; and (3) “provides
educational scholarships to eligible students
without limiting student access to only one
education provider.” The purpose of SSOs “is
to provide parental and student choice in
education with private contributions through
tax replacement programs.”

Does the Tax Credit Program violate
Article X, Section 6, of the Montana
Constitution?
We conclude the Tax Credit Program violates
Article X, Section 6, of the Montana
Constitution and accordingly reverse the
District Court’s order granting Plaintiffs
summary judgment.

Taxpayer donors donate to SSOs generally;
they “may not direct or designate
contributions to a parent, legal guardian, or
specific [QEP].” SSOs then use those
donations to fund student tuition scholarships
at private schools meeting the definition of
QEP in § 15-30-3102(7), MCA. SSOs are
responsible for maintaining “an application
process under which scholarship applications
are accepted, reviewed, approved, and
denied.” Section 15-30-3103(1)(h), MCA.
After an SSO decides to grant a student a
tuition scholarship, the SSO pays the

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND
In 2015, the Legislature, through Senate Bill
410, enacted Title 15, chapter 30, part 31,
MCA, entitled “Tax Credit for Qualified
Education Contributions.” Part 31 provides
two types of dollar-for-dollar tax credits to
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scholarship directly to the scholarship
recipient’s QEP. Section 15-30-3104(1),
MCA. The Legislature defined QEP as “an
education provider that”:
(a)

(f) qualifies for an exemption from
compulsory enrollment under 20-5102(2)(e) and 20-5-109.
Essentially, the Legislature’s definition of
QEP means “a private school.”

is not a public school;

(b) (i) is accredited, has applied for
accreditation, or is provisionally
accredited by a state, regional, or
national accreditation organization;
or (ii) is a nonaccredited provider or
tutor and has informed the child’s
parents or legal guardian in writing at
the time of enrollment that the
provider is not accredited and is not
seeking accreditation;

The Department is responsible for
implementing and administering Part 31. The
Department must perform extensive
administrative tasks to ensure Part 31
functions appropriately. Sections 15-303103, -3105, -3111 to -3113, MCA. The
Legislature explicitly granted the Department
rulemaking authority to “adopt rules, prepare
forms, and maintain records that are
necessary to implement and administer [Part
31].” The Legislature also instructed the
Department to administer Part 31 in
compliance with Article V, Section 11(5),
and Article X, Section 6, of the Montana
Constitution.

(c) is not a home school as referred to
in 20-5-102(2)(e);
(d)
administers
a
nationally
recognized standardized assessment
test or criterion-referenced test and:

Beginning in fiscal year 2016, to accomplish
these statutorily-mandated responsibilities,
the Department required additional resources
and personnel. Senate Bill 410’s Fiscal Note
[hereinafter Fiscal Note] estimated one-time
costs to the Department of $420,325 to
develop new forms and add data processing
systems. Further, the Department required
two additional full-time employees: one to
process and verify credit applications and
annual reports from SSOs and another to
verify and audit the new tax credits.

(i) makes the results available to the
child’s parents or legal guardian;
(ii) administers the test for all 8th
grade and 11th grade students and
provides the overall scores on a
publicly accessible private website or
provides the composite results of the
test to the office of public instruction
for posting on its website;
(e) satisfies the health and safety
requirements prescribed by law for
private schools in this state; and

Tasked with constitutionally implementing
Part 31, the Department identified what it
saw as a constitutional deficiency: the Tax
Credit Program aided sectarian schools in
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violation of Article X, Section 6, of
Montana’s
Constitution.
Under
the
Legislature’s definition of QEP, most QEPs
were religiously-affiliated private schools.
The Department examined how the Tax
Credit Program operated and determined it
unconstitutionally aided those religiouslyaffiliated QEPs. To combat the issue, and
pursuant to the rulemaking authority granted
by the Legislature, §§ 15-30-3101, -3114,
MCA, the Department adopted Rule 1.

church,
religious
sect,
or
denomination” includes accreditation
by a faith-based organization.
Simply put, Rule 1 excluded religiouslyaffiliated private schools from the
Legislature’s definition of QEP, § 15-303102(7), MCA.
Plaintiffs are parents whose children attend a
religiously-affiliated private school in
Montana. The school qualifies as a QEP
under the Legislature’s definition, § 15-303102(7), MCA, but does not qualify as a QEP
under the Department’s definition, Rule 1.
Plaintiffs challenged Rule 1 in District Court,
arguing it violated the free exercise clauses of
the Montana and U.S. Constitution.2
Plaintiffs further reasoned that Rule 1 was
unnecessary because the Tax Credit Program
and the Legislature’s definition of QEP were
constitutional. The Department responded,
arguing that the Tax Credit Program is
unconstitutional and reasoning that Rule 1
necessarily restricted the Tax Credit Program
which, absent Rule 1, aided sectarian schools.
Both sides filed cross-motions for summary
judgment.

Rule 1 added to the Legislature’s definition
of QEP, § 15-30-3102(7), MCA, providing:
(1) A “qualified education provider”
has the meaning given in 15-30-3102,
MCA, and pursuant to 15-30-3101,
MCA, may not be:
(a) a church, school, academy,
seminary, college, university, literary
or scientific institution, or any other
sectarian institution owned or
controlled in whole or in part by any
church,
religious
sect,
or
denomination; or
(b) an individual who is employed by
a church, school, academy, seminary,
college, university, literary or
scientific institution, or any other
sectarian institution owned or
controlled in whole or in part by any
church,
religious
sect,
or
denomination when providing those
services.

The District Court narrowly focused its
analysis on the tax credits themselves, noting
the credits did not “involve the expenditure
of money that the state has in its treasury.”
Instead, it determined the tax credits
“concern[ed] money that is not in the treasury
and not subject to expenditure.” For that
reason alone, the District Court concluded the
Department incorrectly interpreted Article V,
Section 11(5), and Article X, Section 6(1), of
the Montana Constitution. Because it decided

(2) For the purposes of (1),
“controlled in whole or in part by a
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the Tax Credit Program was constitutional as
enacted by the 2015 Legislature, the District
Court did not further address Rule 1’s
constitutionality. The District Court granted
Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment,
denied the Department’s motion for summary
judgment, and permanently enjoined the
Department from applying or enforcing Rule
1. The Tax Credit Program remained as
enacted by the 2015 Legislature. The
Department now appeals the District Court’s
decision.

establishment of religion. Where a state’s
constitution “draws a more stringent line than
that drawn by the United States
Constitution,” the “room for play” between
the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses
narrows. The Montana Constitution broadly
and strongly prohibits state aid to sectarian
schools, leaving a very limited amount of
“room for play.” See Mont. Const. art. X, § 6
(hereinafter, Article X, Section 6).
Our analysis, therefore, considers Article X,
Section 6, within a narrower “room for play”
between the federal Religion Clauses and,
consequently, we do not address federal
precedent. We conclude that Montana’s
Constitution more broadly prohibits “any”
state aid to sectarian schools and draws a
“more stringent line than that drawn” by its
federal 11 counterpart. Therefore, the sole
issue in this case is whether the Tax Credit
Program runs afoul of Montana’s specific
sectarian education no-aid provision, Article
X, Section 6. For the following reasons, we
conclude the Tax Credit Program aids
sectarian schools in violation of Article X,
Section 6.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court exercises plenary review over
constitutional law questions. A statute is
presumed constitutional unless it “conflicts
with the constitution, in the judgment of the
court, beyond a reasonable doubt.” The party
challenging the constitutionality of the statute
bears the burden of proof. If any doubt exists,
it must be resolved in favor of the statute.
Whether
an
administrative
rule
impermissibly conflicts with a statute is a
question of law to be decided by the court.
We review a district court’s conclusions of
law to determine if they are correct.

I. Article X, Section 6, broadly and strictly
prohibits aid to sectarian schools.

DISCUSSION

Article X, Section 6, of the Montana
Constitution, entitled “Aid prohibited to
sectarian schools,” provides:

The First Amendment’s Religion Clauses—
the Establishment Clause and the Free
Exercise Clause—are “frequently in
tension.” Yet, “there is room for play in the
joints” between them. A state’s constitutional
prohibition against aid to sectarian schools
may be broader and stronger than the First
Amendment’s prohibition against the

(1) The legislature, counties, cities, towns,
school districts, and public corporations shall
not make any direct or indirect appropriation
or payment from any public fund or monies,
or any grant of lands or other property for any
sectarian purpose or to aid any church,
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school, academy, seminary, college,
university, or other literary or scientific
institution, controlled in whole or in part by
any church, sect, or denomination.

towns, school districts, and public
corporations” from making “any direct or
indirect appropriation or payment from any
public fund or monies, or any grant of lands
or other property for any sectarian purpose or
to aid any . . . school . . . controlled in whole
or in part by any church, sect, or
denomination.”

(2) This section shall not apply to funds from
federal sources provided to the state for the
express purpose of distribution to non-public
education.

The provision’s plain language begs three
main inquiries, each of which cast a broad net
clearly intended to prohibit “any” type of
state aid being used to benefit sectarian
education. First, the provision’s plain
language identifies the entity that is
prohibited from providing the aid: Article X,
Section 6, prohibits the “legislature, counties,
cities, towns, school districts, and public
corporations” from aiding sectarian schools.
Second, the provision’s plain language
identifies the type of aid it prohibits: Article
X, Section 6, broadly prohibits any type of
direct or indirect aid to sectarian schools—
“any direct or indirect appropriation or
payment from any public fund or monies, or
any grant of lands or other property.” Third,
the provision’s plain language specifies that
the aid is prohibited “for any sectarian
purpose or to aid any church, school,
academy, seminary, college, 13 university, or
other literary or scientific institution,
controlled in whole or in part by any church,
sect, or denomination.”

The Constitutional Convention Delegates’
(Delegates) intent controls our interpretation
of a constitutional provision. We primarily
discern the Delegates’ intent “from the plain
meaning of the language used.” However, we
define the Delegates’ intent “not only from
the plain meaning of the language used, but
also in light of the historical and surrounding
circumstances under which the [Delegates]
drafted the Constitution, the nature of the
subject matter they faced, and the objective
they sought to achieve.” Accordingly, we
“determine the meaning and intent of
constitutional provisions from the plain
meaning of the language used without resort
to extrinsic aids except when the language is
vague or ambiguous or 12 extrinsic aids
clearly manifest an intent not apparent from
the express language.”
In determining what the Delegates intended
Article X, Section 6, to mean, we first
observe that the plain language of the
provision’s title is expansive and forceful:
“Aid prohibited to sectarian schools.” The
title clearly manifests the Delegates’ intent to
broadly prohibit aid to sectarian schools. The
provision’s text is equally expansive,
prohibiting numerous types of state actors,
including the “legislature, counties, cities,

The Delegates adapted Article X, Section 6,
of the Montana Constitution from the 1889
Constitution’s broad and general no-aid
provision, recognizing that it was already
“among the most stringent [no-aid clauses] in
the nation.” Montana Constitutional
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Convention, Verbatim Transcript, March 11,
1972, pp. 2008, 2011 (hereinafter
Convention Transcript).

purpose of distribution to non-public
education.”
Notably,
the
Delegates
understood that Montana could prohibit
forms of state aid that were otherwise
permissible as federal aid. Our conclusion
that Article X, Section 6, more broadly
prohibits aid to sectarian schools than the
federal Establishment Clause is consistent
with the Delegates’ intent of the provision.

The Delegates’ strong commitment to
maintaining public education and ensuring
that public education remained free from
religious entanglement is evident from the
Constitutional Convention Transcripts; the
Delegates wanted the public school system to
receive “unequivocal support.” Delegate
Burkhardt noted, “Under federal and state
mandates to concentrate public funds in
public schools, our educational system has
grown strong in an atmosphere free from
divisiveness and fragmentation.” He further
emphasized, “Any diversion of funds or effort
from the public school system would tend to
weaken that system in favor of schools
established for private or religious purposes.”
(emphasis added).

It is also worth observing that Montana’s noaid provision is unique from other states’ noaid provisions. Article X, Section 6’s
prohibition of “any direct or indirect
appropriation or payment from any public
fund or monies, or any grant of lands or other
property for any sectarian purpose or to aid
any . . . school . . . controlled in whole or in
part by any church” make it a broader and
stronger prohibition against aid to sectarian
15 schools than other states. Even other states
whose no-aid provisions also contain
“indirect” language only prohibit aid in the
form of the direct or indirect taking of money
from the public treasury. Such language is
distinct from and less stringent than
Montana’s prohibition on any type of aid,
whether it be a “direct or indirect
appropriation or payment from any public
fund or monies, or any grant of lands or other
property.”

A minority of Delegates sought to delete the
language prohibiting indirect aid from Article
X, Section 6. Those Delegates wanted to
ensure private school students could receive
federal aid under the United States Supreme
Court’s child-benefit theory, which allows
federal aid as long as it directly supports the
child and not the religious school. Delegate
Blaylock, however, expressed concern that
deleting the indirect language would make it
“fairly easy to appropriate a number of funds
. . . to some other group and then say this will
be done indirectly.” The Delegates ultimately
maintained the indirect language and instead
added a separate subsection specifically
addressing federal aid: “[Article X, Section
6] shall not apply to funds from federal
sources provided to the state for the express

As a Court, we have not yet interpreted
Article X, Section 6. However, the 1972
Constitutional
Convention
Delegates
intended Article X, Section 6, to retain the
meaning of Article XI, Section 8, of the
Montana Constitution of 1889. Accordingly,
this Court’s pre-1972 precedent analyzing
Article XI, Section 8, of the Montana
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Constitution of 1889 remains helpful to our
analysis of Article X, Section 6. In State ex
rel. Chambers v. School Dist. No. 10, the
Court considered whether a tax levy intended
to fund general teaching positions at a
religiously-affiliated private school violated
Article XI, Section 8, of the Montana
Constitution of 1889. The Court observed
that the tax levy permitted a religiouslyaffiliated school to unconstitutionally obtain
teachers at public expense. Even though the
teachers would have taught general, secular
subjects, the Court noted that the funding
nonetheless aided sectarian schools, as there
was no way to determine “where the secular
purpose ended and the sectarian began.”
Accordingly, the Court determined Article
XI, Section 8, of the Montana Constitution of
1889 prohibited “a public school board from
making a levy for, or expending funds for the
employment of teachers to teach in a
parochial school.”

itself was constitutional. Therefore, the
District Court easily dispelled of Rule 1 after
concluding it was based on a mistake of law.
On appeal, the Department argues that the
Tax Credit Program is unconstitutional and,
accordingly, Rule 1 is necessary for the
Department to constitutionally administer the
program. To properly evaluate the propriety
of Rule 1, we must first address the
Department’s contention that the Tax Credit
Program is unconstitutional. It is clear the
Department’s contention is a facial challenge
to the Tax Credit Program, as it asserts the
Tax Credit Program unconstitutionally aids
sectarian schools and promulgated Rule 1 to
cure the constitutional defect. Under United
States v. Salerno, a party bringing a facial
challenge must “establish that no set of
circumstances exists under which the
[statute] would be valid”—that is, that the
law is unconstitutional in all of its
applications.

The plain language of Article X, Section 6,
and
the
Constitutional
Convention
Transcripts demonstrating the Delegates’
clear objective to firmly prohibit aid to
sectarian schools lead us to the conclusion
that the Delegates intended Article X, Section
6, to broadly and strictly prohibit aid to
sectarian schools.

To analyze the Tax Credit Program under
Article X, Section 6, first, we identify the
entity providing the aid; second, we identify
the type of aid; and third, we consider
whether the entity provided the aid “for any
sectarian purpose or to aid any . . . school . . .
controlled in whole or in part by any church .
. . .” We ultimately conclude the Tax Credit
Program aids sectarian schools in violation of
Article X, Section 6, and that it is
unconstitutional in all of its applications.

II. The Tax Credit Program aids sectarian
schools in violation of Article X, Section 6, of
the Montana Constitution.

a. The Legislature aided sectarian schools
when it enacted the Tax Credit Program.

Plaintiffs initially filed this action
challenging Rule 1. The District Court
focused its analysis on the underlying Tax
Credit Program, determining the program

Article X, Section 6, directly prohibits
various entities, including the Legislature,
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from aiding sectarian schools. Preliminarily,
we recognize that an individual taxpayer may
give money to any cause she wishes. A
taxpayer is free to donate to an SSO, a QEP,
or any other charitable cause of her choice.
There is no prohibition on a taxpayer giving
her money away, nor would such prohibition
be constitutional.

The Tax Credit Program permits the
Legislature to indirectly pay tuition at
private,
religiously-affiliated
schools.
Parents owe a certain amount of tuition to the
QEP their child attends. If a child receives a
tuition scholarship from an SSO, the
scholarship decreases the amount of tuition
that child’s parents owe to the QEP. Many of
the taxpayer donors who would donate to
SSOs would be parents of children who
attend QEPs. When parents donate to an
SSO, they receive a dollar-for-dollar tax
credit of up to $150. If the parents’ child also
receives a tuition scholarship from an SSO in
the amount of, for example, $150, the
parents’ tuition obligation to the QEP
decreases by $150—the exact amount the
parents received as a tax credit for their
donation to an SSO. The parents donated
$150 to an SSO, received a dollar-for-dollar
reimbursement for that donation in the form
of a tax credit, and subsequently owed $150
less in tuition to their child’s QEP. The
Legislature indirectly payed $150 of that
student’s tuition by permitting his or her
parents to claim a tax credit instead of paying
that amount of tuition to the QEP.

In this case, the action under scrutiny is the
Legislature’s provision of a tax credit to
taxpayer donors. The Legislature, by
enacting the Tax Credit Program, involved
itself in donations to religiously-affiliated
private schools. The Tax Credit Program
provides a dollar-for-dollar incentive of up to
$150 for taxpayer donations to SSOs. The tax
credit encourages the transfer of money from
a taxpayer donor to a sectarian school
because the taxpayer donor knows she will be
reimbursed, dollar-for-dollar, for her
donation to an SSO. SSOs, in turn, directly
fund tuition scholarships at religiouslyaffiliated QEPs. The Legislature, by enacting
a statute that provides a dollar-for-dollar
credit against taxes owed to the state, is the
entity providing aid to sectarian schools via
tax credits in violation of Article X, Section
6.

The Legislature attempted to sever the
indirect payment by requiring taxpayer
donors to donate to an SSO generally and
prohibiting them from directing or
designating contributions to specific parents,
legal guardians, or QEPs. Therefore, parents
cannot donate to an SSO, claim a tax credit
for their donation, and then directly designate
the funds they donated to their own child’s
scholarship. However, an indirect payment
still exists, as described above, when a
student whose parents claimed the tax credit

b. The Tax Credit Program permits the
Legislature to indirectly pay tuition at
private, religiously-affiliated schools.
Article X, Section 6, broadly prohibits any
type of direct or indirect aid: the Legislature
may not make “any direct or indirect
appropriation or payment from any public
fund or monies, or any grant of lands or other
property.”
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receives a scholarship from an SSO. The
simple fact that parents who donate to SSOs
cannot directly designate the scholarship
funds to their own child or to their child’s
school does not defeat the fact that the
Legislature indirectly pays tuition to the
QEP. Senate Bill 410’s Fiscal Note
recognized as much, stating that the
donations to SSOs, the bases for the tax
credits, “would primarily represent funds that
would have been used to pay tuition directly
. . . .” The Tax Credit Program permits the
Legislature to indirectly pay tuition at QEPs
by reimbursing parents for donating to SSOs,
donations funded with money the parents
would have otherwise used to pay their
child’s tuition.

insignificant to an Article X, Section 6,
analysis. The Legislature violates Article X,
Section 6’s prohibition on aid to sectarian
schools when it provides any aid, no matter
how small. Further, the $150 indirect
payments certainly add up over time,
especially as the aggregate limits on the tax
credits increase from $3 million each year the
limit is met. The Tax Credit Program creates
an indirect payment: the program reduces
“the net price of attending private school . . .
for students who receive scholarships and
whose families claim the credit.” Article X,
Section 6, expressly prohibits that type of
indirect payment to sectarian schools.
Importantly, for purposes of examining the
facial constitutionality of the Tax Credit
Program, the schools meeting the
Legislature’s definition of QEP may be—
and, in fact, the overwhelming majority are—
religiously affiliated. There is simply no
mechanism within the Tax Credit Program
itself that operates to ensure that an indirect
payment of $150 is not used to fund religious
education in contravention of Article X,
Section 6. The Department, in administering
the Tax Credit Program pursuant to the
Legislature’s definition of QEP, § 15-303102(7), MCA, has no ability to ensure that
indirect payments are not made to religious
schools. Or, as this Court has previously
cautioned, there is no mechanism within the
Tax Credit Program to identify “where the
secular purpose end[s] and the sectarian
beg[ins].” The Department cannot discern
when the tax credit is indirectly paying
tuition at a secular school and when the tax
credit is indirectly paying tuition at a
sectarian school. Because the Tax Credit

The Tax Credit Program permits the
Legislature to subsidize tuition payments at
religiously-affiliated private schools. A
subsidy is a “grant, usu[ally] made by the
government, to any enterprise whose
promotion is considered to be in the public
interest.” “Although governments sometimes
make direct payments (such as cash grants),
subsidies are usu[ally] indirect. They may
take the form of . . . tax breaks . . . .” When
the Legislature indirectly pays general tuition
payments at sectarian schools, the
Legislature effectively subsidizes the
sectarian school’s educational program. That
type of government subsidy in aid of
sectarian schools is precisely what the
Delegates intended Article X, Section 6, to
prohibit.
While $150 may seem like a small sum of
money when compared to the State’s overall
operating budget, the amount of aid is wholly
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Program does not distinguish between an
indirect payment to fund a secular education
and an indirect payment to fund a sectarian
education, it cannot, under any circumstance,
be construed as consistent with Article X,
Section 6.

Program aids schools controlled by churches,
in violation of Article X, Section 6.
“The most effective way to establish any
institution is to finance it.” The Legislature’s
enactment of the Tax Credit Program is
facially unconstitutional and violates
Montana’s constitutional guarantee to all
Montanans that their government will not use
state funds to aid religious schools. This basic
notion of separation of church and state is a
foundation of our Nation’s federal
Constitution, but is more fiercely protected
by Montanans through the broader
prohibitions contained in Article X, Section
6. Although the Tax Credit Program provides
a mechanism of attenuating the tax credit
from the SSO’s tuition payment to a
religiously-affiliated QEP, it does not
comport with the constitutional prohibition
on indirectly aiding sectarian schools. We
conclude, following consideration of both the
plain language of the provision and the
Delegates’ intent as discerned from their
discussion when drafting Montana’s 1972
Constitution, that such attenuation remains
inconsistent with Article X, Section 6’s strict
and broad prohibition on aid to sectarian
schools. The Tax Credit Program constitutes
the precise type of indirect payment the
Delegates sought to prohibit in their
formulation of Article X, Section 6. Based on
the Legislature’s definition of QEP, the
Department
cannot
constitutionally
implement or administer the Tax Credit
Program. Because Senate Bill 410 contained
a severability clause,7 we conclude the Tax
Credit Program, § 15-30-3111, MCA, must
be severed from the remainder of Part 31, §§
15-30-3101 to -3114, MCA.

c. The Legislature provided the tax credits to
aid schools controlled in whole or in part by
churches.
Article X, Section 6, prohibits aid used “for
any sectarian purpose or to aid any . . . school
. . . controlled in whole or in part by any
church, sect, or denomination.” In Chambers,
we explained that public funds could not be
used to pay teachers’ salaries at a religiouslyaffiliated private school, even if those
teachers provided standard, non-religious
instruction. In support of that conclusion, we
reasoned that the school was sectarian as a
whole, and therefore there was no way to
determine “where the secular purpose ended
and the sectarian began.”
Under the Legislature’s definition of QEP,
the majority of QEPs are private schools
controlled by churches. SSOs pay
scholarship funds directly to QEPs and the
funds offset scholarship recipients’ general
tuition obligations. General tuition payments
fund the sectarian school as a whole and
therefore may be used by the school to
strengthen any aspect of religious education,
including those areas heavily entrenched in
religious doctrine. Religious education is a
“rock on which the whole [church] rests, and
to render tax aid to [a religious school] is
indistinguishable . . . from rendering the same
aid to the [c]hurch itself.” The Tax Credit
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Having concluded the Tax Credit Program
violates Article X, Section 6, it is not
necessary to consider federal precedent
interpreting the First Amendment’s lessrestrictive
Establishment
Clause.
Conversely, however, an overly-broad
analysis of Article X, Section 6, could
implicate free exercise concerns. Although
there may be a case where an indirect
payment constitutes “aid” under Article X,
Section 6, but where prohibiting the aid
would violate the Free Exercise Clause, this
is not one of those cases. We recognize we
can only close the “room for play” between
the joints of the Establishment and Free
Exercise Clauses to a certain extent before
our interpretation of one violates the other.

interpret, make specific, or otherwise
carry out the provisions of the statute,
an adoption, amendment, or repeal of
a rule is not valid or effective unless
it is:
(a) consistent and not in conflict with
the statute; and
(b) reasonably necessary to effectuate
the purpose of the statute.
Accordingly, the Department’s rules
implementing Part 31 needed to be (1)
consistent and not in conflict with Part 31 and
(2) reasonably necessary to effectuate the
purpose of Part 31.

III. Rule 1 is unnecessary because the
underlying Tax Credit Program is
unconstitutional
and,
further,
the
Department exceeded its rulemaking
authority when it enacted Rule 1.

Rule 1 is inconsistent with the Legislature’s
definition of QEP. The Legislature broadly
defined QEP to include all private schools in
Montana, including religiously-affiliated
schools. The Department’s Rule 1
significantly narrowed the scope of the
schools qualifying as QEPs, excluding all
schools controlled in whole or in party by any
church. The Department’s limitation on the
definition of QEP conflicts with the
Legislature’s broad definition.

The Department enacted Rule 1 in its efforts
to constitutionally implement the Tax Credit
Program, which we have now determined is
unconstitutional. We severed the Tax Credit
Program from the remainder of Part 31. As a
result, Rule 1 is superfluous. However, we
further note that, in enacting Rule 1, the
Department exceeded the Legislature’s grant
of rulemaking authority.

Although we recognize that the Legislature,
by enacting § 15-30-3101, MCA, granted the
Department broad authority to implement
Part 31 consistent with Article X, Section 6,
an agency may only adopt rules to
“implement, interpret, make specific, or
otherwise carry out the provisions of [a]
statute.” An agency cannot transform an
unconstitutional statute into a constitutional
statute with an administrative rule. It is the

An agency’s authority to adopt rules is
limited:
Whenever by the express or implied
terms of any statute a state agency has
authority to adopt rules to implement,
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Legislature’s responsibility to craft statutes in
compliance with Montana’s Constitution,
which it failed to do here. Rule 1 is
superfluous because the underlying Tax
Credit Program is unconstitutional and,
additionally, the Department exceeded the
Legislature’s grant of rulemaking authority in
enacting Rule 1.

Tax Credit Program violates the federal
Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses.
The Tax Credit for Qualified Education
Contributions is an indirect payment under
Article X, Section 6(1), of the Montana
Constitution.
Montana’s definition of “appropriation” is
“well-established and quite limited,”
referring only to the authority given to the
Legislature to expend money from the state
treasury. However, the plain language of
Article X, Section 6(1), prohibits more than
appropriations; as Justice Baker notes in her
Dissent, it prohibits four actions, including
indirect payments. In this case, the District
Court ended its analysis prematurely by not
considering whether the Tax Credit Program
constitutes an “indirect payment.”

CONCLUSION
We conclude the Tax Credit Program violates
Article X, Section 6’s stringent prohibition
on aid to sectarian schools. Because the Tax
Credit Program is unconstitutional, Rule 1 is
superfluous and, further, the Department
exceeded the scope of its rulemaking
authority when it enacted Rule 1. We
accordingly reverse the District Court’s order
granting Plaintiffs summary judgment and
determine the Tax Credit Program, § 15-303111, MCA, must be severed from the
remainder of Part 31, §§ 15-30-3101 to 3114, MCA.

As to whether the money comes from a public
fund, when determining whether the Tax
Credit for Qualified Education Contributions
(TCQEC) of Title 15, chapter 30, part 31,
creates a “direct or indirect appropriation or
payment,” it is necessary to understand that
while the TCQEC deems the money provided
to the SSO by a taxpayer to be a “donation,”
it is not in fact a donation. To donate is to give
property or money without receiving
consideration for the transfer. Here, the
taxpayer “donates” nothing, because for
every dollar the taxpayer diverts to the SSO,
the taxpayer receives one dollar in
consideration from the State in the form of a
lower tax bill. The taxpayer simply chooses,
with the State’s blessing, to pay the money he
or she otherwise owes to the State to an SSO.
Since religious schools would be eligible to

GUSTAFSON, Justice, concurring:
I concur in the Majority’s Opinion and agree
the Tax Credit Program violates our
Constitution’s prohibition against providing
aid to religious schools, and this
constitutional deficiency cannot be cured via
administrative rule. I write separately to
discuss additional grounds upon which the
Tax Credit Program creates an indirect
payment under Article X, Section 6(1), of the
Montana Constitution. Although this Court
has decided this matter purely on State
constitutional grounds, I also discuss how the
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receive tuition payments from these funds,
this runs afoul of the purpose of Article X,
Section 6 “to guard against the diversion of
public resources to sectarian school
purposes.”

public fund is because the TCQEC diverts it
before it reaches the public treasury. The
Legislature recognized this diversion within
SB410, the bill that created the TCQEC,
when it set aside $3 million from the State’s
budget to cover the revenue shortfall the Tax
Credit Program created.3 Justice Baker
likewise acknowledges the TCQEC diverts
funds, although she would deem this “an
indirect transfer of benefit to the studentselected school” but not find this to be an
indirect payment. A “transfer of benefit” is
simply an oblique way of saying
“assignment.”4 Allowing a taxpayer to
assign a portion of his or her tax liability by
paying the money owed to the State to a third
party is not a “donation” by the taxpayer.

For the “donor,” the difference between a
dollar-for-dollar tax credit and a typical
charitable tax deduction is remarkable. The
former costs them absolutely nothing out of
pocket. The dollar-for-dollar diversion
distinguishes this program from other tax
credit programs, such as the contributions to
university or college foundations and
endowment funds codified in § 15-30-2326,
MCA, which offers taxpayers a tax credit
equal to 10% of the amount of qualifying
charitable contributions made. In such
instances, the State incentivizes charitable
giving; for example, under § 15-30-2326,
MCA, for every $10 a taxpayer contributes,
that taxpayer’s tax liability is decreased by
$1. The taxpayer, however, still donates $9
out of his or her own pocket. Here, the
taxpayer donates none of his or her own
funds, but instead dictates where and how a
portion of their tax liability is spent. Our
first—and
currently
only—SSO
acknowledges as much, urging taxpayers to
make a donation “to direct a portion of your
taxes to help a student thrive . . . .”

The TCQEC was explicitly designed as a tax
expenditure.5 Section 5-4-104(2), MCA,
defines “tax expenditures” as “those revenue
losses attributable to provisions of Montana
tax laws that allow a special exclusion,
exception, or deduction from gross income or
that provide a special credit . . . including: . .
. (d) credits allowed against Montana
personal income tax or Montana corporate
income tax.” Indisputably, the Tax Credit
Program creates a “tax expenditure” under §
5-4-104(2), MCA. Moreover, many of the
items enumerated under § 5-4-104(2), MCA,
while not appropriations, are nonetheless
expenditures.

Justice Baker observes that under the
TCQEC, “[n]o money originates, is deposited
into, or is expended from the state treasury or
any public fund.” And since the money is
never deposited into and then expended from
a public fund, it is not an appropriation.
However, the only reason the money is not
deposited into and then expended from a

Every tax exemption constitutes a subsidy
that affects nonqualifying taxpayers, forcing
them to become “indirect and vicarious
‘donors.’” “Both tax exemptions and tax
deductibility are a form of subsidy . . . .
Deductible contributions are similar to cash
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grants of the amount of a portion of the
individual’s contributions.” Regan further
held that, by denying a political lobbying
organization tax-exempt status under §
501(c)(3), the U.S. Code was not denying the
organization any independent benefit, but
“Congress has merely refused to pay for the
lobbying out of public moneys.” Texas
Monthly, Bob Jones University, and Regan
all recognize that deductions and exemptions
function the same as an appropriation by
allowing some taxpayers to pay lower taxes
than they otherwise would. Although Justice
Rice in his Dissent characterizes DOR’s
argument on this point as “an utter
misstatement of the fundamental right of
private property ownership,” it is, in fact,
consistent with the U.S. Supreme Court’s
holdings. Likewise, Article X, Section 6(1),
of the Montana Constitution recognizes that
a tax expenditure may not be an appropriation
per se but nonetheless may function in the
same manner. Thus, Article X, Section 6(1),
prohibits not only appropriations, but also
payments.

schools controlled in whole or in part by a
church, sect, or denomination.
Under the Tax Credit Program, no funds are
delivered to students, but are paid directly to
the schools. Section 15-30-3104(1), MCA,
provides that the SSO delivers the
scholarship funds “directly to the qualified
education provider . . . .” Thus, while the
scholarships aid the students in assisting
them in covering the cost of tuition, they aid
the schools in the form of direct monetary
payments. The economic effect of these
funds is that of aid given directly to the
school.
In addition to the Montana cases cited by the
Majority, federal precedent compels the
conclusion that these funds aid religious
schools. In Comm. for Public Educ. &
Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, the U.S.
Supreme Court found unconstitutional a
statutory scheme which provided a grant to
low-income parents who paid private school
tuition. The Supreme Court rejected the
argument that these grants did not constitute
aid to a religious school since they went to the
parents, holding, “By reimbursing parents for
a portion of their tuition bill, . . . the effect of
the aid is unmistakably to provide desired
financial support for nonpublic, sectarian
institutions.” The Nyquist majority rejected
the dissenters’ position that “government aid
to individuals generally stands on an entirely
different footing from direct aid to religious
institutions.” Here, by relieving parents of a
portion of their tuition bill by directly paying
part of the students’ tuition, the effect of the
aid is to provide financial support to QEPs,
including religious schools.

By creating a diversionary scheme whereby
money otherwise bound for the public
treasury is diverted, the Legislature has
created an indirect payment. Moreover, as
noted above, the TCQEC does require
“funding,” with the State setting aside $3
million to cover the anticipated revenue
shortfall this statutory scheme is expected to
cause in its first year—in addition to the
substantial administrative costs described in
the Majority Opinion.
The funds generated by the Tax Credit for
Qualified Education Contributions aid
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Later, in Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch.
Dist., the U.S. Supreme Court upheld a deaf
student’s right to the services of a signlanguage interpreter funded by the local
school district, and pursuant to the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
(IDEA), 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq., even
though he attended a Catholic high school.
The Supreme Court reasoned that the funding
of an individual’s interpreter “creates no
financial incentive for students to undertake
sectarian education.” In other words, the
student would have received the services of a
district-funded sign-language interpreter
regardless of which school he attended, and
providing the interpreter gave no aid to the
religious school because it did not relieve it
of any costs it otherwise would have borne to
educate its students. The interpreter benefited
the student and not the school. Here,
however, the tuition payments aid the
recipient schools because these funds directly
cover the costs of educating the school’s
students. They do not, as in Zobrest, provide
a benefit only to the student and to which the
student would have been entitled regardless
of school attended.

Section 15-30-3111(1), MCA, provides in
part that “[t]he donor may not direct or
designate contributions to a parent, legal
guardian, or specific qualified education
provider.” Thus, a taxpayer who reduces his
or her tax liability by up to $150 by sending
those funds to the SSO has no control over
which QEP receives the benefit of those
funds. Those funds may go to pay the tuition
of a student at a secular school or a religious
school, but the taxpayer cannot choose which
school—or which type of school—to
support.
As explained above, I do not consider this
diversion of funds to be a genuine
“donation.” Nonetheless, taxpayers may wish
to take advantage of the proffered tax credit,
whether to support a school or schools
providing instruction consistent with a
particular religion, to support the secular
school that is designated as a QEP, or because
they believe their tax money is better spent
supporting private schools in general.
Nonetheless, a taxpayer who desires to
donate to an SSO in exchange for a tax credit
may find donating under the constraints of
the TCQEC untenable as the SSO is free to
use this money to aid a religious school which
the taxpayer may prefer not to support
financially.

Therefore, I agree with the majority that the
Tax Credit Program unconstitutionally
creates an indirect payment of public funds
that aids religious schools.

As the Majority explains, “The Legislature
attempted to sever the indirect payment by
requiring taxpayer donors to donate to an
SSO generally and prohibiting them from
directing or designating contributions to
specific parents, legal guardians, or QEPs.”
However, in their attempt, the Legislature ran
afoul of the Establishment and Free Exercise

The Tax Credit Program violates the U.S.
Constitution’s Establishment and Free
Exercise Clauses by compelling taxpayers to
support religious schools in order to avail
themselves of the tax credit.
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Clauses by compelling taxpayers who seek
the tax credit to relinquish the choice as to
whether to support a religious school, and
whether to support, or decline to support, a
particular religion.

whether a parent received a cash
reimbursement for tuition or was allowed to
reduce his or her tax bill, “in both instances
the money involved represents a charge made
upon the state for the purpose of religious
education.”

A. The Tax Credit Program violates the
Establishment Clause because it prohibits
the donating taxpayer from choosing
whether the funds aid a religious school.

In Mueller, 463 U.S. at 390, 103 S. Ct. at
3064, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld a
Minnesota tax scheme which allowed parents
to deduct certain educational expenses from
their state income tax. Some Minnesota
taxpayers had challenged the law, arguing
that it violated the Establishment Clause by
providing financial assistance to religious
schools. The Supreme Court, noting that in
some instances it had struck down
“arrangements resembling . . . forms of
assistance,” while in other instances it upheld
roughly similar arrangements, analyzed the
constitutionality of Mueller by comparing its
facts to Nyquist and the cases Nyquist relied
upon to determine if the Minnesota statute
violated the Establishment Clause. First, the
Supreme Court concluded that a State’s
decision to defray the educational expenses
parents bear is a secular and understandable
purpose, regardless of the nature of the
school attended. The Mueller court found the
universality of the tax deduction to be of
considerable importance in upholding the
Minnesota tax scheme. It held: In this respect,
as well as others, this case is vitally different
from the scheme struck down in Nyquist.
There, public assistance amounting to tuition
grants was provided only to parents of
children in nonpublic schools. Because the
Minnesota tax scheme was available to the
parents of all students in any school, public
or private, the Supreme Court found it

The Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment, applied to the States through the
Fourteenth Amendment, prevents a State
from enacting laws that have the “purpose”
or “effect” of advancing or inhibiting
religion. In Agostini v. Felton, the U.S.
Supreme Court acknowledged its recent
cases had undermined the assumptions upon
which some of its earlier Establishment
Clause cases had rested. It then took the
opportunity to reiterate the principles it uses
to evaluate Establishment Clause challenges:
“[W]e continue to ask whether the
government acted with the purpose of
advancing or inhibiting religion,” and “we
continue to explore whether the aid has the
‘effect’ of advancing or inhibiting religion.”
We apply those principles here.
In Nyquist, the U.S. Supreme Court
concluded that a state-funded tuition
reimbursement for nonpublic schools
violated the Establishment Clause. The
Supreme Court explained, “[I]f the grants are
offered as an incentive . . . the Establishment
Clause is violated . . . . Whether the grant is
labeled a reimbursement, a reward, or a
subsidy, its substantive impact is still the
same.” The Supreme Court further held that,
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distinguishable from Nyquist, and thus
constitutional. Here, the scholarships
regulated by the TCQEC bear the purpose of
defraying the cost of tuition. However, this
aid is available only for the parents of
students attending certain non-public
schools—unlike in Mueller, where parents
could claim the tax deduction regardless of
whether their children attended public or
private schools. The present case is more akin
to Nyquist than Mueller in this regard.

not readily subject to challenge under the
Establishment Clause.”
Here, the recipients of the “government aid”
are not the parents and students; they are the
taxpayers who donate to the SSO and in
exchange obtain tax credits. Under §§ 15-303104(1), and -3111(1), MCA, these taxpayers
get no choice; they are at the mercy of the
SSO as to where their donations are spent.
Thus, it cannot be said the donations are
given “to religious schools wholly as a result
of their own genuine and individual private
choice.”

In Zelman, the U.S. Supreme Court
considered whether an Ohio program that
provided tuition aid to families violated the
Establishment Clause. In so doing, the
Supreme Court found that its Establishment
Clause jurisprudence drew “a consistent
distinction between government programs
that provide aid directly to religious schools
and programs of true private choice, in which
government aid reaches religious schools
only as a result of the genuine and
independent choices of private individuals.”
Most pertinent to the present case, the
Supreme Court explained that the amount of
government aid channeled to religious
institutions by aid recipients is irrelevant to
the constitutionality of the scheme. The
salient point is “whether recipients generally
were empowered to direct the aid to schools
or institutions of their own choosing.”
Relying on Mueller, Witters, and Zobrest,
Zelman held: “[W]here a government aid
program is neutral with respect to religion,
and provides assistance directly to a broad
class of citizens who, in turn, direct
government aid to religious schools wholly
as a result of their own genuine and
independent private choice, the program is

In Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn,
the U.S. Supreme Court concluded that
Arizona taxpayers, as mere taxpayers, lacked
standing to challenge a tax credit/tuition
scheme roughly similar to the TCQEC. In
that instance, the scholarship organization,
similar to our SSO, was called a “school
tuition organization,” or STO.. There, the
Supreme Court held that taxpayers had no
standing to challenge the scheme because
they were free to choose not to donate to an
STO, and because they had no right to dictate
how other citizens spent, or chose not to
spend, their own pre-tax money. The
Supreme Court explained that all Arizona
taxpayers “remain free to pay their own tax
bills, without contributing to an STO,” or
may “contribute to an STO of their choice,
either religious or secular.” Here, Montana
taxpayers who wish to take advantage of the
Tax Credit Program have no such choice, as
§ 15-30-3111(1), MCA, mandates that the
donor cannot choose which school receives
their contribution. Thus, since only one SSO
exists in Montana, and its QEPs consist of
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both religious and secular schools, the
contributor cannot choose whether or not to
support a religious school and still avail
himself or herself of the tax credit.

which barred religious institutions from
participating in a playground resurfacing
program, “expressly discriminates against
otherwise eligible recipients by disqualifying
them from a public benefit solely because of
their religious character.” Here, contributors
who wish to claim an otherwise available tax
credit for donating to an SSO cannot do so
without being compelled to support a
religious school. In Trinity Lutheran, the
Supreme Court stated, “[T]he Department’s
policy puts Trinity Lutheran to a choice: It
may participate in an otherwise available
benefit program or remain a religious
institution.” Here, § 15-30-3111(1), MCA,
puts the taxpayer to a choice: He or she may
participate in the Tax Credit Program, but
only if he or she agrees to relinquish control
of where that donation is spent, with the
likely result that the SSO will give those
funds to a religious school.

Plaintiffs have litigated this matter in their
role as parents of children attending
Stillwater Christian School and not as
taxpayers seeking a tax credit. The Tax Credit
Program does not inhibit Plaintiffs’ choice as
to whether their children attend a religious
school, but it does inhibit the taxpayers’ right
to exercise their own “genuine and individual
private choice[s]” as to whether their
donations fund a secular or religious
education. On these grounds, I would hold
the Tax Credit Program violates the
Establishment Clause.
B. The Tax Credit Program violates the
Free Exercise Clause because it compels
taxpayers to acquiesce in the use of their
donations to support religious schools in
order to claim a tax credit.

The Free Exercise Clause protects religious
observers from unequal treatment. Denying a
generally available benefit solely due to
religious identity imposes a penalty on the
free exercise of religion that can be justified
only by a state interest “of the highest order.”
Here, the Tax Credit Program would deny
this benefit to taxpayers who wish to avail
themselves of a tax credit for private-school
scholarships but prefer not to support
religious schools, or may prefer to support
only a specific religion’s schools.

In Mitchell v. Helms, the U.S. Supreme Court
commented that it had, in numerous
decisions, “prohibited governments from
discriminating in the distribution of public
benefits based upon religious status or
sincerity.” Here, however, the TCQEC
discriminates in its distribution of a tax credit
for donations to SSOs because donors have
no choice but to permit the SSO to designate
a donation to a student attending a religious
school.

The U.S. Supreme Court has held that the
exclusion of degrees in devotional theology
from eligibility in a state scholarship program
did not violate the Free Exercise Clause
because the exclusion “does not require

In Trinity Lutheran, the U.S. Supreme Court
found that a policy of the Department of
Natural Resources of the State of Missouri,
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students to choose between their religious
beliefs and receiving a government benefit.”
Here, however, taxpayers wishing to donate
to a QEP and claim a tax credit for that
donation are forced to choose between their
religious beliefs and a government benefit
because they cannot control whether the
donation is used to fund a religious
education.

analysis. However, reasonable doubt is
inherently and exclusively a standard of
factual proof. Nothing more. The question of
whether a statute conflicts with a federal or
state constitutional provision, whether
facially or as applied to a certain factual
scenario, is a pure question of law. Whether
facially or as applied, a statute either conflicts
with a constitutional provision as a matter of
law or it does not. Without reference to
“reasonable doubt” or “proof,” the proper
standard for reviewing the constitutionality
of statutes should be that statutes are
presumed constitutional until clearly
demonstrated to conflict with a constitutional
provision, whether facially or as applied to a
particular set of facts. The party challenging
the constitutionality of a statute has the
burden of demonstrating the asserted
unconstitutionality by appropriate legal
analysis.

Notwithstanding the additional analysis I
offer here, I concur with and join in this
Court’s Opinion.
SANDEFUR, Justice, concurring:
I concur in the ultimate result reached by the
Court and much of its reasoning. However, I
write separately to clearly state the reasons
for my concurrence.
As a preliminary aside not at issue, I reject
and condemn this Court’s continuing use of a
reasonable doubt standard for reviewing the
constitutionality of statutes. As it has many
times before, the Court again begins an
analysis of the constitutionality of a statue by
stating as the standard of review that:
[a] statute is presumed constitutional unless it
“conflicts with the constitution, in the
judgment of this court, beyond a reasonable
doubt.” The party challenging the
constitutionality of the statute bears the
burden of proof. If any doubt exists, it must
be resolved in favor of the statute.

Turning to the matters at issue, I concur that
the dollar-for-dollar private school tax credit
program embodied in §§ 15-30-3101 to 3114, MCA, is not a direct or indirect
“appropriation” as referenced in Article V,
Section 11(5), or Article X, Section 6, of the
Montana Constitution. In context, the
constitutional phrase “appropriation” from
“any public fund or monies” narrowly
connotes an expenditure or commitment of
public money in hand. I further concur that
the program does not effect a direct payment
from “any public fund or monies” as
referenced in Article X, Section 6.

Certainly, legislative enactments are and
should be presumed constitutional until
clearly demonstrated otherwise upon legal

I concur, however, that as applied to
religiously-affiliated private schools, the
private school tax credit program effects an
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indirect payment of public monies for a
sectarian purpose or to aid schools controlled
in whole or in part by a church, religious sect,
or religious denomination. Though it does not
effect a direct or indirect “appropriation” or a
direct payment, the program nonetheless
diverts, on a dollar-for-dollar basis, funds
otherwise earmarked and accrued to the
public purse in the form of tax liability
independently imposed by law. As applied to
religiously-affiliated private schools, the
undeniable purpose of the diversion is to
further a sectarian purpose—the proliferation
of the chosen religious beliefs and values of
the participating parents—thereby further
aiding private schools controlled in whole or
in part by the affiliated church, religious sect,
or religious denomination. As noted by the
majority and previously by this Court, “[t]he
most effective way to establish any
institution is to finance it.” The private school
tax program is a clever, even somewhat
ingenious, attempt by the Legislature to have
the State provide affirmative financial aid to
help parents enroll their children in private
schools, not coincidentally including
religiously-affiliated private schools. The
Legislature attempted to accomplish this
manifest objective through the guise of a
facially neutral statutory scheme that does
not reference religion or religiously-affiliated
schools and which directs an administrative
agency to administer the scheme in a
constitutional manner.

schools but, rather, merely to facilitate
parental educational choice without regard
for the choice made. They assert that any
secondary benefit to religiously-affiliated
schools is only incidental or de minimis.
Despite the superficial appeal of this
argument, closer examination quickly unveils
the false distinction on which it is premised.
Religiously-affiliated schools exist for the
purpose of providing a quality general
education, but with a specific emphasis on
religious beliefs and values not taught in
public schools. It is certainly conceivable that
some parents, even though they do not
subscribe to the affiliated religion, may
nonetheless choose a religiously-affiliated
school in pursuit of a quality general
education perceived to be unavailable in
public schools. However, the obvious and
indisputable fact is that most, if not all,
parents choose to send their children to a
religiously-affiliated school for the specific
purpose of educating their children with an
emphasis on particular religious beliefs and
values not taught in public schools. Providing
children with particular religious instruction
or emphasis incident to general education
unquestionably aids and benefits the exercise
and proliferation of those religious beliefs
and values—the very raison d’être for
religiously-affiliated schools. Tuition aids
also help maintain enrollment in religiouslyaffiliated schools, thereby helping facilitate
their continued existence and administration.
However neutrally characterized, a law
diverting money otherwise earmarked and
accrued to the public purse to allow parents
to choose religiously-affiliated schools is
clearly tantamount to an indirect payment of
government monies for a sectarian purpose

Plaintiffs assert, inter alia, that the program
does not violate Article X, Section 6, of the
Montana Constitution because the purpose
and effect of the program is not to further a
sectarian purpose or aid religiously-affiliated
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and aids schools controlled in whole or in part
by a particular church, religious sect, or
religious denomination.

First Amendment to the United States
Constitution. As applied to the states through
the
Fourteenth
Amendment,
the
Establishment Clause clearly, broadly, and
unequivocally prohibits state governments
from “mak[ing]” any “law respecting an
establishment of religion . . . .” As applied to
religiously-affiliated schools, and for the
same reasons that it violates Article X,
Section 6, of the Montana Constitution, the
private school tax credit program constitutes
a state law “respecting an establishment of
religion.” Whether viewed objectively or
through the subjective view of the churches
or religious denominations that provide and
control religiously-affiliated schools, the
provision of government tuition subsidies,
aids, or incentives to facilitate enrollment in
those schools is a substantial, if not essential,
aid to the proliferation of the affiliated
religions and the continued existence and
administration of the schools.

As an ancillary matter not necessary to the
Court’s decision in light of its primary
holding, I further concur with the majority
that the Department of Revenue exceeded the
scope of its administrative rulemaking
authority in adopting Rule 1. Regardless of
its general charge to the Department to
administer the private school tax credit
program in a constitutional manner, the
Legislature has long provided that
administrative agencies have no authority to
promulgate rules conflicting with or
otherwise limiting a clear and unequivocal
statutory provision. The Legislature put the
Department in a hopelessly untenable
position—it enacted a facially neutral
statutory scheme with obvious application,
inter alia, to an unconstitutional purpose and
effect, and then inconsistently charged the
Department with the task of administering
the scheme in a constitutional manner. The
only way for the Department to carry out the
Legislature’s mandate was to administer the
program in a manner inconsistent with the
manifest intent and express provision of the
statute—by declaring the tax credit
unavailable to help fund the cost of sending
children to religiously-affiliated schools.

Finally, I concur with the majority and
Justice Gustafson’s concurrence, that as
applied to the private school tax credit
program as it applies to religiously-affiliated
schools, Montana’s constitutional prohibition
on the indirect payment of public monies for
sectarian purposes or to aid schools
controlled in whole or in part by a church,
religious sect, or denomination does not
violate the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment
to the United States
Constitution. As applied to state governments
through the Fourteenth Amendment, the Free
Exercise Clause does nothing more than
clearly, broadly, and unequivocally prohibit
state governments from “mak[ing]” any “law
. . . prohibiting the free exercise” of religion.

I further concur with the Court’s implicit
holding, and Justice Gustafson’s express
concurrence, that as applied to religiouslyaffiliated schools, the private school tax
credit program not only violates Article X,
Section 6, of the Montana Constitution, but
also violates the Establishment Clause of the
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Regardless of the increasingly value-driven
hairsplitting
and overstretching that
unnecessarily complicates its modern
jurisprudence, the Free Exercise Clause is
nothing more than a protective shield against
government interference in the free exercise
of a citizen’s chosen religion or religious
views. The Free Exercise Clause is not, nor
did the Framers intend it to be, a sword or
affirmative right to receive government aid—
precisely the manifestly intended purpose
and effect of the private school tax credit
program as applied to religiously-affiliated
schools. Though there may indeed be some
room for “play” in reconciling the
Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses, the
bottom line is that the Free Exercise Clause
only prohibits the government from
interfering with the exercise of religious
beliefs, practices, and, by extension, related
activities and operations of religious and
affiliated entities. As applied to the private
school tax credit program, Montana’s
constitutional ban on sectarian aid does not in
any way interfere with or otherwise
substantially burden the preexisting First
Amendment right of parents to send their
children to religiously-affiliated schools
without government-imposed interference or
impediment. Parents who wish to send their
children to religiously-affiliated schools can
and will continue to do so without
government inference or impediment, just as
they always have. As applied here, Article X,
Section 6, of the Montana Constitution
merely prohibits state and local governments
from affirmatively promoting or facilitating
the exercise of religious beliefs by diverting
or foregoing government tax revenue for that
purpose. The right to freely exercise religious

beliefs without government interference or
impediment cannot be reasonably stretched
to require the state and its taxpayers to help
pay for the exercise of that right through the
diversion of otherwise earmarked and
accrued government tax revenue.
Nor does Montana’s broad constitutional ban
on
sectarian
aid
unconstitutionally
discriminate on the basis of religion. Article
X, Section 6 may well have broader
application that might be problematic in
some other context. But, as specifically
applied to the particular private school tax
credit at issue and its application to
religiously-affiliated schools, Article X,
Section 6 does not discriminate against the
exercise of religion any more than the First
Amendment Establishment Clause already
lawfully does, just as intended and expressly
provided by the Framers of the United States
Constitution.
Having greatly benefitted from eight years of
attendance in a religiously-affiliated
elementary and middle school, I certainly
understand the value and import to parents of
educating their children with an emphasis on
their chosen religious beliefs and values,
parents’ desire to further the proliferation of
those beliefs and values, parents’
fundamental right to make that choice for
their children without governmental
interference or impediment, and the
concerted, well-intentioned efforts of
powerful social and political forces to
advance the proliferation of their respective
religious beliefs in our state and country.
However, the federal and state constitutional
prohibitions on government aid for sectarian
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purposes respectively embodied in the First
Amendment Establishment Clause and
Article X, Section 6, of the Montana
Constitution do not conflict, and are perfectly
consistent, with the fundamental right to
freely exercise one’s chosen religion. In
balanced tandem, the Establishment and Free
Exercise Clauses form one of the
cornerstones upon which our country and
federal and state constitutions were founded
and framed to the benefit and protection of
all—the clear separation of church and state
regardless of the will of the majority at any
given time. The Court today fulfills its
constitutional oath and duty to neutrally
recognize, enforce, and maintain that critical
constitutional balance under our state and
federal constitutions.

government establishment of religion and the
restraint
against
government
action
interfering with its free exercise. The
Montana
Constitutional
Convention
Delegates, seeking to avoid “jeopardiz[ing]
the precarious historical balance which has
been struck between opposing doctrines and
countervailing
principles,”
Montana
Constitutional
Convention,
Committee
Proposals, Feb. 22, 1972, p. 728, preserved
the 1889 State Constitution’s protection
against direct or indirect public funding for
sectarian purposes. As the Court accurately
observes, other than stylistic changes, the
Delegates maintained the language, and thus
the meaning, of the 1889 Constitution when
they adopted Article X, Section 6. Opinion,
¶¶ 21, 25. The Court today seeks to outline a
logical framework for examining claimed
violations of Article X, Section 6, of the
Montana Constitution. But it does not adhere
to controlling principles of law in analyzing
§ 15-30-3111, MCA, and Rule 1 within that
framework.

I concur.
BAKER, Justice, dissenting:
I agree that the Department overstepped its
executive authority when it adopted Rule 1
because the enabling legislation did not
trump existing statutory limitations on an
agency’s rulemaking authority. Rule 1
conflicts with § 15-30-3111, MCA, and was
an ultra vires act by the Department. I do not
join the Court’s Opinion, however, because,
in my view, the Court oversteps its own
authority in invalidating § 15-30-3111, MCA
(the
Tax
Credit
Program),
as
unconstitutional.

The Court begins with a fundamental mistake
that permeates the remainder of the Opinion
and flaws its conclusions. Relying in part on
the title of Section 6, the Court makes a
sweeping statement that the provision
broadly prohibits “aid” to sectarian schools.
Recognizing the first principle of statutory
construction—to examine the plain meaning
of the words used—it nonetheless skips over
the words used in Section 6 to divine the
Delegates’ intent. Throughout the Opinion,
the Court then applies its broad construct of
“aid” to draw conclusions on each element
within its outlined framework.

Cases that test the limits of the government’s
involvement in matters of religion are
difficult, in no small part because of the
constitutional tension between prohibited
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Let’s back up a step. Article X, Section 6,
says that the government “shall not make any
direct or indirect appropriation or payment
from any public fund or monies, or any grant
of lands or other property for any sectarian
purpose or to aid any church, . . . or other . .
. institution, controlled in whole or in part by
any church, sect, or denomination.” In
purporting to identify the “three main
inquiries” required in its analysis, the Court
applies the sweeping term “aid” instead of the
textual “appropriation or payment from any
public fund or monies.” As an established
principle of statutory construction, we do not
rely on a provision’s title over the language
contained within its text. The operative
language in the text is “direct or indirect
appropriation or payment from any public
fund or monies.” Without examining what
that language plainly means, the Court
employs a broad meaning of “aid” for its
analysis. I begin with the plain language.

of money out of that which may be in the
treasury in a given year, to specified objects
or demands against the state. It means the
setting apart of a portion of the public funds
for a public purpose, and there must be
money in the fund applicable to the
designated purpose to constitute an
appropriation.
A “payment” is the “[p]erformance of an
obligation by the delivery of money or some
other valuable thing . . . .” The Constitution
likewise extends this prohibition to “any
grant of lands or other property”—other
items of value that the government must own,
or be entitled to, before it can effectuate a
delivery to another. Article X, Section 6,
using the disjunctive “or,” distinguishes an
“appropriation” from a “payment.” As
discussed above, an appropriation comes
“from the law-making body” or the
“legislature” to “expend” or “apply” money
“from the state treasury.” A “payment,” in
contrast, is attenuated from the law-making
body. The Legislature cannot “appropriate”
funds “to any private individual, private
association, or private corporation not under
control of the state.” “Payments” are made by
the Executive Branch carrying out its
appropriated spending authority, for
example, by spending on contracts or by
awarding grants.

Article X, Section 6(1) prohibits four actions:
(1) direct appropriations;
(2) indirect appropriations;
(3) direct payments; or
(4) indirect payments
from public funds or monies. The first step is
to examine what is an “appropriation” and
what is a “payment.” “A long line of Montana
cases has established that ‘appropriation’
refers only to the authority given to the
legislature to expend money from the state
treasury.” We discussed the nature of state
appropriations in Dixon, explaining:

For illustrative purposes, using the SSO
Program as an example, the plain language of
Article X, Section 6, would apply to the
following:
1. Direct Appropriation: the Legislature
appropriates $3 million to QEPs as defined in
the statute, including religious schools;

“Appropriation” means an authority from the
law-making body in legal form to apply sums

730

2. Indirect Appropriation: the Legislature
appropriates $3 million to SSOs, which then
award the funds to QEPs, including religious
schools;

In this regard, “we have long adhered to
ordinary rules of grammar” in construing
statutes. As the Court observes, the same
principles of statutory construction apply
when we interpret constitutional provisions.
To invalidate the statute on the basis that it
indirectly impacts sectarian schools to the
detriment of the public fisc violates ordinary
rules of grammar, as it requires reading
“indirect” to modify “aid” rather than
“appropriation or payment.” The clause, “any
direct or indirect appropriation or payment
from any public funds or monies . . . for any
sectarian purpose or to aid any” sectarian
institutions, contains at least two modifiers of
“appropriation or payment.” The first, “direct
or indirect,” modifies the parallel terms
“appropriation or payment.” It thus prohibits
any appropriations or payments, whether
direct or indirect. What follows are nonparallel prepositional phrases, which describe
from where these appropriations or payments
may not be taken—“any public fund or
monies”—and for what these appropriations
or payments may not be used—“any
sectarian purpose” or “to aid” sectarian
institutions. The sentence structure means
that
“direct
or
indirect” modifies
“appropriation or payment,” and does not
modify the non-parallel phrases “from public
funds or monies” or “to aid any” sectarian
school.

3. Direct Payment: (a) the Office of Public
Instruction (OPI) implements a grant
program to award grants from its general
fund budget to QEPs, including religious
schools, or contracts with religious schools to
hire teachers, or (b) the State Land Board
donates a section of state trust land to a QEP
on which to build a religious school;
4. Indirect Payment: (a) OPI grants funds to
SSOs to provide teachers to religious schools,
or (b) the State Land Board donates a section
of state trust land to an SSO, which then
auctions the land to support QEPs, including
religious schools, or conveys the land for a
sectarian school building site.
There is little dispute that the Tax Credit
Program’s tax credit does not constitute a
direct appropriation or payment. The
Department argues instead that the District
Court erred by failing to consider the indirect
impact that targeted tax breaks have on the
public fisc. It emphasizes that the tax breaks
indirectly aid sectarian schools. This
argument becomes the lynchpin for the
Court’s holding. The argument may be
correct, as far as it goes. But a theory based
upon “indirect impacts” or “indirect effects”
of the Tax Credit Program diverges from the
constitutional
text.
Unambiguous
constitutional language must be given its
plain, natural, and ordinary meaning.

The funds at issue pass from donor to SSO to
student-selected school; they are accounted
for in the public fisc by virtue of the dollarfor-dollar offset. Although this may be an
indirect transfer of benefit to the studentselected school, the word “indirect,” by itself,
does not impose a prohibition upon all tax
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policies merely because they have that
indirect effect. Rather, “indirect” modifies
the subject of the clause, which is the
“payment.” Thus, the provision prohibits
government agencies from making payments
from a public fund or monies to religious
schools indirectly. In this case, the funds
eligible for tax credits are not “payment from
any public fund or monies.” The creation of
the credit is a government’s determination
not to collect tax revenues. The statute diverts
the funds before they ever become public
monies. This well may result in an indirect
impact on the “public fund or monies,” but it
is not an indirect payment.

The concern about “indirect payments” that
undergirded the Delegates’ decision to readopt the subject provisions in the 1972
Constitution was the possibility that
government would appropriate funding for
religious schools through intermediaries,
necessitating retention of the language
prohibiting “indirect” payments. “[I]t would
be fairly easy to appropriate a number of
funds and then-to [sic] some other group and
then say this will be done indirectly.” The
Constitutional Convention was held one year
after this Court had decided Montana State
Welfare Board v. Lutheran Social Services,
in which we rejected the State Welfare
Board’s argument that payment of medical
benefits to a woman using a religiously
affiliated adoption agency would violate the
Constitution—and two years after this
Court’s decision in Chambers, in which we
distinguished property tax exemptions from
impermissible property tax levies in support
of religious schools. Delegate Loendorf,
sponsor of the proposal to retain the
“indirect” language that the Convention
ultimately adopted, stated that, under his
proposal, the provision “will continue to
mean and do whatever it does now,”
expressing an apparent desire to preserve the
status quo so recently stated by this Court.
Beyond indirect payments, the delegates did
not discuss tax credits or deductions for
private donations to religious schools.

Under the Tax Credit Program, the funds
originate with private donors and are donated
to the SSOs, which in turn direct the funds to
the student’s chosen school as a credit toward
the student’s obligation. No money
originates, is deposited into, or is expended
from the state treasury or any public fund.
The State never takes “title” to the donated
money or otherwise possesses it.
When this Court struck the property tax levy
for private schools in Chambers, it was
careful to distinguish its holding from
property tax exemptions for religious
institutions that had been upheld by the U.S.
Supreme Court in Walz. This was so even
though the 1889 Constitution, under which
Chambers was decided, contained the same
prohibition on payments “from any public
fund or moneys whatever” in aid of religious
schools, whether directly or indirectly, as in
the 1972 Constitution.

The Convention debates on Article X,
Section 6, thus reflect an intention that is
consistent with the plain language the
Delegates ultimately adopted. For this
reason, the Court’s reliance on Nelson to
divine a broader meaning is misplaced. The

732

Constitutional Convention record we
examined in Nelson directly discussed the
issue before the Court—the retention of
common-law privileges—and contained
thorough consideration explaining the
Delegates’ intention that such privileges
would survive the broad language of the
public’s right to know in Article II, Section 9.
Here, in contrast, the Convention transcript
contains zero discussion of the use of, or
prohibition against, tax incentives to
encourage donations to private schools. The
transcripts thus do not “clearly manifest an
intent not apparent from the express
language.”
Rather,
as
the
Court
acknowledges, the transcripts demonstrate
the Delegates’ desire to maintain the 1889
status quo.

constitutionality of a statute bears the burden
of proof. The Court mentions the heightened
standard that a facial challenge brings, but
falls short of actually analyzing the statute
under this standard. Conceivably, the statute
would not be applied unconstitutionally if a
student chose to apply her scholarship to a
non-sectarian private school. In such a case,
the tax credits offered under the statute would
not offend Article X, Section 6. The Court
dismisses
any
such
constitutional
applications because the statute contains “no
mechanism” for the Department to determine
whether the money will be used to indirectly
pay tuition at sectarian schools. This
conclusion is problematic for at least two
reasons. First, no one—not even the
Department—argued that every application
of the statute was unconstitutional under
Article X, Section 6. Rather, the Department
instituted Rule 1 to prohibit what it saw as
unconstitutional applications of the statute,
while still allowing what it saw as
constitutional applications to continue to
utilize the Tax Credit Program. Second, the
Court’s holding transforms almost any asapplied challenge into a facial challenge;
challenged statutes rarely have a built-in
mechanism to sift out unconstitutional
applications. The Court notably ignores the
statute’s severability clause until after it
already has thrown out the entire Tax Credit
Program.

Turning its focus to the specific provisions of
§ 15-30-3111, MCA, the Court strikes the
statute in its entirety as unconstitutional. The
Court concludes that the statute is facially
invalid. But it does not properly address the
difference between a facial and an as-applied
challenge, important here because the
Court’s analysis—and its rationale for
striking the statute—employs a strictly asapplied theory.
A party bringing a facial challenge “must
show that no set of circumstances exists
under which the statute would be valid or that
the statute lacks any plainly legitimate
sweep.” We presume that a statute is
constitutional, unless the Court is convinced
beyond a reasonable doubt that the statute
conflicts with the constitution. Any doubt
must be resolved in favor of upholding the
statute. Importantly, the party challenging the

The Court’s heavy reliance on Chambers,
e.g., fails because that case involved payment
from public monies to hire teachers at a
parochial high school—a plain violation of
the
prohibition
against
“direct
appropriations.” Even though the teachers
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were to give “a standard course of
instruction” at the sectarian school, the public
school district had no control over the
parochial school, and “it of necessity must
supplement these courses of instruction by
those required by the doctrines of the
Church.” Citing a Roman Catholic
Encyclical, the Court pointed out that every
subject taught must “be permeated with
Christian piety.” It was in this context—
public payment of teacher salaries—that the
Court concluded the lines between secular
and sectarian purposes were impermissibly
blurred. The case sheds no light on whether
Tax Credit Program at issue is facially invalid
simply because the Department does not
examine how a taxpayer’s contributions are
used.

Second, a fiscal note is simply the
Executive’s estimate of revenue and
spending impacts based on a series of
assumptions made by presumably affected
agencies. The Court relies on the
Department’s fiscal note assumptions to
support its conclusion that the statute is
facially unconstitutional because of how the
agency surmised the tax credit would be
used. Those assumptions reflect the
Department’s advocacy here—that Rule 1
was necessary to save the statute from
“aiding” sectarian schools. Whether the
Department’s assumptions were wellresearched or its predictions accurate is not
the point of an inquiry into the
constitutionality of the statute. They do not
represent the Legislature’s rationale for the
statute and do not control a facial analysis of
the statute’s constitutionality. Third, relying
on the assumption that many donors who
claim the tax credit also will be parents who
otherwise would be paying tuition reduces
the issue to a purely as-applied challenge. It
overlooks the instances in which the Tax
Credit Program could constitutionally be
applied.

In rejecting any valid application of the
statute, the Court’s singular focus is on the
Fiscal Note to Senate Bill 410. The Court
relies on the Fiscal Note to conclude that
many donors claiming the tax credit also
would be parents who send their children to
QEPs. It cites the Fiscal Note to demonstrate
“the fact that the Legislature indirectly pays
tuition to the QEP.” And it cites the Fiscal
Note in holding that the Tax Credit Program
“creates an indirect payment” by reducing
“the net price of attending private school.”
The Opinion contains no other support for its
key holding that the Tax Credit Program is an
indirect payment of tuition at private,
religiously affiliated schools.

Its failure to recognize constitutional
applications of the statute under Article X,
Section 6, undermines the Court’s
severability analysis, because—focusing
only on Article X, Section 6, as the Court
does—parts of the law would have valid
application. Tax credits could be afforded for
donations to private secular schools without
running afoul of that section. That said, given
its conclusion that the Tax Credit Program
violates the prohibition against aid to
religious schools,
First
Amendment

This is a problem. First, fiscal notes are
prepared by the Governor’s Office of Budget
and Program Planning, an agency of the
Executive Branch, not by the Legislature.
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considerations may require the Court’s
ultimate solution here—striking § 15-303111, MCA, in its entirety.

granting tax credits that may benefit religious
entities, among them Montana’s College
Contribution Credit, § 15-30- 2326, MCA,
and Qualified Endowment Credit, § 15-302328, MCA.

Quite remarkably, the Court dismisses any
Free Exercise Clause concerns by
proclaiming simply that “this is not one of
those cases.” I do not believe this issue so
easily may be discarded. The Department
acknowledges this as well, explaining that if
the Court holds the Tax Credit Program
unconstitutional, “the only way of respecting
both constitutional limits on the State is to
invalidate the private school tax-credit
program and sever it from the remaining
curricular innovation program.” A State’s
interest “in achieving greater separation of
church and State than is already ensured
under the Establishment Clause of the
Federal Constitution [] is limited by the Free
Exercise Clause.” The exclusion of a group
“from a public benefit for which it is
otherwise qualified, solely because it is a
church, is odious to our Constitution.” Only
an analysis of both Article X, Section 6, and
the Free Exercise Clause would eliminate all
applications of the tax credits, and the
Opinion offers no such analysis.

At the end of the day, this case—like others
involving the religion clauses—may be made
more difficult by the circuitous path a
legislative body designs in attempting to
advance policy within its constitutional
limits. It is in those instances that the Court’s
examination must be particularly precise.
Tax policy is within the Legislature’s
wheelhouse. Tax laws “that seek to influence
conduct are nothing new.” Quoting Justice
Joseph Story’s early treatise on the United
States Constitution, the NFIB Court pointed
out that “the taxing power is often, very often,
applied for other purposes, than revenue.”
The Montana Constitution does not bar the
Legislature from setting tax policy to
encourage any manner of private action,
including incentivizing individuals to support
certain philanthropic undertakings, religious
or otherwise. Precisely because there is “play
in the joints” between prohibited
establishment and interference with free
exercise, the Court should hew closely to the
constitutional text and uphold statutes unless
their invalidity is established beyond a
reasonable doubt. Even if “it differs from our
idea of wise legislation, . . . with the wisdom
and policy of legislation, the courts have
nothing to do.”

The Court today holds that a tax credit—
granted to a private individual for a donation
that may or may not be directed to a religious
entity—violates the State Constitution, even
though it is clear under the law that a direct
tax exemption by the State to a church does
not. As discussed above, the Delegates did
not “clearly manifest” this intent in their
discussions of Article X, Section 6. Although
the Court does not mention them, its ruling
calls into question numerous other state laws

I dissent and would affirm the District Court
on the grounds discussed above.
RICE, Justice, dissenting:

735

I concur in Justice Baker’s dissenting
opinion, and offer the following further
thoughts.

interpretation ignores, for the most part, the
plain language of the Constitution and our
Constitutional history.

First, this case was pled and litigated as a
challenge brought by the Plaintiffs against
the Department’s enactment of Rule 1. The
Plaintiffs gave notice of their challenge,
stating “the Department of Revenue’s Rule 1
implementing the [Scholarship] program
violates Named Plaintiffs’ rights under the
Montana and U.S. Constitutions” and that
“the Department of Revenue’s rule is
inconsistent with the statutory language and
intent.” In response, the Attorney General
elected not to defend the Rule. No challenge
to the constitutionality of § 15-30-3111,
MCA, was ever made or noticed and,
therefore, the Attorney General was not
provided an opportunity to appear and defend
its constitutionality. While the State is a
party, and therefore, had notice of the
proceeding itself, no challenge to the statute
was made within the proceeding, and,
consequently, the issue was not noticed,
briefed, or argued. The Court has raised the
constitutionality of the statute sua sponte.
Striking a statute under such circumstances,
including without notice, briefing or
argument, and an opportunity for the parties
and Attorney General to argue the issue, is a
violation of due process and an inappropriate
exercise of the Court’s powers.

The Court summarily declares that the
subject Scholarship Program “aids sectarian
schools” in violation of Article X, Section 6,
of the Montana Constitution, a conclusion
that is factually and legally incorrect. First, as
the Department acknowledges, the Program
is facially neutral, and does not require any
benefit to accrue to a particular school,
religious or otherwise. The Program is
voluntary, funded by charitable donations,
and, consistent with its stated legislative
purpose to promote school choice, is entirely
directed by private action, without
government direction, as follows: (1) the
charitable donor has a choice, first, whether
to donate, and, second, whether to donate to
the private or to the public school scholarship
program, but may not direct contributions to
specific schools; (2) the student and
parents/guardians choose the qualifying
private institution, whether religious or nonreligious, which the student will attend and to
which a scholarship is directed; and (3) the
SSO must direct the scholarship to the
institution, religious or non-religious, chosen
by the student’s family, and may not
otherwise reserve or restrict scholarships for
use at a particular school. Thus, a religiously
affiliated school cannot be designated by the
donor, the SSO, or the government—only by
students and their families.

On the merits of its analysis, the Court’s
conclusions are largely devoid of supporting
authority, and I concur with Justice Baker
that the Court is not interpreting the Montana
Constitution in accordance with established
legal principles. Indeed, the Court’s

Further, the beneficiary of the Program is not
the school, but the student/family receiving
the scholarship, because they are relieved of
a portion of their financial obligation for the
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student’s attendance at a private school. This
is separate from the private school itself,
which must be paid the same tuition
regardless of any assistance from the
Program. Other courts have widely
recognized this principle.

government extraction and expenditure of tax
dollars, or by other coercive means.
Because the scholarships are directed by
students and families, and there is no
government action endorsing or directing
funds for sectarian or religious purposes,
there is no significance to the fact that more
Program options are currently available for
students choosing to attend private religious
schools than private non-religious schools.
The same was true for the private religious
adoption agencies at issue in Lutheran Soc.
Servs. Other courts have widely recognized
this principle. As stated by the U.S. Supreme
Court, the “constitutionality of a neutral
education aid program simply does not turn
on whether and why, in a particular area, at a
particular time, most private schools are run
by religious organizations, or most recipients
choose to use the aid at a religious school.”
The Program simply creates a neutral
opportunity for genuine independent choices
of donors and scholarship recipients, and
provides that the beneficiaries of the program
are the scholarship recipients.

Similar to our acknowledgment in Mont.
State Welfare Bd. v. Lutheran Soc. Servs., of
the “purely incidental” benefit that inured to
the private adoption agency under the
indigent mother’s assistance program,
Kotterman recognized that programs such as
the Scholarship Program can have “ripple
effects” that “radiate to infinity,” but that
these are not constitutionally significant. Any
benefit of the Scholarship Program flowing
from the private donor’s voluntary
contribution to the SSO, and then, if the
student and family so chose, to a qualified
religiously-affiliated school, is incidental and
attenuated. Indeed, it is even more attenuated
than the benefit provided by the government
program in Lutheran Soc. Servs., because the
Scholarship Program does not involve money
that issues from a government fund. As the
U.S. Supreme Court has stated for
establishment clause purposes, “government
programs that neutrally provide benefits to a
broad class of citizens defined without
reference to religion” are not invalid merely
“because sectarian institutions may also
receive an attenuated financial benefit.” The
Program stands in stark contrast, factually
and legally, to the levy imposed upon
taxpayers in State ex rel. Chambers v. Sch.
Dist., 155 Mont., as Montana taxpayers have
not been implicated in, or made to support, a
sectarian or religious activity by way of

Thus, in my view, the Court’s conclusion that
the Program “permits the Legislature to
indirectly pay” sectarian schools, is not
supported by the facts here, and, as Justice
Baker’s dissenting opinion also illustrates, is
not supported by the plain language of the
Constitution or the history of the
Constitutional Convention. This conclusion
follows the Department’s troubling argument
that the Scholarship Program is a “diversion”
of “public funds” by the Legislature. The
argument is premised on the Department’s
theory that the base tax liability each taxpayer
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will owe to the State on income that the
taxpayer will earn should be considered
“public funds,” and that all tax liability—
even potential liability on potential income,
before a taxpayer timely completes the tax
return process and applies deductions and
credits for the entire year—is the property of
the State, until such time a proper tax return
is filed and the state permits a credit for the
year’s donations to be made against the
taxpayer’s liability. The Department’s view,
that “‘[t]ax expenditures’ are monetary
subsidies the government bestows on
particular individuals or organizations by
granting them preferential tax treatment . . .
the various deductions, credits and loopholes
[] are just spending by another name,”1 might
be correct for purposes of internal state
government budgeting, § 5-4-104, MCA, but
it is an utter misstatement of the fundamental
right of private property ownership. A
citizen’s income—all income of each year,
every year—belongs to the citizen until such
time the proper portion thereof becomes
owed to the government; the government
does not own all income until the citizen
demonstrates otherwise. At the time a citizen
donates to the Scholarship Program, the tax
year has not ended, the donor’s total income
may not have been earned, the tax return
process has not been timely initiated, and the
donor’s potential tax liability is unknown.
The government cannot at that time “own”
the unknown tax liability as a public fund, or
even an asset, regardless of whether the tax
credit is “dollar-for-dollar” or otherwise, and
regardless of the previous year’s tax law.
“[U]nder such reasoning all taxpayer income
could be viewed as belonging to the state

because it is subject to taxation by the
legislature.”
A study of history reminds us that
governments
have
oppressed
or
discriminated against citizens based upon
their religious faith over millennia. Today,
courts are to ensure that the citizen’s free
exercise of religion is not violated by the
government. As the U.S. Supreme Court has
stated in a recent religious rights case, “all
officials must pause to remember their own
high duty to the Constitution and to the rights
it secures.” I thus disagree with the Court’s
determination that it need not entertain the
Plaintiffs’ pled free exercise claims because
“this is not one of those cases.”
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“Supreme Court to Hear School Choice Case”
U.S. News
Lauren Camera
June 28, 2019
The U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear oral
arguments this fall concerning a decision by
Montana's Supreme Court to halt the
operation of a tax credit scholarship program
that allowed students to enroll in private
schools, including private religious schools.

choice advocacy organization that DeVos
formerly led, said in a statement.
"This could be the most impactful Supreme
Court case since the pivotal Zelman decision
in 2002, which ruled that state-level voucher
programs are constitutional," he said. "This
Montana case has the opportunity to
definitively establish that religious schools
cannot be excluded from school choice
programs by virtue of their religion."

The announcement Friday breathed new life
into the private school choice movement,
which has made little to no headway at the
federal level despite a tax credit scholarship
being the No. 1 agenda item of Secretary of
Education Betsy Devos, herself a private
school choice supporter.

But opponents of private school choice
programs, including teachers unions, argued
that the separation of church is a fundamental
pillar to the U.S. Constitution.

Private school choice advocates cheered the
decision by the high court to review Espinoza
v. Montana Department of Revenue, saying
they're hopeful the court will provide a
definitive answer on the constitutionality of
directing public money or aid to private
religious schools.

"This long tradition – established to ensure
the religious freedom of all – should be
protected by conservatives and liberals
alike," said Randi Weingarten, president of
the
1.7-million-member
American
Federation of Teachers. "It's alarming that the
current Supreme Court would try to revisit
and undo that precedent, in public schools no
less, as it sets a dangerous standard and opens
the door to the dismantling of a basic tenet of
our nation's democracy."

"We are incredibly pleased to learn that the
Supreme Court will hear oral arguments this
fall on the Montana tax credit scholarship
case, which could fundamentally alter the
landscape for school choice across the
country," John Schilling, president of the
American Federation of Children, the school

The specific question the court will consider
is whether the state of Montana violates the
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First Amendment by prohibiting students and
families who choose to enroll in private
religious schools from participating in the
state's tax credit scholarship program, which
provides tuition assistance to students to
attend private school.

inoperable. The state's Constitution includes
language that bars direct and indirect aid to
religious institutions – just one of the 37
states that's adopted what's known as a Blaine
Amendment.
The Trump administration has not
commented on the Montana case, but earlier
this month the Justice Department lent its
support to three families seeking to require
the state of Maine to pay tuition for their
children to attend religious high schools.

The program was enacted in 2015 and served
25 students with an average scholarship of
$500 during the 2016-17 school year. In
2018, the Montana Supreme Court ruled the
program unconstitutional, rendering it

740

“Religious-School Scholarships Draw U.S. Supreme Court Review”
Bloomberg
Greg Stohr
June 28, 2019
The U.S. Supreme Court added a new
religion case to the calendar for its next term,
agreeing to rule on a Montana tax-credit
program that generates scholarship money
for students who attend private schools.

The 2015 scholarship program gives
individuals and corporations a tax credit for
contributing up to $150 to an organization
that funds scholarships to help needy students
attend private schools.

The high court on Friday agreed to hear
arguments from three parents who have used
money from the program to send their
children to a Christian school.

The only organization formed under the law,
Blue Sky Scholarships, supports just one
non-religious school along with 12 religious
schools, the state says. Big Sky awarded 54
scholarships during the most recent school
year, totaling $27,000.

The Montana Supreme Court struck down the
program as violating a state constitutional
provision that bars aid to religious schools.
The parents say that ruling violates the U.S.
Constitution.

The parents sued after the Department of
Revenue issued a rule that barred use of
scholarship money at religious schools. A
trial judge blocked the rule before the
Montana Supreme Court threw out the entire
program.

Montana officials say the state court was
right to invalidate the entire program if any of
the money would go to religious schools. The
state Department of Revenue says more than
90% of the scholarships go to students
attending religious schools.

The case is Espinoza v. Montana Department
of Revenue, 18-1195.
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“If the Supreme Court Hears This Case, It Could Change The Face Of Public
Education”

Forbes
Peter Greene
June 13, 2019
This summer the US Supreme Court is
expected to decide whether or not to
hear Espinoza v. Montana Department of
Revenue. If it hears the case, its decision will
have huge repercussions for public
education. To grasp why this case matters
and why it's coming up now, there are two
pieces of background you need to understand.

Tax Credit Scholarships do an end run around
the wall. A business or wealthy individual
gives a contribution to a special "scholarship"
organization that then hands out scholarships
to private schools. The state lets the business
or wealthy individual count that contribution
as some or all of their tax liability. Think of
it this way: I'm the state, and you owe me
$100. I am not allowed to gamble, but if you
give that $100 to my bookie instead, I'll
consider us square.

Tax Credit Scholarships
Tax credit scholarships are yet another
variation on a school voucher program. With
vouchers, a family picks the school it wants
its child to attend, and the state hands that
child's "share" of education funding to that
school. The problem is that when a family
chooses a religious school (as is often the
case), that can run afoul of the separation of
church and state in general, and Blaine
Amendment laws in particular. The Blaine
Amendment was a failed Constitutional
amendment that prohibited spending tax
dollars on sectarian schools; 38 states
adopted it for their own constitutions. It's not
an easy law to defend, because it rose out of
nativist reaction to immigrant Catholics, even
if does fit with the wall between church and
state.

Rules vary from state to state (in Georgia, for
example, contributors can actually turn a
profit on the TCS donation). But one feature
is constant--whatever money is fed into the
TCS represents money subtracted from state
revenue. This, it should also be noted, is the
model for Betsy DeVos's proposed Education
Freedom Scholarships. In all cases, these are
vouchers dressed up with fancy accounting.
A Church Parking Lot In Missouri
The other factor here is Trinity Lutheran v.
Comer. The case seems like small potatoes; a
church in Missouri wanted to apply for a
public monies grant to help resurface its
playground. It was disqualified because it's a
church. The case ended its five-year trek to
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the Supreme Court in 2017, and Chief Justice
Roberts said, "The exclusion of Trinity
Lutheran from a public benefit for which it is
otherwise qualified, solely because it is a
church, is odious to our Constitution … and
cannot stand.” This was a big deal because,
as Bloomberg noted:

claiming it broke the law. The Montana
Supreme Court agreed that the tax credit
benefited religious schools and therefore
broke the rules.
The case has found its way very quickly to
the Supreme Court, and the long list of very
conservative and religious school choice fans
filing amicus briefs lets us know just how
much some folks are hoping the Supremes
will reverse Montana's own high court. Cato
Institute, EdChoice, Christian Legal Society,
Liberty Justice Center, Becket Fund for
Religious Liberty, Wisconsin Institute for
Law and Liberty, Georgia Goal Scholarship
Program, Alliance for Choice in Education,
and former governor Scott Walker are among
the many who have been urging SCOTUS to
take this case and run with it.

It’s the first time the court has used
the free exercise clause of the
Constitution to require a direct
transfer of taxpayers’ money to a
church. In other words, the free
exercise clause has trumped the
establishment clause, which was
created precisely to stop government
money going to religious purposes.
Some of the majority tried to rein in the
implications of the case by noting it was a
ruling strictly about playground resurfacing.
Justices Gorsuch and Thomas, however,
indicated
that
they
believed
that
discriminating against religious practices was
not okay "on the playground or anywhere
else."

The case matters because it could extend the
Trinity Lutheran notion that free exercise
beats the establishment clause. The case
matters because it could open the door wide
to the use of public tax dollars for private
religious schools. The court could also drive
a stake through the heart of voucher programs
aimed at shuttling public funds to private
religious schools, no matter how clever and
convoluted the voucher scheme may be. That
last possibility seems less likely, because, as
with many issues beloved by the right, this is
an issue that may be facing the friendliest
court in many decades. This is definitely one
case to watch for this summer.

Meanwhile, In Montana
Montana's legislature tried to get a voucher
foot in the door with the Montana Tax Credit
Scholarship Program, which allowed a notvery-staggering tax credit of $150. There was
just one problem; the Montana Department of
Revenue wouldn't implement the program,
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“The Supreme Court has a chance to uphold school choice and religious liberty”
The Hill
Jamie Gass and Ben Degrow
June 20, 2019
The Supreme Court of the United States is
expected to decide whether to hear Espinoza
v. Montana Department of Revenue, a case
that reveals the harm a state constitutional
amendment marked by religious bias can do
to families.

a dark, bigoted chapter of history that still
limit educational opportunities for students
and families who need them most.
The case offers the U.S. Supreme Court the
opportunity to reject the last vestiges of 19th
century,
anti-Catholic
legal
discrimination that remain in nearly 40
states. Massachusetts has the oldest
discriminatory amendment and Michigan has
the most recent, but both are considered to be
among the worst.

Kendra Espinoza, who suddenly became a
single mom, sought a better education for her
daughters. In their public schools, one
daughter was bullied and the other struggled
academically. Both later would thrive in
parochial school.

In the mid-1850s, in the wake of Irish
immigration, Massachusetts’ virulently antiCatholic Know-Nothing party passed the
nation’s first anti-aid amendment, which,
along with a revised amendment added in the
early 20th century, prohibits any
governmental unit from disbursing public
funds to parochial-school parents.

After the Montana Supreme Court struck
down her state’s education tax credit
program, Espinoza was denied access
to scholarships her children badly needed.
She and two other Montana moms facing
similar plights have asked the nation’s
highest court to weigh in.
Nationally, over 250,000 students benefit
from
private-school
choice
through
education tax credits. The basis for the
Montana court’s decision was the state’s
130-year-old anti-aid, or Blaine, amendment.
The state constitutional provisions in
Montana, along with those in our respective
states of Massachusetts and Michigan,
represent distinct but formidable legacies of

Today, these anti-aid amendments prevent
more than 100,000 urban Bay State families
with children in chronically underperforming
districts from receiving education vouchers
and tax credits that would grant them greater
school choice.
In the late 19th century, President Ulysses S.
Grant proposed an anti-aid amendment to the
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federal constitution. Maine Congressman
James G. Blaine’s anti-aid bill followed,
falling just short of congressional approval.
Ultimately, his nativist scheming encouraged
states to adopt anti-aid amendments in their
own constitutions.

families paying private school tuition. One
pro-initiative brochure noted that the measure
would overwhelmingly deny funds to
“schools owned by the clergy of one
politically active church.”
In the half-century since Michigan’s anti-aid
initiative passed, about half the states —
including some with less onerous Blaine
amendments — have adopted some form of
private school parental choice. Yet harmful
constitutional language still denies many
Massachusetts and Michigan families equal
access to educational options aligned to the
dictates of their consciences.

Michigan’s turn came nearly a century later,
as then-Gov. William Milliken sought to
direct state aid to private and religious
schools. While Reformed and Lutheran
leaders were among those seeking financial
support, the ensuing backlash took full aim at
the most prominent target. “There can be no
doubt in the mind of any informed observer,”
private school choice opponents wrote in
1969, “that the goal of the Catholic Church
hierarchy is complete tax support for its
schools.”

The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that
our Constitution’s First Amendment allows
states to give families options between
religious and nonreligious schools. Now the
justices can take a close look at removing
additional barriers to choice.

Resistance to the governor’s proposal,
referred to as “parochiaid,” stoked the flames
of bigotry. “I have never witnessed such antiCatholic sentiment in my life,” one state
senator observed.

Thanks to Kendra Espinoza, a determined
Montana mom, the court has the opportunity
to take up and strike down the infamous
legacy of state Know-Nothing and Blaine
amendments. From Massachusetts to
Michigan and across the nation, many
families’ hopes for more educational choice
and religious liberty hang in the balance.

Some of that sentiment carried over to a
successful 1970 ballot initiative campaign.
Advocates for church-state separation joined
forces with the teachers unions to prohibit
both direct and indirect state support for
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“Montana Supreme Court Strikes Down Tax-Credit Program for Private Schools”
Education Week
Mark Walsh
December 13, 2018
Montana's highest court has struck down a
tuition tax-credit program which, as enacted
by that state's legislature, allowed tuition
scholarships to benefit students at private
religious schools as well as secular schools.

of Revenue. "The legislature's enactment of
the Tax Credit Program is facially
unconstitutional and violates Montana's
constitutional guarantee to all Montanans that
their government will not use state funds to
aid religious schools."

The program, which provides a tax credit of
up to $150 per year to individuals and
corporations that donate to tuition
scholarship organizations, violates the state
constitution's provision barring government
aid to "sectarian schools," the Montana
Supreme Court ruled 5-2. The program could
not be saved by a rule adopted by the state
department of revenue that excluded private
religious schools from participation, the court
further held.

Writing in a dissent joined by one other
member of the court, Justice Beth Baker said
the scholarship funds never truly become
public funds because they are donated to
private scholarship organizations, and thus
the inclusion of religious schools as
beneficiaries does not violate the state
constitutional bar against indirect aid to
religion.
A legal organization representing religious
school families who would have benefited
from the tax-credit program as enacted by the
legislature vowed to appeal to the U.S.
Supreme Court.

The state high court ruled that the Montana
Constitution "more broadly prohibits 'any'
state aid to sectarian schools and draws a
more stringent line than that drawn by" the
U.S. Constitution's prohibition against
government establishment of religion.

"Not only is the court misinterpreting the
Montana Constitution, but it is ignoring
important provisions in the federal
Constitution," Erica Smith, a lawyer with the
Arlington,
Va.-based
Institute
for
Justice, said in a statement. "The U.S.
Supreme Court has been clear that the First
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution

"Therefore, the sole issue in this case is
whether the Tax Credit Program runs afoul of
Montana's specific sectarian education no-aid
provision, Article X, Section 6," Justice
Laurie McKinnon wrote for the majority on
Dec. 12 in Espinoza v. Montana Department
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prevents the government from discriminating
against religious individuals in awarding
public benefits. We plan to immediately
appeal."

Montana's 1889 Constitution. (The state in
1972 adopted a new constitution, which kept
language barring direct and indirect aid to
religious institutions.)

Those families, in their suit that challenged
the revenue department rule that sought to
save the tax-credit program by barring
religious schools, allege that there was antiCatholic sentiment behind the inclusion of
the no-aid-to-sectarian-schools provision in

The U.S. Supreme Court has recently been
skeptical of state programs that exclude
religious institutions from general aid
programs, but it has left open the question of
how it would analyze such aid to religious
schools.
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June Medical Services v. Gee
Ruling Below: June Medical Services v. Gee, 905 F. 3d 787 (5th Cir. 2018).
Overview: Louisiana created a law that required doctors who perform abortions to have the
authority to admit patients at a hospital within 30 miles of the clinic that the doctor provides
abortion care. The Louisiana law was scheduled to go into effect on Monday, February 4, 2019.
Abortion providers went to the Supreme Court to bar the Louisiana law from going into effect and
the Supreme Court has put the law on hold indefinitely.
Issue: Whether the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit’s decision upholding Louisiana’s law
requiring physicians who perform abortions to have admitting privileges at a local hospital
conflicts with the Supreme Court’s binding precedent in Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt.
JUNE MEDICAL SERVICES, L.L.C., Behalf of Its Patients, Physicians, and Staff, Doing
Business as Hope Medical Group for Women; John Doe 1; John Doe 2, Plaintiffs-Appellees
v.
Doctor Rebekah GEE, Defendant- Appellant
United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit
Decided on September 26, 2018
[Excerpt; some citations and footnotes omitted]
SMITH, Circuit Judge:
Louisiana enacted the Unsafe Abortion
Protection Act ("Act 620" or "the Act"),
requiring abortion providers to have
admitting privileges at a hospital located
within thirty miles of the clinic where
they perform abortions. On remand for
consideration in light of Whole Woman's
Health v. Hellerstedt, ("WWH"), the district
court invalidated the Act as facially
unconstitutional. The court overlooked that
the facts in the instant case are remarkably
different from those that occasioned the
invalidation of the Texas statute in WWH.
Here, unlike in Texas, the Act does not

impose a substantial burden on a large
fraction of women under WWH and other
controlling Supreme Court authority. Careful
review of the record reveals stark differences
between the record before us and that which
the Court considered in WWH.
Almost all Texas hospitals required that for a
doctor to maintain privileges there, he or she
had to admit a minimum number of patients
annually. Few Louisiana hospitals make that
demand. Because Texas doctors could not
gain privileges, all but 8 of 40 clinics closed.
Here, only one doctor at one clinic is
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currently unable to obtain privileges; there is
no evidence that any of the clinics will close
as a result of the Act. In Texas, the number of
women forced to drive over 150 miles
increased by 350%. Driving distances will
not increase in Louisiana. Unlike the record
in Louisiana, the record in Texas reflected no
benefits from the legislation. Finally, because
of the closures, the remaining Texas clinics
would have been overwhelmed, burdening
every woman seeking an abortion. In
Louisiana, however, the cessation of one
doctor's practice will affect, at most, only
30% of women, and even then not
substantially.

patient . . . ." Each violation can result in a
fine up to $4,000.
Act 620 is premised on the state's interest in
protecting maternal health. Introducing the
Act, Representative Katrina Jackson
explained, "[I]f you are going to perform
abortions in the State of Louisiana, you're
going to do so in a safe environment and in a
safe manner that offers women the optimal
protection and care of their bodies." During
consideration of the Act, the Louisiana
Senate Committee on Health and Welfare
heard testimony from women who had
experienced complications during abortions
and had been treated harshly by the provider.
For example, Cindy Collins with Louisiana
Abortion Recovery testified that when she
underwent an abortion and began to
hemorrhage, "the abortion doctor could see
that something had gone wrong" but, instead
of assisting her, "told [her] to get up and get
out." She eventually required an emergency
dilation and curettage ("D&C"). Testimony
also established numerous health and safety
violations by Louisiana abortion clinics.

That is only a summary. As we explain in
detail, other facts underscore how
dramatically less the impact is in Louisiana
than in Texas. Because the Louisiana Act
passes muster even under the stringent
requirements of WWH and the other Supreme
Court decisions by which we are strictly
bound, we reverse and render a judgment of
dismissal.
I.

In addition to the concern for maternal health
expressed at the hearing, Louisiana has an
underlying interest in protecting unborn life.
The state has codified its intent to "regulate
abortion to the extent permitted." Its
longstanding policy is that "the unborn child
is a human being from the time of conception
and is, therefore, a legal person . . . entitled to
the right to life." And, Louisiana enacted a
trigger law such that "if those decisions of the
United States Supreme Court [legalizing
abortion] are ever reversed or modified or the
United States Constitution is amended to
allow protection of the unborn then the

Act 620 requires "a physician performing or
inducing an abortion" to "[h]ave active
admitting privileges at a hospital that is
located not further than thirty miles from the
location at which the abortion is performed or
induced and that provides obstetrical or
gynecological health care services."
"'[A]ctive admitting privileges' means that
the physician is a member in good standing
of the medical staff of a hospital that is
currently licensed by the department, with the
ability to admit a patient and to provide
diagnostic and surgical services to such
749

former policy of this State to prohibit
abortions shall be enforced."

whom only one had qualifying admitting
privileges. Since the enactment, two clinics
have closed for reasons unrelated to the Act,
and at least one doctor has obtained
qualifying privileges. The analysis is factbound, as required by WWH, so we begin
with a detailed overview of each clinic and
the abortion doctors it employs.

A.
Act 620 was set to become effective
September 14, 2014, but on August 22, 2014,
Bossier Medical Suite ("Bossier"), Causeway
Clinic ("Causeway"), Hope Medical Group
for Women ("Hope"), and two abortion
doctors—Doe 1 and Doe 2 — (collectively
"June Medical") sued to enjoin the Act,
mounting a facial challenge, claiming that the
Act placed an undue burden on women's
access to abortions. The district court entered
a temporary restraining order allowing the
doctors to seek privileges during the
preliminary-injunction proceedings. After a
bench trial, the court granted a preliminary
injunction on January 26, 2016, and denied a
stay pending appeal.

1. The Causeway Clinic
Causeway opened in 1999 and was located in
Metairie, a suburb of New Orleans. It closed
February 10, 2016, for reasons not disclosed
in this record. It had provided only surgical
abortions during the first and second
trimesters. Between 2009 and mid-2014,
about 10,836 abortions were performed there.
Causeway employed two abortion doctors,
Doe 2 and Doe 4, neither of whom held
admitting privileges at the time of Act 620's
enactment. Within 30 miles of Causeway's
former location, there are 10 qualifying
hospitals.

Louisiana requested and received from this
court an emergency stay that the Supreme
Court vacated on March 4, 2016. After the
Supreme Court decided WWH, we remanded
"so that the district court can engage in
additional fact finding required by [WWH]."
The district court entered final judgment
April 26, 2017, permanently enjoining the
Act. The court found "minimal" health
benefits but "substantial burdens" and ruled
the Act unconstitutional on its face
under Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey, and WWH. Louisiana
appeals.

a. Doe 2
Doe 2 is a board-certified OB/GYN who has
been performing abortions since 1980. He is
the only doctor in Louisiana willing to
provide abortions after 18 weeks up to the
legal limit of 21 weeks, 6 days. At Causeway,
Doe 2 performed only surgical abortions
between 6 weeks and 21 weeks, 6 days. He
worked 2 weekends a month and performed
25% of the clinic's abortions. In 2014, he
estimated he performed about 450 abortions
at Causeway, the majority being firsttrimester terminations.

B.
At the time of enactment, only five abortion
clinics operated in Louisiana, and only six
doctors performed elective abortions, of

From 2009 through mid-2014, Doe 2 had
only
two
patients
who
required
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hospitalization. In one instance, during a
second-trimester procedure, the woman
experienced heavy vaginal and intraabdominal bleeding from a rupture of her
incision from a prior C-Section. Doe 2 called
9-1-1 and sent her charts and a note
explaining the situation to the emergency
room doctor. Doe 2 also called the doctor
before the woman's arrival to explain the
situation and visited her in the hospital after
the surgery.

Doe 4 worked Thursdays and every other
weekend and performed 75% of the abortions
that were done at the Causeway Clinic; all of
his were first-trimester terminations. Doe 4
"imagine[s] [he performs] about a thousand,
fifteen hundred" abortions annually. He
explained he would provide from 5 to 15
abortions per day and that there was not a
high demand or "a significant volume of
business" at the Causeway clinic.
Since resuming his abortion practice in 2013,
Doe 4 has had one patient experience heavy
bleeding caused by an atonic uterus. An
ambulance had to be called, as the woman
was not responding. Doe 4 thinks he "sent a
note with her or a copy of her chart went with
her to the emergency room," then he
explained the situation to the doctor over the
phone.

The second instance was also a secondtrimester
termination.
The
woman
experienced some bleeding from uterine
atony, and though Doe 2 believed it was noncritical bleeding, he called 9-1-1 to be safe.
Though he did not have admitting privileges
before the Act's effective date, Doe 2 has
since secured limited, non-qualifying
privileges at Tulane in New Orleans.

Doe 4 does not currently possess admitting
privileges but did apply to Ochsner at
Kenner. He applied only to Ochsner because
he "worked at Ochsner before in Baton
Rouge and [he] had a doctor who had
privileges at Ochsner who would certify that
he would back up for" him. Other than a
request for additional information (which he
provided) and learning that Ochsner had
spoken to one of his references, Doe 4 did not
receive a decision on his application, though
he "think[s] he [has] a very good chance of
getting privileges there." Doe 4 agreed that
requiring the covering doctor to be an
OB/GYN is not "an overburdensome
requirement for admitting privileges." But he
does not know any OB/GYNs in the area
because "[a]ll the doctors that [he has]
known, they've kind of died out. . . . [or] are
no longer in practice."

b. Doe 4
Doe 4 is 82 years old and a board-certified
OB/GYN with over 51 years' experience. He
once provided abortions at the Acadian clinic
but stopped in 2003 when that clinic closed.
Though he retired from practice in 2012,
Causeway requested in 2013 that he fill in for
a doctor who had fallen ill. He agreed and
provided abortions (for the first time in ten
years) at Causeway until its closure. Other
than ensuring that Doe 4 remained boardcertified, had a DEA license, and "was in
good standing with the medicals," Doe 4
knows of no other review undertaken, similar
to hospitals' credentialing process, that
ensures a doctor has the requisite skills and
capacity to perform relevant procedures.
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Upon Causeway's closure, Doe 4 stopped
performing abortions and no longer intends
to seek admitting privileges. Nothing in the
record suggests he has been asked to continue
at any other clinic or that the Act has caused
him not to move to another clinic. In fact,
during his deposition (when still working at
Causeway) he was asked whether he would
work at other clinics if requested, and he
stated he was already "working more than
enough for [his] age" and "do[es]n't want to
work more." That would be his "personal
choice."

Doe 2 applied for privileges within thirty
miles of the Bossier clinic. Because he
already had consulting privileges at
University Health, Doe 2 inquired about
upgrading to courtesy privileges. He says that
the "head of the department [of OB/GYN] . .
. was very reticent and reluctant to consider
that because of the political nature of"
abortion. The department head spoke with the
Dean and then informed Doe 2 "that [he was]
not going to go beyond [his] [consulting]
privileges."
Doe 2 also applied to Willis Knighton
Bossier City Hospital ("WKBC") on May 12,
2014. WKBC sent a letter indicating that
"applicants must demonstrate they have been
actively practicing Obstetrics/Gynecology
(in your case only Gynecology) in the past 12
months." "In order for the Panel to
sufficiently
assess
current
clinical
competence," WKBC requested that Doe 2
"submit documentation, which should
include operative notes and outcomes, of
cases performed within the past 12 months
for the specific procedures you are requesting
on the privilege request form." Doe 2 testified
that "it would have been impossible for [him]
to submit that information . . . because [he has
not] done any in-hospital work in ten years,
so there is no body of hospitalized patients
that [he has] to draw from."

2. The Bossier Clinic
Bossier Medical Suite opened in 1980 and
was located in Bossier City in Northwestern
Louisiana. It closed on March 30, 2017, for
reasons not reflected in this record. It
provided both medication and surgical
abortions during the first and second
trimesters. Between 2009 and mid-2014,
about 4,171 abortions were performed there.
Bossier employed one abortion doctor, Doe
2, who did not hold admitting privileges at
the time of the Act's enactment. There are 5
qualifying hospitals within 30 miles of
Bossier.
In addition to his work at Causeway, Doe 2
provided medical and surgical abortions at
Bossier, his primary clinic. He worked there
Tuesday through Saturday when he was not
going to Causeway and Tuesday,
Wednesday, and Thursday when he was
going to Causeway. In 2014, he performed
about 550 abortions at Bossier, at least 90%
of which were first-trimester terminations.

Doe 2 sent an email to WKBC indicating that
"[o]ver the past 12 months [he] performed the
procedures [he is] requesting privileges for
several hundred times with no major
complications" at Bossier. Instead of
attaching documentation to that email,
however, he merely invited "any qualified
person who would like to visit the Clinic and
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examine the records" to do so. Doe 2 initially
testified that was his only response, but he
later vaguely contradicted himself on redirect, prompting the district court to
question him directly to determine whether
he had submitted any information. In
response, Doe 2 stated, "I actually called . . .
and [they] said send 20 representative cases
and that's what I did."

Doe 2 also said he had no intention of
applying to Minden Hospital because it was
"very close to the [geographic] limits," is "a
smaller hospital," and he "[doesn't] really
know anyone there." Though a smaller
hospital and close to the thirty-mile limit,
Minden is a qualifying hospital under the
Act.
3. Delta Clinic

It remains unclear whether Doe 2 sent a list
of cases, as no document supporting that
contention was ever supplied. Even the
district court, in its thoroughly documented
opinion, did not point to any evidence other
than Doe 2's contradictory testimony. WKBC
responded via letter that his answer
(whatever it was) was not satisfactory.
WKBC stated that the "application remains
incomplete and cannot be processed" until
the pertinent list of cases was submitted.
Thus, Doe 2 has not been able to secure
privileges at WKBC.

Delta, in Baton Rouge, has offered abortions
since 2001. It provides medication and
surgical abortions up to the seventeenth
week. Between 2009 and mid-2014, it
provided about 8,800 abortions. Two of those
patients required direct hospital transfer, one
because she "decided during a procedure that
she no longer wanted to have the abortion,"
and "the physician had already begun the
process." Delta employs one abortion doctor,
Doe 5, who does not hold admitting
privileges within thirty miles of Delta. Four
qualifying hospitals are located within thirty
miles of Delta.

Doe 2 has not applied, nor does he intend to
apply, to any other hospital within thirty
miles of Bossier. For instance, he refused to
apply to Christus Schumpert. He says
applying would be fruitless because the
Catholic hospital would be unlikely to grant
him privileges on account of the nature of his
work.

Doe 5 is a board-certified OB/GYN who has
performed abortions since April 2012, when
he started working at the Delta and Women's
clinics. He began working there after
receiving a letter the clinics sent to all
licensed physicians in Louisiana advertising
the open position. Doe 5 is at Delta on
Tuesdays and Thursdays but works
additional days when necessary. It does not
appear that Doe 5 maintains a separate
OB/GYN practice.

That assumption is belied by Doe 2's own
personal history. He previously secured
privileges at that hospital when he had both
an OB/GYN practice and an abortion
practice. Furthermore, as Doe 2 is aware, Doe
3 maintains privileges at that hospital.

In 2013, Doe 5 performed approximately
2,000 abortions at Delta. He has performed
abortions up to 18 weeks' gestation but will
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not go beyond that point. By week 18, the
baby is formed to a certain degree that it is
beyond what he "feel[s] comfortable looking
at and dealing with." In a typical week,
between both clinics, he performs "between
40 and 60 of the surgical abortions and 20 to
30 of the medical . . . abortions." Between the
clinics, he believes he performs about 6
second-trimester abortions per week. No
patient has required a direct hospital transfer.

Woman's Hospital before doing so. But, as
explained, Woman's Hospital marked his
application as pending until he finds someone
to serve as a covering physician. He has
contrived a situation in which it is impossible
for him to obtain privileges. Woman's
Hospital will not grant or deny privileges
until he takes action to find a covering
physician—something solely within his
control. Yet, he refuses to follow up with
other hospitals until Woman's Hospital takes
action, something it cannot do until after Doe
5 provides further information.

Doe 5 has not secured qualifying privileges
in Baton Rouge. He has applied to three
hospitals: Woman's Hospital, Baton Rouge
General Medical Center, and Lane Regional
Medical Center. He has not heard back from
the latter two but did receive a positive
response from Woman's Hospital.

4. The Hope Clinic
Hope opened in 1980 and is located in
Shreveport. It provides surgical and
medication abortions through 16 weeks; it
performs about 3,000 abortions per year. In
the past 20 years, 4 patients at Hope required
hospitalization, with 2 of those occurring in
the past 5 years. The clinic offers abortions 3
days a week. On busy days, it provides up to
30 terminations, but its administrator,
Kathaleen Pittman, testified that it could
provide up to 60, though she thought that
would be "quite a bit."

Woman's Hospital indicated that it would
grant privileges to Doe 5 once he identified a
doctor willing to cover his service when he is
unavailable. In fact, Doe 5 explained that
Woman's Hospital cannot deny him
privileges once he does that because, "from
what [he is] told, [he] meet[s] all the
qualifications. And as long as [he] meet[s]
those, they can't deny [his application]."
Delta has a transfer agreement with a
physician at Woman's Hospital, so Doe 5
asked that doctor whether he would be his
covering doctor. That doctor refused because
he did not want his information or
relationship with the clinic to become public.
Doe 5 does not appear to have reached out to
anyone else, thus his application will remain
pending until he takes further action.

At the time of trial, Hope employed two
doctors, Doe 1 and Doe 3, to perform
abortions. Following the closures of
Causeway and Bossier (which occurred after
the trial concluded), Hope also employs Doe
2. Because Doe 2 began working at Hope
post-trial, all estimates in the record for Hope
encompass only Doe 1 and Doe 3.
Doe 3 had admitting privileges before the
enactment of Act 620 and remains Hope's
only abortion doctor who has privileges.

Doe 5 has not followed up with the other two
hospitals on the status of his applications. He
says he is waiting for a complete denial from
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There are 4 qualifying hospitals within 30
miles of Hope.

complications he expects to treat at WKBC.
He responded with a list of all patients he
treated when working at a hospital from July
2008 to May 2009. He indicated that he had
not had to admit any patient for abortionrelated complications in the preceding twelve
months, though he has referred women to
other doctors in a few situations. WKBC has
not responded to that update.

a. Doe 1
Doe 1 is not an OB/GYN but, instead, is
board certified in Family Medicine and
Addiction Medicine. He has worked at Hope
as a counseling physician since 2006 but
began providing abortions only in 2008. He
has never had a family-medicine practice. He
is at Hope 3 days a week and provides about
71% of Hope's abortions. In a given month,
Doe 1 generally performs 250-300 abortions.
He performs medication abortions up to 8
weeks and surgical abortions up to 13 weeks.
Between 2009 and 2014, he has had only one
woman require hospitalization.

Doe 1 corresponded with Christus Health at
length. Christus requested additional
information, and Doe 1 provided almost all
such information. Christus requested Doe 1
come in to receive an ID badge to complete
the application, but when he tried to do so, he
was told that he could not receive the badge
because he was not applying for the right
privileges. He then received a letter saying
his application remained incomplete for lack
of a badge. That letter also said his
application had been pending for 120 days,
and applications pending for longer than 90
days were deemed withdrawn. Doe 1
admitted he waited until the very end of the
90-day period to try for the badge. He claims
he was later told over the phone that he
qualified only for a caregiver position, which
would not include admitting privileges. That
is not supported by documentation.

Doe 1 applied to three of the four qualifying
hospitals: WKBC, Christus Health, and
Minden. He originally applied to WKBC to
receive privileges via their Addiction
Department, as he maintains a private
practice in addiction medicine. WKBC could
not grant him privileges in that field because
its bylaws require "successfully complet[ing]
a residency training program . . . in the
specialty in which" privileges are sought.
Doe 1 did not complete a residency in
addiction medicine because no such
residency program existed when he
graduated medical school.

Minden Hospital informed Doe 1 that it had
no "need for a satellite primary care
physician." The one hospital to which he did
not apply, University Health, extends
privileges by invitation only. He spoke to the
chair of the Family Medicine Department,
and, although the chair indicated an invitation
would be forthcoming, Doe 1 was later told
that there was "resistance" to extending him
an invitation.

Doe 1 then submitted a new application
requesting
privileges
in
Family
Medicine. WKBC requested that he "submit
documentation of hospital admissions and
management of patients 18 years of age or
older for the past 12 months." It also
requested him to explain further the types of
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b. Doe 2

He implied that he also admitted her and
performed her procedures. The fourth
woman, Doe 1's patient, had a perforated
uterus. Doe 3, who was on call at the hospital,
admitted her and performed her procedures.

Doe 2 provided abortions at Hope for a
number of years before moving to the Bossier
and Causeway clinics. Once those clinics
closed, Doe 2 returned to Hope. He currently
provides abortions at Hope when Doe 1 or
Doe 3 is absent.

Doe 3 is active staff, with admitting
privileges at WKBC and Christus Schumpert
Hospital. He maintains those privileges on
account of his private OB/GYN practice. In
his declaration, Doe 3 stated that he will
cease performing abortions "if he is the only
provider in Louisiana with admitting
privileges." Curiously, after Doe 5 obtained
qualifying privileges in New Orleans—such
that Doe 3 would no longer be at risk of being
"the only provider in Louisiana"—Doe 3
testified that he does not "believe [he] will
continue" if he is "the last physician
providing abortions in Northern Louisiana"
(emphasis added).

c. Doe 3
Doe 3 is a board-certified OB/GYN who has
been performing abortions since 1981. He is
the Chief Medical Officer at Hope. Of note,
he has trained other doctors to provide
abortions. Three of those are not OB/GYNs.
One is a radiologist, another an
ophthalmologist. The third, Doe 1,
specialized in general family medicine. Doe
3 hired all three and was the only one to
evaluate their credentials. He admits he
neither performed background checks nor
inquired into their previous training.

5. Women's Health

Doe 3 performs about 29% of the abortions at
Hope. He provides both surgical and
medication abortions two days a week. On
average he sees 20-30 patients a week but has
seen up to 64. If everything goes well, he can
perform "about six procedures in one hour."
Doe 3 says he cannot not devote any more
time to Hope.

Women's Health, in New Orleans, began
providing abortions in 2001. It performs
abortions through the seventeenth week of
pregnancy, and it offers both medication and
surgical abortions. Between 2009 and mid2014, about 7,400 abortions were performed
there, with 2,300 in 2013 alone. Of those
patients, 2 required direct hospital transfer.
Women's employs 2 abortion doctors, Doe 5
and Doe 6, neither of whom had admitting
privileges at the time of Act 620's enactment.
Doe 5 has since secured qualifying privileges
at Touro Infirmary. There are 9 qualifying
hospitals within 30 miles of Women's.

In the past twenty years, Doe 3 has had three
patients require hospitalization, and he
knows of a fourth from Doe 1. One woman
had a perforated uterus, and Doe 3
accompanied her to the hospital and
performed the necessary procedures. Another
woman had heavy bleeding. The third had
placenta accrete, "a very dangerous situation
because you cannot get the bleeding to stop."

a. Doe 5
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Doe 5 began working at Women's in 2012.
He works two days a week unless it is busy,
in which case he may come in extra days. In
2013, Doe 5 performed approximately 40%
of the abortions provided by Women's, all of
which were surgical procedures. As noted
previously, Doe 5 has secured qualifying
privileges at Touro, which is within thirty
miles of Women's.

substantially burden a large fraction of
women, the court invalidated the law.
We review the district court's legal
conclusions de novo and its factual findings
for clear error. A finding is "'clearly
erroneous' when although there is evidence to
support it, the reviewing court on the entire
evidence is left with the definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been
committed." "If the district court's account of
the evidence is plausible in light of the record
viewed in its entirety, the court of appeals
may not reverse it even though convinced
that had it been sitting as the trier of fact, it
would have weighed the evidence
differently."

b. Doe 6
Doe 6 is a board-certified OB/GYN who has
been performing abortions since 2002. He
began working at Women's and Delta in 2002
and has been the medical director of both
since 2008. In 2013, he provided about 60%
of the abortions occurring at Women's, which
represents the percentage of medication
abortions performed there. In that year, Doe
6 provided approximately 1,300 medication
abortions at Women's. In his ten years at
these clinics, he has had two patients require
direct hospital transfer.

A.
First we must resolve the appropriate
framework for reviewing facial challenges to
abortion statutes. As a general matter,
"[f]acial
challenges
are
disfavored." Louisiana says we should
reverse because the district court used the
wrong framework for evaluating a facial
challenge and that we instead should
follow United States v. Salerno, under which
plaintiffs "must establish that no set of
circumstances exists under which the [law]
would be valid."

Doe 6 has not secured privileges. He applied
to only one hospital, East Jefferson General
Hospital ("EJGH"), and has not received a
response. He inquired at Tulane but claims he
"was told that [he] should not bother to apply
because they would not grant privileges to
[him] because [he has] not had hospital
admitting privileges since August 2005."

June Medical urges, to the contrary,
that WWH foreclosed
using
the Salerno framework in the abortion
context. In WWH, the Court, reviewing an asapplied challenge, reversed and invalidated
the law in its entirety, finding that a large
fraction of women would be substantially
burdened.

II.
On the above facts, the district court found
that all doctors had put forth a good-faith
effort to obtain privileges and that Doe 5
would be the sole remaining abortion
provider in Louisiana were Act 620 to go into
effect. Because it concluded that that would
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Before WWH, this court viewed the standard
for facial invalidation of abortion regulations
as "uncertain." In Lakey, we explained that a
plurality in Casey, had concluded that a
regulation was facially invalid if, "in a large
fraction of the cases in which it is relevant, it
will operate as a substantial obstacle." Earlier
decisions, however, had used the "no set of
circumstances" standard

Here, too, the relevant denominator to
determine a "large fraction" is all women
seeking abortions in Louisiana, as Act 620
applies to providers of both medication and
surgical abortions. Accordingly, to sustain
the facial invalidation of Act 620, we would
have to find that it substantially burdens a
large fraction of all women seeking abortions
in Louisiana.

In WWH, the Court eliminated the
uncertainty and adopted the Casey plurality's
large-fraction framework. As the Eighth
Circuit explained, "For [facial] challenges to
abortion regulations, however, the Supreme
Court has fashioned a different standard
under which the plaintiff can prevail by
demonstrating that 'in a large fraction of the
cases in which [the law] is relevant, it will
operate as a substantial obstacle to a woman's
choice.'"

B.

Importantly, the Court in WWH clarified by
limiting the "large fraction" to include only
"those women for whom the provision is an
actual rather than an irrelevant restriction."
"[C]ases in which [the provision at issue]
is relevant" is a narrower category than "all
women," "pregnant women," or even
"women seeking abortions identified by the
State." For a law regulating only medication
abortions, for example, the relevant
denominator is not all women seeking any
type of abortion, but only those potentially
impacted (i.e., those seeking a medication
abortion). In WWH, the Court treated the
denominator as all women seeking abortions,
but only because the statute at issue,
encompassed all types of abortions.

WWH's analysis is rooted in Casey, which
defined an "undue burden" as "shorthand for
the conclusion that a state regulation has the
purpose or effect of placing a substantial
obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an
abortion of a nonviable fetus." The Court
in WWH explained that Casey "requires that
courts consider the burdens a law imposes on
abortion access together with the benefits
those laws confer."

The parties present conflicting interpretations
of the legal standard for finding an undue
burden
under WWH.
June
Medical
frames WWH's analysis as a balancing test:
"Where an abortion restriction's burdens
outweigh its benefits, the burdens are 'undue'
and unconstitutional." Louisiana counters
that WWH did not alter the well-known
standard in Casey.

In WWH, the Court relied on Casey's
analyses of the spousal-notification and
parental-notification
provisions.
In
parentheticals, it describes the decisional
process
as
"balancing." Consequently,
"[u]nnecessary health regulations that have
the purpose or effect of presenting a
substantial obstacle to a woman seeking an
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abortion impose an undue burden on the
right."

fraction of women seeking abortions in
Louisiana.

There is no doubt that WWH imposes a
balancing test, and Louisiana errs in denying
that. It is not reasonable to read the language
in WWH, quoted above, as announcing
anything but a balancing test, especially
given the Court's express use of the word
"balancing" to describe Casey.

C.
We are of course bound by WWH's holdings,
announced in a case with a substantially
similar statute but greatly dissimilar facts and
geography. We begin by summarizing the
Court's close, fact-bound balancing analysis
of the benefits and burdens in WWH—an
analysis that led the Court to conclude that
Texas's admitting-privileges requirement
was unduly burdensome.

Hewing to WWH and Casey, we recognize
and apply a balancing test. Louisiana,
however, is correct that it is not a "pure"
balancing test under which any burden, no
matter how slight, invalidates the law.
Instead, the burden must still be substantial,
as we will explain.

1.
The Court began by examining the benefits
the admitting-privileges requirement might
provide. It noted that the purpose of Texas's
law was to "ensure that women have easy
access to a hospital should complications
arise during an abortion procedure." The
evidence the court examined to determine
whether the law served its stated purpose
included expert testimony and studies about
abortions in the United States generally. The
Court explained that there was "nothing in
Texas' record evidence that shows that,
compared to prior law (which required a
'working arrangement' with a doctor with
admitting privileges), the new law advanced
Texas' legitimate interest in protecting
women's health." The Court specifically
noted that Texas could not point to "a single
instance in which the new requirement would
have helped even one woman obtain better
treatment."

Quoting Casey as cited above, the WWH
Court began by emphasizing that to fail
constitutional scrutiny, a law must place "a
substantial obstacle in the path of a woman
seeking an abortion." Casey expressly allows
for the possibility that not every burden
creates a "substantial obstacle." Thus, even
regulations with a minimal benefit are
unconstitutional only where they present a
substantial obstacle to abortion.
The proper reading of WWH is a combination
of the views offered by June Medical and
Louisiana: A minimal burden even on a large
fraction of women does not undermine the
right to abortion. To conclude otherwise
would neuter Casey, and any reasonable
reading of WWH shows that the Court only
reinforced what it had said in Casey. Thus,
we must weigh the benefits and burdens of
Act 620 to determine whether it places a
substantial obstacle in the path of a large

Further, the Court found that the privileges
had no relationship to a doctor's
ability. Instead, the privileges provision
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looked to discretionary factors such as
clinical data requirements and residency
requirements. One abortion doctor who had
practiced for 38 years was unable to obtain
privileges at any of the 7 hospitals within the
required
30-mile
radius
of
the
clinic. Therefore, "[t]he admitting-privileges
requirement does not serve any relevant
credentialing function."

Closures in Texas caused the third burden:
increased driving distances. After the
closures, the number of women living more
than 150 miles from a clinic rose from 86,000
to 400,000, an increase of 350%. The number
of women living more than 200 miles from a
clinic increased from 10,000 to 290,000, an
increase of 2,800%. The Court "recognize[d]
that increased driving distances do not
always constitute an 'undue burden,'" but
stacking that burden on top of the others,
"when viewed in light of the virtual absence
of any health benefit," supported the finding
of an undue burden.

2.
WWH identified four burdens imposed by the
admitting-privileges requirement. Primarily,
it caused the closure of 80% of Texas's
abortion clinics. Only 7 or 8 of the 40
remained. The Court looked to the timing of
the closures as evidence of causation. When
H.B. 2 began to be enforced, the number of
clinics dropped to half, from 40 to 20. The
day the requirement took effect, 11 more
clinics closed.

The final burden was decreased capacity—
"fewer doctors, longer waiting times, and
increased crowding." The Court used
"common sense" to conclude that the
remaining clinics could not expand their
capacity fivefold to meet the demand for
abortions. The remaining clinics would need
to expand from providing 14,000 abortions
per year to providing 60,000-72,000 per
year. The Court found that to be unrealistic
because of the capacity currently carried by
existing clinics and the lack of evidence that
expansion was feasible.

Part of the reason for the closures was the
difficulty of obtaining privileges. Many
Texas hospitals conditioned admitting
privileges on having a minimum number of
patient admissions per year. That created an
almost-universal requirement that physicians
with privileges maintain minimum annual
admissions, constituting a per se bar to
admission for most abortion doctors. The
president of a Texas hospital testified that no
doctor could get privileges near El Paso
because not a single patient seeking an
abortion had required transfer to a hospital in
the past ten years. Thus, "doctors would be
unable to maintain admitting privileges or
obtain those privileges for the future."

III.
Mirroring the fact-intensive review that the
Supreme Court performed in WWH, we do
the same in-depth analysis of the instant
record, weighing both the benefits and the
burdens of Act 620. Unlike Texas, Louisiana
presents some evidence of a minimal benefit.
And, unlike Texas, Louisiana presents far
more detailed evidence of Act 620's impact
on access to abortion. In light of the more
developed record presented to the district
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court and to us, the district court—albeit with
the best of intentions and after diligent
effort—clearly and reversibly erred. In
contrast to Texas's H.B. 2, Louisiana's Act
620 does not impose a substantial burden on
a large fraction of women, so the facial
challenge fails.

injections into the spinal cord, and orthopedic
procedures.
Outpatient procedures such as dental
surgeries and some D&C miscarriagemanagement procedures do not require the
same admitting privileges. Those are
governed by Title 46 of the regulatory code,
whereas outpatient abortion facilities and
ASCs are under Title 48. Louisiana's expert,
who was involved in the drafting of Act 620,
testified that the differential treatment was
because of that grouping and did not single
out abortion providers from other outpatient
surgery centers. Thus, Louisiana was not
attempting to target or single out abortion
facilities.

A.
The legislative history of Act 620 plainly
evidences an intent to promote women's
health. Specifically, the Act seeks to
accomplish that goal by ensuring a higher
level of physician competence and by
requiring continuity of care.
Texas presented no evidence that the
credentialing function performed by
hospitals differed from the credentialing
performed by clinics. The record for
Louisiana contains testimony from abortion
providers themselves, explaining that the
hospitals perform more rigorous and intense
background checks than do the clinics. The
record shows that clinics, beyond ensuring
that the provider has a current medical
license, do not appear to undertake any
review of a provider's competency. The
clinics, unlike hospitals, do not even appear
to perform criminal background checks.

In fact, it was just the opposite—the purpose
of the Act was to bring them "into the same
set of standards that apply to physicians
providing similar types of services in
[ASCs]." The benefit from conformity was
not presented in WWH, nor were the reasons
behind the conformity—continuity of care,
qualifications,
communication,
and
preventing abandonment of patients—
directly addressed. Accordingly, unlike
in WWH, the record here indicates that the
admitting-privileges requirement performs a
real,
and
previously
unaddressed,
credentialing function that promotes the
wellbeing of women seeking abortion.

Finally, Louisiana explains that the Act
brings the requirements regarding outpatient
abortion clinics into conformity with
the preexisting requirement that physicians at
ambulatory surgical centers ("ASCs") must
have privileges at a hospital within the
community. 48 LA. ADMIN. CODE §
4535(E)(1). Procedures performed at ASCs
include upper and lower GI endoscopies,

Still, the benefits conferred by Act 620 are
not huge. Though we credit Louisiana's more
robust record on the benefits side of the
ledger, the district court did not clearly err in
finding that Act 620 provides minimal
benefits, given the current standard of care in
highly specialized hospital settings.
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B.

connection between Act 620 and its burden
on women than was possible in WWH. For
one, we can examine each abortion doctor's
efforts to comply with the requirements of
Act 620. We also can look to the specific bylaws of the hospitals to which each applied.
This more intricate analysis yields a richer
picture of the statute's true impact, the sort of
obstacle it imposed. And this methodology
allows us to scrutinize more closely whether
June Medical has met its burden.

In WWH, the Court identified four obstacles
erected by Texas's requirement of admitting
privileges: closure of facilities, difficulty in
obtaining privileges, driving distances, and
clinic capacities. The Court decided not that
any burden individually was sufficient but
that the four dominoed to constitute a
substantial burden.
The near impossibility of obtaining privileges
was the first domino to fall. Had that
difficulty not loomed, there would have been
no facility closures, no increased driving
distances, and no issues regarding clinic
capacities. Given the high minimum
admissions requirement at most Texas
hospitals, that first burden was unavoidable.

We conclude that it has not. To the contrary,
it has failed to establish a causal connection
between the regulation and its burden—
namely, doctors' inability to obtain admitting
privileges. Specifically, there is insufficient
evidence to conclude that, had the doctors put
forth a good-faith effort to comply with Act
620, they would have been unable to obtain
privileges. Instead, as discussed below, the
vast majority largely sat on their hands,
assuming that they would not qualify. Their
inaction severs the chain of causation.

Originally, Texas had 40 facilities and
numerous abortion doctors. Because the
doctors could not obtain privileges, the
number of clinics fell from 40 to only 7 or 8.
Those closures undoubtedly burdened almost
all women seeking abortions in Texas as a
result of capacity issues and increased
driving distances.

The district court inquired whether the
doctors had put forth a good-faith effort,
without which June Medical cannot establish
the requisite causation between Act 620 and
a doctor's inability to obtain privileges. And,
as WWH emphasized, it is June Medical's
burden to put forth affirmative evidence of
causation. Were we not to require such
causation, the independent choice of a single
physician
could
determine
the
constitutionality of a law. Using this
methodology, we conclude, given the entire
weight of the evidence, that the district court
clearly erred in saying that all doctors had put
forth a good-faith effort to obtain privileges.

Thus, everything turns on whether the
privileges requirement actually would
prevent doctors from practicing in Louisiana.
If that domino does not fall, no other burdens
result. So we review the difficulty facing the
abortion providers and trace them back to the
patients to determine whether Act 620
substantially burdens a large fraction of
women seeking abortions.
The paucity of abortion facilities and
abortion providers in Louisiana allows for a
more nuanced analysis of the causal
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Unlike the litigants in WWH, who presented
only generalities concerning admitting
privileges, the parties here provide the
bylaws for the relevant hospitals. The
situation differs from the circumstances
in WWH in that the majority of hospitals do
not have a minimum number of required
admissions that a doctor must have to
maintain privileges. Instead, most hospitals
have
a
competency
requirement.
Competency is evaluated either by requesting
the doctor to provide information about
recent admissions at any other hospital or by
having a provisional admittance period
during which the hospital can personally
observe and evaluate him. Although the grant
of privileges remains discretionary, the death
knell to Texas's H.B. 2 was the combination
of discretion and minimum admission
requirements—the latter of which is less
prevalent in Louisiana.

2. Doe 2
The district court erroneously concluded that
Doe 2 put forth a good-faith effort. Doe 2,
now a back-up abortion doctor at Hope in
Shreveport, inquired about privileges at two
hospitals within thirty miles of Hope. He
claims that University Health refused to
extend an invitation because of his abortion
practice. WKBC required he submit
documentation of OB/GYN procedures on
whether he supplied documentation. At the
very least, he explained to WKBC that he
"performed the procedures [he is] requesting
privileges for several hundred times" at the
Bossier clinic. WKBC responded that that did
not suffice—but the record does not establish
whether the deficiency was his email
response or actual documentation of the
Bossier cases. performed within the past
twelve months. Doe 2's testimony was
contradictory

1. Doe 1

It is possible that Doe 2 could obtain
privileges at Christus, though he has not
applied. He previously had privileges there,
and Doe 3 currently maintains privileges
there. Thus, Doe 2's theory that a Catholic
hospital would not staff an abortion provider
is blatantly contradicted by the record.
Opposite to what the district court found,
Christus and Minden remain open options.

The district court concluded that Doe 1 put
forth a good-faith effort and could not obtain
privileges. Doe 1 applied to three of four
qualifying hospitals near Hope. WKBC has
not responded. There appears to be an
unresolved communication problem with
Christus, so it is possible Doe 1 could obtain
qualifying privileges there. The record is
uncertain on this point, so we cannot say that
the district court clearly erred in concluding
that Doe 1 put forth a good-faith effort. Doe
1 was definitively rejected by Minden for
reasons other than credentials. The fourth
hospital, University Health, requires an
invitation to apply, and the hospital declined
to extend an invitation because of department
resistance to staffing an abortion provider.

3. Doe 3
Doe 3 already has privileges at two hospitals
within thirty miles of Hope. Thus, the Act is
not burdensome on him.
4. Doe 4
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In order to return to retirement, Doe 4 has
stopped pursuing privileges and came out of
retirement to cover for a sick doctor. There is
no evidence of causation, so we need not
evaluate whether he could obtain privileges.

a covering physician, the district court clearly
erred in finding that Doe 5 put forth a goodfaith effort and that his application at
Woman's Hospital was de facto denied. The
Act is not overly burdensome on Doe 5.

5. Doe 5

6. Doe 6

The district court erroneously concluded that
Doe 5 put forth a good-faith effort in
obtaining privileges for his practice at Delta.
For his abortion practice at Women's, Doe 5
received admitting privileges at Touro, which
is within thirty miles of Women's.

The district court erroneously concluded that
Doe 6 put forth a good-faith effort. Doe 6
applied to one hospital, EJGH, from which he
has received no response. He was told by
Tulane that his lack of recent admissions is
likely a barrier, so he did not apply there.

For his practice at Delta, Doe 5 applied to
three nearby hospitals. Two have not
responded, but, according to Doe 5, Woman's
Hospital will grant him privileges once he
finds a covering doctor. He mentions asking
only one doctor to serve as his covering
physician. That doctor declined, and Doe 5
provides no evidence that he has reached out,
or intends to reach out, to other doctors.
Though Woman's Hospital is awaiting Doe
5's further action, he inexplicably states he is
waiting on Woman's Hospital's further action
before following up on his other two
applications. The most logical explanation
for Doe 5's delay is that he is awaiting the
result of this litigation before he acts.

But there are nine qualifying hospitals in the
area. Moreover, he has not applied to Touro,
where Doe 5 was able to obtain qualifying
privileges. That lack of effort demonstrates
the district court's clear error in finding that
Doe 6 put forth a good-faith effort.
7. Conclusion
Given the evidence, only Doe 1 has put forth
a good-faith effort to get admitting privileges.
Doe 2, Doe 5, and Doe 6 could likely obtain
privileges. Doe 3 is definitively not
burdened.
At least three hospitals have proven willing
to extend privileges. On the entire evidence,
we are left with the definite and firm
conviction that the district court erred in
finding that only Doe 5 would be able to
obtain privileges and that the application
process creates particular hardships and
obstacles for abortion providers in Louisiana.

As Doe 4 testified, finding a covering
physician is not overly burdensome. Under
the clear-error standard, looking to the entire
weight of the evidence, we are left with the
impression that Doe 5 is waiting for the
outcome of this litigation to put forth an
actual good-faith effort. That lackluster
approach is insufficient for facial invalidation
of the law. In light of Doe 5's failure to seek

C.
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In Texas, the admitting-privileges law caused
32 of the 40 clinics to close. In dramatic
contrast, under the record presented to us,
there is no evidence that Louisiana facilities
will close from Act 620. If the Act were to go
into effect today, both Women's and Hope
could remain open, though each would have
only one qualified doctor. Delta would be the
only clinic required to close, as its only
Doctor, Doe 5, does not have admitting
privileges within 30 miles. Because obtaining
privileges is not overly burdensome,
however, the fact that one clinic would have
to close is not a substantial burden that can
currently be attributed to Act 620 as
distinguished from Doe 5's failure to put forth
a good-faith effort. And, because Doe 5 has a
pending offer and probably will be able to
obtain privileges, the only permissible
finding, under this record, is that no clinics
will likely be forced to close on account of
the Act.

The district court's contrary findings are
clearly erroneous. To attribute a doctor's
cessation of practice to Act 620, his
retirement must be caused by a direct
inability to meet the legal requirements of the
bill. Doe 5's inaction and Doe 3's personal
choice to stop practicing cannot be legally
attributed to Act 620. Departure from the
standard of direct causation leads to a linedrawing problem that would allow unrelated
decisions to inform the undue-burden
inquiry. For the question of causation,
although the "government may not place
obstacles in the path of a woman's exercise of
her freedom of choice, it need not remove
those obstacles."
In WWH, the majority rejected the dissent's
theory that the clinic closures could be
attributed to some other cause and not H.B. 2.
It did so because there was no evidence of
such alternative causes in the record;
accordingly, the dissent's theories were mere
"speculation." Here, by contrast, there was
clear evidence in the record before the district
court that various doctors failed to seek
admitting privileges in good faith. Unlike
in WWH, Act 620's impact was severed by an
intervening cause: the doctors' failure to
apply for privileges in a reasonable
manner. Accordingly, there is an insufficient
basis in the record to conclude that the law
has prevented most of the doctors from
gaining admitting privileges. Similarly, any
clinic closures that result from the doctors'
inaction cannot be attributed to Act 620.

Doe 3 initially indicated that he would cease
practicing if he is the only remaining abortion
doctor in the entire state. Once it became
clear that at least one other doctor (Doe 5)
had obtained privileges and would continue
practicing, Doe 3's story changed. He
testified that he would now cease practicing
were he the only remaining abortion provider
in northern Louisiana. If he leaves the
practice today, Hope would close because
Doe 1 and Doe 2 do not currently have
privileges. The closure, however, would also
lack the requisite causation, as it rests on an
independent personal choice. Doe 3's shifting
preference as to the number of remaining
abortion providers is entirely independent of
the admitting-privileges requirement.

D.
Although "increased driving distances do not
always constitute an 'undue burden,'" they
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can be, under the right facts, "one additional
burden, which, when taken together with
others . . . and when viewed in light of the
virtual absence of any health benefit," can
constitute an undue burden. Louisiana does
not reflect such right facts. Because all three
clinics could remain open, the Act will cause
no increase in driving distance for any
woman—an extremely important distinction
from the record in Texas.

served as the primary provider at Causeway
and Bossier, he performed 1,000 abortions
per year. Doe 3 performs somewhere
between 870 and 1,250 per year.
If Doe 1 ceased performing abortions, Doe 2
could likely step in, as that is his current
arrangement. Assuming Doe 2 performs at
his previous capacity, there would be a gap of
about 1,100 abortions at the Hope clinic. Split
between Doe 2 and Doe 3, that is an
additional 550 procedures per doctor per
year. That is not overly burdensome,
especially given Doe 3's testimony that he has
performed up to 60 procedures per week and
regularly performs up to 30.

E.
Following the implementation of H.B. 2, the
number of clinics in Texas decreased, as we
have repeatedly noted, from 40 to only 7 or
8. The WWH Court expressed concern that
open facilities would not be able to "meet the
demand of the entire State." In Texas, each
open facility would have had to increase its
abortions from 14,000 to 60,000 or 70,000—
"an increase by a factor of about five." The
Court rejected the contention that facilities
could expand to meet the demand absent
facility-specific evidence. In Louisiana,
however, because no clinics would close,
there would be no increased strain
on available facilities, as no clinic will have
to absorb another's capacity.

To put that number in perspective, the Court
in WWH found unduly burdensome the
expectation that 8 clinics could absorb the
work of 40. Each remaining Texas abortion
provider would have had to increase his
capacity by a factor of 5. A fivefold increase
for Doe 3 would mean performing 100-150
abortions per week instead of his usual 20-30.

Importantly, however, it will be nearly
impossible for Doe 1 to obtain qualifying
privileges. Therefore, we review the facts to
determine whether the remaining abortion
providers at Hope have the capacity to meet
the demand Doe 1 currently satisfies.

In contrast, the loss of Doe 1 would require
Doe 3 to perform only 5 extra procedures
each day he currently works (2 days per
week). Instead of performing 20-30 abortions
per week, he would perform 30-40. It
necessarily follows that a gap of 1,100
procedures per year—split between 2
doctors—does not begin to approach the
capacity problem in WWH and is not a
substantial burden.

Doe 1 practices at Hope alongside Doe 2 and
Doe 3. Doe 1 testified that he performs about
2,100 abortions annually. Doe 2 fills in when
Doe 1 or Doe 3 is unavailable. When Doe 2

Consider, for example, Doe 3's testimony that
he can perform up to 6 abortions per hour.
Using that number, adding 1,100 abortions
would require 183.3 hours per year, which is
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an extra 3.6 hours per week, or about 1.8
hours per day, assuming a two-day work
week for 50 weeks of work. Divided between
two doctors, that is 54 minutes per day. Under
that estimation based on the facts in the
record, the extra 54 minutes of procedure
time is unlikely to result in an undue burden
on women. At the very least, June Medical
did not produce sufficient evidence to evince
such a burden.

provision] is an actual rather
irrelevant restriction."

than

an

It is an open question whether the
denominator is made up of those women who
could potentially be burdened by the
regulation or just those women who are
actually burdened. Under the former, the
numerator is then comprised of those women
who are actually burdened by the regulation.
Then we would review whether those women
are substantially burdened and whether that
fraction is large. Under the second
interpretation, the numerator is comprised of
those women who are substantially burdened
by the regulation. And, then we would
determine whether the resulting fraction is
large.

To put it another way, Doe 2 and Doe 3 will
each need to perform an additional 550
procedures per year. That amounts to six
extra abortions each day that Doe 3 currently
works. Using his testimony that he can
perform six abortions an hour, that load
would not result in a substantial increase in
wait times. Common sense dictates that an
hour cannot be a substantial burden.

We need not decide which interpretation is
proper because June Medical failed to
demonstrate that a large fraction of women
are substantially burdened under either
analysis.

F.
Though we have determined that no woman
would be unduly and thus unconstitutionally
burdened by Act 620, we additionally hold
that the law does not burden a large fraction
of women. To quantify the burden of
eliminating Doe 1, the large-fraction standard
requires us to determine what percentage of
women seeking abortions in Louisiana would
be affected by Act 620.

1.
We start with the first interpretation—the
reading most favorable for June Medical.
There are approximately 10,000 abortions
performed annually in Louisiana, 3,000 of
which are at Hope, where Doe 1 currently
works. Thus, only 30% (or, less than onethird) of women seeking an abortion would
face even a potential burden of increased wait
times were Doe 1 to cease practicing.

As an initial matter, WWH is less than clear
on how to delimit the numerator and
denominator to define the relevant fraction.
The Supreme Court has limited the
denominator to only individuals whose
abortion rights are burdened by the statute: It
encompasses "those [women] for whom [the

The Supreme Court has not defined what
constitutes a "large fraction," and the circuit
courts have shed little light. The Sixth Circuit
determined that 12% was insufficient and
that the large-fraction requirement is "more
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conceptual than mathematical." It concluded
that "a large fraction exists when a statute
renders it nearly impossible for the women
actually affected by an abortion restriction to
obtain an abortion." In other words, as
"[o]ther circuits" have found, "a large
fraction [exists only] when practically all of
the
affected
women
would
face
a substantial obstacle in obtaining an
abortion."

burden on abortion plaintiffs relative to
plaintiffs who bring challenges to other sorts
of laws. There is a difference, however,
between cracking the door and holding it
wide open.
It cannot be that we force a plaintiff asserting
his right to a fair trial, to freedom from
unconstitutional searches and seizures, to
associate freely, or to exercise his religion
freely, to shoulder the burden of
demonstrating
that
there
is no
possible constitutional application of a law,
while allowing an abortion plaintiff to
succeed on a showing that the law is
unconstitutional in less than one of three
cases. Bearing a burden of 30% compared to
the typical burden of 100% is not large. To
conclude
otherwise
eviscerates
the
restrictions on a successful facial challenge.

Thirty percent does not approach "practically
all" women seeking abortions in Louisiana
and cannot be deemed a large fraction for
purposes of WWH or Act 620. A superficial
reaction might be to think, to the contrary,
that 30% is obviously large. A few easy
examples show why that is not so. If 30% of
a law school class failed the bar, we would
say that is a large fraction. Conversely, if
30% passed the bar, we would think that
small. Again, if 30% of children had food to
eat for lunch today, we would think that a
small fraction. But if 30% were without food,
we would think that large. Thus what
constitutes
a
large fraction
requires
identifying the starting point.

Not only is 30% not a large fraction for
purposes of WWH and Act 620, as already
explained, any burden imposed by the Act is
not substantial even on women within the
30%. The burden is only potential: Doe 1's
capacity can easily be absorbed by the
remaining abortion doctors. Even were that
potential burden of increased wait times to
materialize, it would not be substantial.

In every other area of the law, a facial
challenge requires plaintiffs to establish a
provision's unconstitutionality in every
conceivable application. In other words, they
must demonstrate an unconstitutional burden
on 100% of those impacted. Plaintiffs
asserting abortion rights, however, are
excused from that demanding standard and
must show a substantial burden in only a
large fraction of cases.

June Medical's challenge thus fails under this
interpretation at both critical points. It first
fails to establish that the women potentially
impacted suffer an unconstitutional burden.
And it further fails to show that this group of
women constitutes a large fraction. Instead of
demonstrating an undue burden on a large
fraction of women, June Medical at most
shows an insubstantial burden on a small

The shift from the usual standard to the largefraction standard was intended to ease the
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fraction of women. That falls far short of a
successful facial challenge.

"[u]nnecessary health regulations that have
the purpose or effect of presenting a
substantial obstacle to a woman seeking an
abortion impose an undue burden" on the
exercise of that right. Yet the majority today
fails to meaningfully apply the undue burden
test as articulated in Casey and clarified
in Whole Woman's Health and fails to give
the appropriate deference to the district
court's opinion, essentially conducting a
second trial of the facts on this cold appellate
record. With respect, I must dissent.

2.
Under the second interpretation, June
Medical fares even worse. The denominator
of women actually burdened is limited to
those 3,000 women who seek abortions
annually at Hope Clinic. The numerator is
limited to those women substantially
burdened. Since we have already concluded
that Act 620 effects no constitutional
deprivation, the numerator encompasses no
one. In other words, the statute imposes an
undue burden on 0% of women. By
definition, zero percent is not large. Thus,
June Medical cannot succeed on its facial
challenge under this interpretation either.

I.
We are to "consider the burdens a law
imposes on abortion access together with the
benefits those laws confer." While the
majority correctly rejects Louisiana's
untenable position that WWH does not
require balancing, it then misapplies that
balancing. As I will detail, Act 620 will
substantially burden women's access to
abortion with no demonstrable medical
benefit. In reaching a contrary conclusion,
the majority accepts the district court's
findings of a want of benefits but offers a
starkly different view of the burdens
imposed.

IV.
We are bound to apply WWH, which is highly
fact-bound, and the records from Texas and
Louisiana diverge in all relevant respects. Act
620 results in a potential increase of 54
minutes at one of the state's clinics for at most
30% of women. That is not a substantial
burden at all, much less a substantial burden
on a large fraction of women as is required to
sustain a facial challenge. Despite its diligent
effort to apply WWH faithfully, the district
court clearly erred in concluding otherwise.

On a robust trial record after conducting a
six-day bench trial, the district court
documented its findings of benefits and
burdens in a lengthy and detailed opinion.
The divergence between the findings of the
district court and the majority is striking—a
dissonance in findings of fact inexplicable to
these eyes as I had not thought that abortion
cases were an exception to the coda that
appellate judges are not the triers of fact. It is

The judgment is REVERSED, and a
judgment of dismissal is RENDERED.
HIGGINBOTHAM,
dissenting:

Circuit

Judge,

Twenty-six years ago, the Supreme Court
laid down the now familiar metric:
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apparent that when abortion comes on stage
it shadows the role of settled judicial rules.

combination of two drugs and requires no
anesthesia or sedation.

A.

The numbers are telling: the district court
found that the prevalence of any
complication in first trimester abortion in an
outpatient setting is 0.8% and the prevalence
of major complication requiring treatment in
a hospital is 0.05%. The risk of complication
requiring hospitalization in the second
trimester is 1.0%. The district court made
findings that the incidence of complications
requiring direct transport to a hospital is
similarly low at Louisiana clinics. At the
Hope Clinic, which serves approximately
3,000 patients a year, only four patients have
required direct transfer to a hospital in the
past 23 years. Between 2009 and mid-2014,
the Bossier Clinic performed 4,171 abortions
with only two patients requiring direct
hospital transfer and the Causeway Clinic
performed 10,836 abortions, with only one
patient requiring direct hospital transfer.
Among doctors involved in the litigation, the
district court found that Doe 2 performed
approximately 6,000 abortions between 2009
and mid-2014, with only two patients
requiring direct hospital transfer, Doe 5 has
performed thousands of abortions at
Women's Health and Delta Clinic in the past
three years and has never had a patient
requiring hospital transfer, and Doe 6 has
performed thousands of abortions in the past
ten years with only two patients requiring a
direct hospital transfer. Summarizing the
evidence, the district court concluded that
hospital transport was required "far less than
once a year, or less than one per several
thousand patients."

While the majority correctly states that "the
district court did not clearly err in finding that
Act 620 provides minimal benefits," it also
"credit[s] Louisiana's [claims of a] more
robust record on the benefits side of the
ledger" than the record of the Texas law's
benefits in WWH. Louisiana contends that the
purpose of the admitting privileges
requirement is to facilitate care for women
who experience complications during an
abortion procedure that require admission to
a hospital and to ensure the competence of
physicians performing abortion procedures.
The district court found that the law
conferred no benefit and was "an inapt
remedy for a problem that does not exist."
The record provides ample evidence for the
district court's findings that Act 620 "confers
only minimal, at best, health benefits for
women seeking abortions." Nationally,
nearly one million abortions are performed
each year, approximately 90% of which
occur in the first trimester. There are two
types of abortion procedures: surgical and
medication abortion. Surgical abortion is
minimally invasive and does not require an
incision or the use of general anesthesia but
instead uses only mild or moderate sedation
and/or local anesthesia. Complications of
surgical abortions are rare and can generally
be managed in the clinic setting. Patients
rarely suffer complications requiring direct
transfer from the clinic to the hospital.
Medication
abortion
involves
the
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Those findings mirror findings credited by
the Supreme Court in WWH that "before the
act's passage, abortion in Texas was
extremely safe with particularly low rates of
serious complications and virtually no deaths
occurring on account of the procedure."

significant that the record is devoid
of any instance of a patient receiving
substandard care or suffering any medical
hardship after experiencing a complication
requiring hospital transfer at the hands of a
physician without admitting privileges. The
majority concedes this lack of evidence, and
aptly refuses to credit a purported health
benefit.

The district court documents the protocol
followed by physicians and clinics in the rare
instances where direct transfer to a hospital is
required. As the majority notes, the statutory
scheme that was in place prior to Act 620's
passage required abortion clinics to have "a
written transfer agreement with a physician
who has admitting privileges within the same
town or city." There was testimony
describing the process at the clinics for
managing complications. For example, at
Hope Clinic, if a physician determines that a
patient needs direct transport to the hospital
(a situation the district court found has
presented for four patients in the past 23
years), emergency transport is called, the
Clinic ensures that the chart is complete and
sent to the hospital, and the physician
contacts the hospital to alert the attending
physician that the patient will be arriving and
provides information about the complication.

The majority does credit Act 620 with
assisting in the credentialing of physicians.
First, the majority contends that, unlike the
Texas law at issue in WWH, Act 620 serves a
credentialing function, filling a purported
void created by the clinics' failure to perform
a review of a provider's competency or to
conduct criminal background checks. The
district court made no such finding. Instead,
the majority appears to rely on Doe 3's
testimony that, as medical director at Hope,
he was responsible for hiring new physicians
for the clinic and, in that capacity, did not
perform criminal background checks on two
physicians he hired. In his testimony, Doe 3
describes the differences between the hiring
process at Hope Clinic and at hospitals where
Doe 3 has previously been involved in hiring,
including Bossier Medical Center, WillisKnighton Bossier, and Doctor's Hospital.
Doe 3 testified that he sat on committees of
those hospitals that approve admitting
privileges requests and he answered
affirmatively when asked if those committees
consider the applying doctors' training,
education,
experience,
and criminal
backgrounds. In contrast, Doe 3 compared
hiring at Hope Clinic to "setting up a private
practice." He testified that there was no
"committee" responsible for hiring because
"there aren't that many physicians at Hope."

The majority notes that Louisiana, in an
attempt to emphasize the importance of
continuity of care, highlights three instances
where Doe 3, the one physician who had
admitting privileges prior to the passage of
Act 620, used those privileges to care for
patients who experienced complications
following abortion procedures. As the
majority acknowledges, however, there is no
evidence in the record that those patients
would not have received proper treatment
had Doe 3 lacked admitting privileges. It is
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Doe 3 did not run background checks and was
the only person to consider their
qualifications because, as medical director,
he had sole responsibility for hiring. There is
no dispute that hiring at clinics functions
differently than hiring or consideration of
admitting privileges at hospitals. The
majority ascribes a benefit to that difference,
a finding not made by the district court and
not evident in the record. Doe 3
acknowledges that he trained the two
physicians he hired to perform abortion
procedures because they had previously
practiced as an ophthalmologist and
radiologist. The record is devoid of any
finding that a single physician with a criminal
history has been hired by Hope (or any of the
other clinics providing abortion services in
Louisiana), that any physician that has
performed abortions was incompetent to
provide such services, or that any patient has
suffered for want of physician competence.
On this record the "credentialing function"
benefit is "a solution in search of a problem,"
one for which the majority is the main
proponent.

could decide the case differently." Yet, on the
burdens side of the ledger, it is apparent that
the majority here swiftly retries the case
failing to credit findings that were not
"clearly erroneous."
Louisiana disputes the district court's
findings that two of the doctors would stop
performing abortions if Act 620 went into
effect. First, that the limited privileges Doe 2
obtained from Tulane qualify under Act 620
and the district court erred in concluding
otherwise. Next, that the district court erred
in finding that Doe 3 will no longer provide
abortions in Louisiana if Act 620 takes effect
because of a "well-founded concern for his
personal safety" if he is the last remaining
provider in either Louisiana or northern
Louisiana, rejecting the district court's
conclusion that Doe 3's "personal choice to
stop practicing" can be legally attributed to
Act 620.
Louisiana does not appear to dispute that: (1)
Does 1 and 6 were unable to obtain privileges
despite their good-faith efforts to do so; (2)
Doe
2
was
unable
to
obtain
privileges other than the limited privileges
obtained from Tulane (which appellant
argues qualify under Act 620); and (3) that
Doe 5 was unable to obtain privileges at a
hospital within 30 miles of Delta Clinic. The
state did not challenge the district court's
findings that Does 2, 5, and 6 each put in a
good-faith effort to obtain admitting
privileges—a plain waiver. Undeterred, the
majority simply finds the opposite.

B.
Having determined the absence of evidence
that Act 620 will provide any benefit, we ask
whether the burden imposed by the statute is
"undue." It is beyond strange that it is
necessary to remind that "[i]t is not our task
to re-try the facts of the case; this is especially
true where the lower court's findings are
based on oral testimony and the trial judge
has viewed the demeanor and judged the
credibility of the witnesses." We cannot
"reverse the findings of the trial judge simply
because we are convinced that we would or

1. Doe 1
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Doe 1 provides medication abortions through
8 weeks and surgical abortions through 13
weeks, six days at Hope Clinic in Shreveport,
where he provides approximately 71% of the
3,000 abortions performed each year. The
district court found that Doe 1 had put forth a
good-faith effort to secure admitting
privileges, documenting his attempts to
secure privileges at five different hospitals
and his inability to do so for reasons unrelated
to his competence.

hospitalization, he had not admitted any
patients in that timeframe so instead provided
information about his training and
procedures. The application remained
pending neither approved nor denied by the
hospital and the district court found that,
under those circumstances, the application
was de facto denied. The district court
concluded that a fifth application, to Christus,
was also de facto denied. Doe 1 submitted his
application to Christus in July 2014 and
subsequently
provided
additional
information to Christus on two occasions
when it was requested. When the
administrator for the Hope Clinic called to
make an appointment for Doe 1 to get an ID
badge (also a requirement of the application
process), the administrator was told Doe 1
had submitted the wrong type of application
and needed to submit a "non-staff care giver"
application (a type of privilege that would not
qualify under Act 620). Doe 1 then received
a letter stating that his application was
incomplete for failing to obtain an ID badge,
and would be deemed withdrawn. Doe 1
reached out to the hospital, and was again
told that he would need to apply for non-staff
care giver privileges, which would not
qualify under Act 620.

Doe 1 contacted the Family Medicine
Department at University Health in
Shreveport (where he had done his residency
in family medicine) but was told by the
department director that he would not be
offered a position due to staff objections to
his work at Hope Clinic. In another attempt
to obtain privileges, Doe 1 applied to Minden
Medical Center, but the staff coordinator
rejected the application, stating "[s]ince we
do not have a need for a satellite primary care
physician at this time, I am returning your
application and check." Hope's administrator
contacted a third hospital, North Caddo, on
Doe 1's behalf and was told they did not have
the capacity to accommodate transfers. Doe 1
applied to WKBC as an addiction medicine
specialist because he has a board certification
in addiction medicine and the hospital has an
addiction recovery center. His application
was denied because he had not undergone a
residency program in addiction medicine (a
program which did not exist at the time he
received his board certification). He
reapplied as a family practice specialist, at
which time WKBC requested documentation
of hospital admissions from the last 12
months. Because abortion procedures rarely
result
in
complications
requiring

The majority credits the district court's
finding that Doe 1 has been unable to secure
admitting privileges despite good-faith
efforts to do so and agrees that Doe 1 will be
required to stop providing abortions if Act
620 goes into effect.
2. Doe 2
Doe 2 provides medication abortions through
8 weeks and surgical abortions up to the legal
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limit of 21 weeks, 6 days. In the year prior to
trial, Doe 2 performed 550 abortions at
Bossier Clinic and 450 abortions at
Causeway Clinic, or a total of 1,000
abortions. Since Bossier's closure, Doe 2 has
entered into a working agreement with Hope
to provide abortion services when Hope's
primary physicians are unavailable to
perform abortions.

12 months for the specific procedures you are
requesting on the privilege request form." In
his testimony before the district court, Doe 2
stated that it was impossible to submit
information about procedures performed in
hospitals because he had not "done any inhospital work in ten years, so there is no body
of hospitalized patients that [he had] to draw
from." Instead, Doe 2 testified that he
submitted cases that he had done at the clinic
in Bossier. At that point, WKBC sent a
second letter, stating in relevant part: "The
data submitted supports the procedures you
perform, but does not support your request
for hospital privileges. In order for the Panel
to evaluate and make recommendations for
hospital privileges they must evaluate patient
admissions and management, consultations,
and procedures performed. Without this
information your application remains
incomplete and cannot be processed."

The district court found that Doe 2 has been
unsuccessful in his good-faith efforts to
obtain active admitting privileges within 30
miles of the Bossier Clinic and that the
limited privileges he obtained at Tulane were
insufficient under Act 620 because those
privileges did not allow him to "provide
diagnostic and surgical services to [admitted
patients]" consistent with the requirements of
Act 620.
The district court documents Doe 2's attempts
to secure admitting privileges at three
separate hospitals. Doe 2 previously had
admitting privileges at University Health
while he was on staff as an Assistant Clinical
Professor of Medicine with a general
OB/GYN practice. After leaving the staff in
2004, Doe 2 maintained consulting privileges
that did not allow him to admit patients. After
the passage of Act 620, Doe 2 attempted to
upgrade his privileges but was told by the
head of the OB/GYN department that the
hospital would not upgrade his privileges
because of his abortion practice.

Doe 2 also applied for admitting privileges at
Tulane, a qualifying hospital under Act 620
within 30 miles of Causeway in Metairie.
After a circuitous process, during which Doe
2 was told by a doctor at Tulane that his
request would need to be discussed with the
hospital's lobbyists and that there were
faculty who were concerned that having an
abortion provider on staff would hurt their
referrals, Doe 2 was granted limited
privileges which would allow him to admit
patients but not provide care for the patients.
Louisiana contends that the limited privileges
Doe 2 was granted by Tulane are sufficient
under Act 620. The majority rejects that
argument, agreeing with the district court that
the Tulane privileges do not satisfy the
unambiguous requirements of Act 620.

Doe 2 also applied for privileges at WKBC in
the summer of 2014. The OB/GYN
department wrote to Doe 2 asking for more
information including "operative notes and
outcomes of cases performed within the last
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Louisiana does not argue on appeal that Doe
2 failed to put forth a good-faith effort to
secure privileges elsewhere, instead relying
on its interpretation of the Tulane privileges
to argue that his limited privileges are
sufficient under Act 620. Despite the fact that
the state never makes the argument, the
majority concludes that Doe 2's efforts with
respect to securing privileges elsewhere were
insufficient and that the district court's
conclusion that Doe 2 had put forth a goodfaith effort was clearly erroneous.

extent the majority deems clearly erroneous
the district court's finding that Doe 2 put forth
a good-faith effort with respect to WKBC, it
defies logic to suggest that Doe 2 could be
awarded privileges if he had just "tried
harder;" the hospital required information
that did not exist. Furthermore, it is unclear
how Doe 2's experience applying to WKBC
differs from Doe 1's application to that
hospital which the district court found to be
de facto denied, a finding the majority
appears to credit in one case, and reject in the
other.

The majority notes without comment that
Doe 2 claims University Health refused to
extend him an invitation to apply because of
his abortion practice. With respect to WKBC,
the majority states that "it remains unclear
whether Doe 2 sent a list of cases." The
majority continues, stating that the record
does not establish whether WKBC found
fault with the completeness of Doe 2's
response to its inquiry or the actual
documentation provided about cases at the
Bossier Clinic. The majority's suggestion that
Doe 2 was merely unresponsive to WKBC is
belied by WKBC's own November letter to
Doe 2—cited by the district court—stating
that "the data submitted supports the
procedures you perform, but does not support
your request for hospital privileges." More
importantly, Doe 2 testimony—supported by
WKBC's letter—highlights the principal
conundrum with his attempts to get admitting
privileges: Doe 2 cannot provide
documentation of in-patient procedures
performed (information required by WKBC)
because the nature of providing abortion
services makes hospital admissions rare on
account of the rarity of complications
associated with the those services. To the

The majority next suggests that, "opposite to
what the district court found," it is possible
that Doe 2 could obtain privileges at Christus
or Minden. While the district court did not
make specific findings as to Christus or
Minden, the record indicates that Doe 2 did
not apply to either hospital. With respect to
Minden, Doe 2 testified that applying for
admissions privileges was a "long, tedious
and not inexpensive process and [he] wanted
to . . . apply to hospitals that [he] knew had
good care and that had a close geographic
location to the clinic and where [he] knew
people might feel more comfortable." He
stated that he chose WKBC, for example,
because it was a good hospital, close to the
clinic, whereas Minden is a smaller hospital,
very close to the 30-mile limit, and he did not
know anyone there. There is nothing in the
record that indicates Doe 2 would have
received privileges at Minden or that the
district court's finding that Doe 2 was putting
forth a good-faith effort—despite not
applying to Minden—was clearly erroneous.
With respect to Christus, the majority
concludes that it is possible that Doe 2 could
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obtain privileges there because he previously
had privileges there and Doe 3 currently
maintains privileges there, "contradicting"
Doe 2's theory that a Catholic hospital would
not staff an abortion provider. The majority
ignores the fact that Doe 3's privileges at
Christus are contingent on his admitting at
least 50 patients a year, a requirement he is
able to meet only because of his OB/GYN
practice. confirmed in his testimony that he
previously had admitting privileges at
Christus because of his OB/GYN practice
and that those privileges were terminated
after he ceased to have a private practice
affiliation. There is no support in the record
for the conclusion that Christus would
potentially award Doe 2 privileges,
especially where, like Minden, Doe 1's
application to the hospital was de facto
denied. Putting aside hostility abortion
providers face in the state, basic economics
make clear why hospitals have no incentive
to grant and every disincentive to deny
privileges to an abortion provider who does
not maintain a separate OB/GYN practice: by
virtue of the safety of the procedures
performed at the clinics, abortion providers
admit very few—if any—patients to a
hospital and risks loss of business by doing
so. That principle is consistent with the
experience at Christus described by Does 2
and 3, that privileges at Christus are
contingent on a physician's ability admit a
certain number of patients, which Does 2 and
3 are (and were) only able to do by virtue of
their general OB/GYN practice.

16 weeks, six days. He performs
approximately 20-30 abortions a week at
Hope Clinic on Thursday afternoons and all
day on Saturday and also maintains an active
general OB/GYN practice. Doe 3 had
privileges at Christus and WKBC before the
passage of Act 620 because of his private
OB/GYN practice. When asked if Doe 3 was
able to increase his capacity of services
provided at Hope, he stated that he could not.
As Doe 3 points out, if he gave up his private
practice to devote more time to Hope to
compensate for the providers who would no
longer be able to practice, ironically, he
would "probably lose [his] admitting
privileges" and would no longer be able to
provide abortion services.

3. Doe 3

4. Doe 4

Doe 3 provides medication abortions through
eight weeks and surgical abortions through

Doe 4 performed abortions at Causeway
Clinic in Metairie until January 2016, where

The district court found that "[a]s a result of
his fears of violence and harassment, Doe 3
had credibly testified that if he is the last
physician performing abortion in either the
entire state or in the northern part of the state,
he will not continue to perform abortions."
The majority concludes that that finding was
clearly erroneous because of Doe 3's "shifting
story," at one point claiming he would stop
practicing if he was the only provider left in
Louisiana then, after Doe 5 obtained
privileges in southern Louisiana, if he was
the only provider left in northern Louisiana.
In the majority's view, "Doe 3's shifting
preference as to the number of remaining
abortion providers is entirely independent of
the admitting-privileges requirement," again
a trial de novo finding by an appellate court.
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he provided approximately 75% of the total
abortions at the clinic. Prior to Causeway's
closure, Doe 4 applied for privileges at
Ochsner, where he did not receive a response,
and testified at his deposition that he did not
apply for admitting privileges at Touro
Infirmary or LSU New Orleans because he
had been unable to find an OB/GYN to cover
for him, a requirement of both hospitals.
Causeway closed in January 2016. Because
of Causeway's closure, Doe 4 is no longer
pursuing privileges.

his declaration, Doe 5 states that, after Act
620 was enacted, he reviewed bylaws and
spoke to people in the medical communities
in New Orleans and Baton Rouge to
determine which hospitals would potentially
grant him privileges. For example, Doe 5
describes some hospitals that require a
physician to admit a certain number of
patients per year to obtain privileges which
he is unable to do. Doe 5 chose, therefore, to
apply to hospitals where "[he] believed that
[he] had a realistic chance of obtaining
admitting privileges" and did not apply to
hospitals where he did not have a good shot,
in part because of the adverse professional
consequences of having an application for
admitting privileges denied. Doe 5 states that
Woman's Hospital has expressed concern
that Doe 5 resides too far from the hospital to
obtain privileges and mentions that a doctor
he spoke with at Woman's Hospital—one of
the doctors with whom Delta Clinic has a
transfer agreement—declined to be Doe 5's
covering physician for his Woman's Hospital
application due to fear of threats and the
possibility that protesters will picket outside
of his private practice.

5. Doe 5
Doe 5 provides medication abortions through
eight weeks and surgical abortions through
16 weeks. He is one of two physicians
providing abortion services at Women's
Health in New Orleans, where he provides
approximately 40% of the abortions, and the
only physician at Delta Clinic in Baton
Rouge. Since the passage of Act 620, Doe 5
has obtained active admitting privileges
within 30 miles of Women's Health, at Touro
Infirmary, but not within 30 miles of Delta
Clinic.
The district court found that Doe 5 had put
forth a good-faith effort to obtain admitting
privileges at a hospital within 30 miles of
Delta Clinic but was unable to do so for
reasons unrelated to his competence. Doe 5
applied for admitting privileges at three
hospitals in Baton Rouge: Woman's Hospital,
Lane Regional Medical Center, and Baton
Rouge General Medical Center. None of the
applications submitted by Doe 5 have been
denied or granted and all remain technically
"pending", leading the district court to
conclude they had been de facto denied. In

The district court found that Doe 5 put forth
a good-faith effort to obtain admitting
privileges within 30 miles of Delta Clinic.
The majority concludes that finding was
clearly erroneous. It faults Doe 5 for failing
to present evidence that he reached out to
additional doctors after the physician at
Woman's Hospital refused to act as a
covering physician and attributes his lack of
follow-up with those hospitals to footdragging. The majority concludes from this
that "[t]he most logical explanation for Doe
5's delay is that he is awaiting the result of
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this litigation before he acts." The majority
also imports testimony from Doe 4 (who was
also unable obtain privileges before
Causeway's closure) which the majority
paraphrases as Doe 4 stating "that finding a
covering
physician
is
not
overly
burdensome." Based on the absence in the
record of evidence documenting follow-up
by Doe 5 to the three hospitals to which he
applied and the testimony of another doctor
on the topic of covering physicians in the
abstract, the majority concludes that the
district court clearly erred in finding that Doe
5 put forth a good-faith effort to obtain
privileges at a qualifying hospital near Delta
Clinic.

admitting privileges, which he could not do
because the nature of his abortion practice.
He applied at a hospital where he believed he
had a realistic chance of obtaining privileges
and knew that he was unlikely to obtain
privileges at other hospitals that required a
certain number of admitted patients.
The majority concludes that the district
court's finding that Doe 6 put forth a goodfaith effort to obtain privileges was clearly
erroneous. It faults Doe 6 for not submitting
more applications for admitting privileges,
especially where there are 9 qualifying
hospitals in the area including Touro, where
Doe 5 was able to secure admitting
privileges. The majority determines that Doe
6's "lack of effort" makes the district court's
finding clearly erroneous. The majority does
not address Doe 6's statement in his
declaration that he chose to apply to hospitals
where he thought he had a "realistic chance"
of obtaining privileges or his claim that he
reviewed hospital bylaws and spoke with
others in the medical community to
determine where he could obtain admitting
privileges without documentation of
admitting patients since 2005.

6. Doe 6
Doe 6 provides medication abortions and is
one of the two clinic physicians at Women's
Health. Doe 6 had admitting privileges at
various hospitals in New Orleans from 1973
until 2005, during which time he maintained
an active OB/GYN practice. When Act 620
passed, Doe 6 contacted Tulane to inquire
about admitting privileges but was told he
would not be granted privileges because he
had not had admitting privileges at any
hospital since 2005. Doe 6 also applied for
privileges at East Jefferson Hospital in New
Orleans and, shortly thereafter, provided
additional information that the hospital had
requested. Since that time, the hospital has
taken no action on his application. The
district court concluded that his application
had been de facto denied. In his declaration,
Doe 6 states that, after the passage of Act
620, he researched hospitals and learned that
many required that a physician admit a
certain number of patients per year to obtain

7. Summary of the Burdens
After documenting the status of each of the
six doctors who provided abortion services at
the outset of the litigation, the district court
made summary findings about the effects of
Act 620. The court determined that Does 1, 2,
4, and 6 would be unable to provide abortions
in Louisiana because of their inability to
obtain admitting privileges, despite their
good-faith efforts to do so. As to Doe 5, the
court determined that he would be unable to
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provide abortion services at Delta in Baton
Rouge because he was unable to obtain
qualifying privileges at a hospital in that area,
but would be able to provide abortions at
Women's Health in New Orleans because he
had obtained privileges there. With respect to
Doe 3, the court found that he would be the
only remaining provider in Northern
Louisiana and, due to a well-founded concern
for his safety, would no longer provide
abortions in the state.

OB/GYN practice, cannot expand his
capacity to provide abortions. Assuming Doe
3 and Doe 5 continue providing abortions, the
district court found that approximately 5,500
women in Louisiana seeking an abortion
would be unable to get one.
The district court notes that, although the
closure of Causeway and Bossier has not
been attributed to Act 620, the existence of
two fewer abortion clinics (notwithstanding
the court's finding that no doctor who was
employed at those clinics was able to obtain
admitting privileges) would amplify the
burdens attributable to Act 620. Furthermore,
the only physician who provides abortions up
to the legal limit of 21 weeks, 6 days, Doe 2,
will be unable to provide abortions,
preventing any woman seeking an abortion at
that stage from exercising her constitutional
right to do so in Louisiana. The district court
concluded that the burdens of Act 620 would
fall most heavily on low-income women in
the state, one of the poorest in the country,
because of increased travel distances and
associated cost. Finally, the court made the
"commonsense inference" that increased wait
times (on account of the decreased number of
providers) would lead to women seeking
abortions in later gestational ages, decreasing
the number of women for whom medication
abortion would be an option and making it
difficult for women to obtain an appointment
before 16 weeks.

In summary, the district court found that Doe
5 would be the only remaining abortion
provider in the state and only one clinic,
Women's Health, would remain open.
Because Doe 5 performed approximately
2,950 abortions in 2013 at Delta and
Women's, if he provided that number of
abortions at Women's (the only clinic which
would remain open on account of Doe 5 not
obtaining privileges within 30 miles of
Delta), approximately 70% of the 9,976
women in Louisiana seeking an abortion
annually would be unable to get one.
The district court made alternative findings,
determining that, "[e]ven if one were to
conclude that Doe 3 will not quit or that his
quitting is legally irrelevant, Act 620 will
nonetheless result in a substantial number of
Louisiana women being unable to obtain an
abortion in this state." If Doe 3's decision to
quit due to fear of providing abortions as the
last remaining physician in northern
Louisiana was not attributed to Act 620's
passage, two clinics would remain open:
Hope and Women's Health. Doe 3 sees
approximately 20-30 abortion patients per
week, or roughly 1,000-1,500 per year, and
has testified that, because of his full-time

The majority reaches different conclusions.
On its determination of the facts, only Doe 1
has put forth a good-faith effort to get
admitting privileges, Does 2, 5, and 6 "could
likely obtain privileges," Doe 3 "is
definitively not burdened," and all three
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clinics could remain open. Because there was
clear evidence in the record that doctors
failed to seek admitting privileges in good
faith, the majority says, any negative impact
on women is attributable to an intervening
cause: the inaction of the doctors rather than
the statute. It proceeds to weigh the impact of
what it determines to be the burden: the near
impossibility of Doe 1 to obtain qualifying
privileges. On that reading of the effects of
Act 620, the majority concludes that the
2,100 abortions that Doe 1 had performed
annually could be covered by Does 2 and 3
and, accordingly, no woman would be unduly
burdened. From there, the majority concludes
that there will not be a large fraction of
women facing a substantial burden: at most,
3,000 out of 10,000, or 30%, of women
seeking abortions in Louisiana would be
burdened by potentially longer wait times if
Doe 1 was unable to practice, and that is only
a potential burden because Doe 1's capacity
will "easily be absorbed."

to which Act 620 advances that interest, and
compare the benefits it provides with the
burdens it imposes on abortion access. It is
noted that Louisiana has a legitimate interest
in ensuring the health and safety of patients
seeking an abortion in the state. However,
even a statute which furthers a valid state
interest cannot be a permissible means of
serving legitimate ends if that statute "has the
effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the
path of a woman's choice." At the same time,
"[u]nnecessary health regulations that have
the purpose or effect of presenting a
substantial obstacle to a woman seeking an
abortion impose an undue burden" on the
exercise of that right.
At the outset, I fail to see how a statute with
no medical benefit that is likely to restrict
access to abortion can be considered anything
but "undue." As I have explained, the
majority draws conclusions for which there is
no support in the record and rejects the
district court's well-supported findings. The
findings of the district court that Does 1, 2, 5
(with respect to privileges near Delta), and 6
were unable to obtain privileges despite
good-faith efforts to do so, for reasons
unrelated to their competence, is plausible
and well-supported. Moreover, it is logical.
The district court received evidence that
many hospitals require doctors to admit a
certain number of patients annually to
maintain privileges or require documentation
of admitted patients in the 12 months
preceding an application to award privileges.
At the most basic level, even where a hospital
does not have an explicit requirement
conditioning privileges on minimum annual
admissions, hospitals have no incentives to
offer privileges to a doctor who provides only

In sum, the district court found that 70% of
women seeking an abortion in Louisiana
would be unable to obtain one and the
majority found that a maximum of 30% of
women would be burdened with increased
wait times, but that the burden of increased
wait times was only potential. The district
court's findings are well-supported in the
record and not clearly erroneous.
II.
I turn now to the application of
the Casey standard to those facts. Numbers
and calculations aside, the task is
straightforward: we are to identify the stated
justification of Act 620, determine the extent
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abortion services, because the doctor is
unlikely to admit any patients or, in other
words, to bring the hospital any business and,
being associated with abortion brings the
concomitant risk of losing business. Instead,
the majority determines that the effort of the
physicians was lackluster and that any
burdens imposed would be a result of the
physicians'
mediocre
efforts
(or
gamesmanship) rather than a direct result of
the statute.

majority in WWH did not require proof that
every abortion provider in Texas had put in a
good-faith effort to get privileges and had
been unable to so. Instead, the majority
credited the district court's findings that the
requirements imposed by the statute led to
clinic closures.
There is no question that, if the statute went
into effect today, Doe 3 and Doe 5 will be the
only remaining providers. The other
providers do not currently have admitting
privileges. The effect of the statute would be
to close one of the three remaining clinics
(Hope), to prevent three of the remaining five
doctors from practicing as abortion providers
(Does 1, 2, and 6), and to prevent Doe 5 from
practicing at one of the two clinics where he
regularly works. The majority today
essentially holds that, because private actors
(the physicians) have not tried hard enough to
mitigate the effects of the act (a conclusion
contradicted by the district court's factual
findings), those effects are not fairly
attributable to the act. That position finds no
support in WWH.

The Court in WWH addressed causation
head-on, there rejecting the dissent's
suggestion that, because some of the clinics
may have closed for reasons unrelated to the
statute, they should not "count" the burdens
resulting from those closures against the
statute. The Court noted that the district court
credited evidence of causation as well as
"plausible inferences to be drawn from the
timing of the clinic closures" and concluded
from that evidence that the statute "in fact led
to clinic closures." As in WWH, the district
court here found that the statute will cause
three doctors to cease providing abortions in
Louisiana altogether because of their
inability to get admitting privileges despite
their good-faith efforts to do so, another
doctor to limit his work to one clinic for the
same reason, and a final doctor to stop
performing abortions out of fear of practicing
as the sole remaining provider in northern
Louisiana. The majority here distorts the
causation analysis by casting aside the
district court's findings that the physicians
made "good-faith efforts" to obtain
privileges, concluding that an intervening
cause—the physicians' lackluster efforts to
obtain privileges—will be responsible for
any burden, not the statute itself. But the

Contrary to the majority's conclusion, the
effect of the Act will be to place a substantial
obstacle in the path of a woman's choice.
Even setting aside the district court's finding
that Doe 3 will stop practicing if he is the sole
remaining provider in the northern part of the
state, only two of the six doctors that
previously provided abortions were able to
obtain admitting privileges and one of the
three remaining clinics will close.
Numerically, Doe 5 provides approximately
2,000 abortions at Delta and 950 abortions at
Women's. Because he does not have
privileges near Delta, Doe 5 will be restricted
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to providing abortions at Women's (and Delta
will close). If he provides all 2,950 abortions
he had previously provided at two clinics per
year at Women's and Doe 3 continues to
provide 1,500 abortions per year, they could
cover approximately 4,450 abortions per
year, or less than half of the total demand in
the state.

the law is a restriction, not the group for
whom the law is irrelevant." The "large
fraction" language does not require the court
to engage in rote mathematical calculations
but instead directs the court to focus its
inquiry on those who will be actually
restricted by the law and determine whether
the law will operate as a substantial obstacle
for that population. In other words, will the
law pose a substantial obstacle to a woman's
choice for a large fraction of those affected.

Because the effect of Act 620 is to place a
substantial obstacle in the path of a woman's
right to seek an abortion, without a
discernable offsetting medical benefit, I
would
affirm
the
district
court's
determination that the burden is undue.
Inherent in the concept of "undue" is the
reality that where the medical grounds of a
statute are weak (or nonexistent), the burden
is more likely to be disproportionate. The
Supreme Court has previously admonished
this court for "imply[ing] that a trial court
should not consider the existence or
nonexistence of medical benefits when
considering whether a regulation of abortion
constitutes an undue burden." By failing to
meaningfully balance the burdens and
benefits here, the court repeats its mistakes
and leaves the undue burden test devoid of
meaning.

The elaborate "mathematical" calculations
attempted by the majority are improper.
Indeed, the Supreme Court rejected this
court's attempt to require precise
mathematical calculations in WWH. In that
case, after weighing the benefits and burdens,
the district court determined that a
"significant, but ultimately unknowable"
number of women would be unduly burdened
by the challenged provisions. This court
reversed, in part because the district court had
not numerically calculated that a "large
fraction" of women would be burdened. The
Supreme Court rejected that approach,
emphasizing that the district court had
developed a sufficient record to support its
finding that weighing the benefits and
burdens demonstrated that the restrictions
represented
an
undue
burden.
Neither Casey nor WWH calculated
a
numerical fraction of women who would be
burdened before invalidating statutory
provisions. Such a calculation is not required.

A brief pause now on the majority's heralding
of the Supreme Court's "large fraction"
language. In WWH, the Court explained that,
in Casey, the phrase "large fraction" was used
"to refer to 'a large fraction of cases in which
[the provision at issue] is relevant,' a class
narrower than 'all women,' pregnant women,'
or even 'the class of women seeking
abortions identified by the state." In other
words, "[t]he proper focus of the
constitutional inquiry is the group for whom

The relevant question here is, for those
women actually restricted by Act 620, will
that restriction amount to a substantial
obstacle for a significant number of women.
For those actually restricted, there is no
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question that the obstacle will be substantial.
Over 5,000 women seeking abortions in
Louisiana will be unable to obtain one within
the state. Because Doe 2 has been unable to
obtain privileges, no woman seeking to
exercise her right to decide to seek an
abortion after 16 weeks will be able to do so
in Louisiana.

precise numerical calculations on its own
terms—and I do not—the calculations are
flawed.
III.
I disagree with the majority's application of
the undue burden test. Act 620 will have the
effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the
path of women seeking to exercise their
constitutional right. Its significant burdens
are not counteracted by any discernable
health benefit and the majority errs in holding
otherwise. But perhaps the more fundamental
misstep here is that the majority fails to
respect its role as an appellate court and the
role of our district courts. These roles are
structural, that is, case neutral.

Even accepting the majority's incorrect
supposition that only Doe 1 will stop
performing abortions and accepting
their premise that the Supreme Court requires
a numerical calculation of the fraction of
women for whom the provision represents a
substantial obstacle (which it does not), the
calculations are flawed. If Act 620 causes
only one doctor to stop performing abortions
at Hope Clinic, then the women for whom the
law is "an actual rather than irrelevant
restriction" will be women seeking abortions
at Hope Clinic. As was the case in Texas,
those are the women who will be subjected to
"fewer doctors, longer waiting times, and
increased crowding." The question then
becomes whether Act 620 will "operate as a
substantial obstacle" to a large fraction
of women seeking abortions at Hope Clinic.
The majority's assumptions that (1) Doe 2
will step in to be a full-time provider at Hope
and (2) Doe 3 will have the capacity to
increase his patient load are unsupported (and
in the case of Doe 3, contradicted) by the
record. Even if Doe 1 were the only provider
to stop performing abortions, it would create
a substantial obstacle for women seeking
abortions at Hope in the form of increased
wait times and the inability for some women
to get an appointment before they passed the
appropriate gestational stage. In short, even
accepting the majority's requirement of

There remains another fundamental flaw in
Louisiana's joining with Texas and other
states in regulating abortion services, one that
also requires that the judgment of the district
court be affirmed. Although it is enough
under Casey to find an undue burden where
Act 620 will have the effect of placing a
substantial obstacle in the path of women
seeking abortions in the state, that is also the
law's purpose. If courts continue to brush past
the purpose prong of Casey, that prong will
cease to have meaning. Casey directs us to
examine the means chosen by the state to
further its interest and warns that those means
must be calculated to further that interest, not
hinder it. As in other areas of constitutional
law, courts are capable of determining
whether the means chosen by the state match
the legitimate ends. Indeed, it remains central
to much of our constitutional doctrine. While
motive of a legislative body cannot for
pragmatic reasons index the legitimacy of its
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work, legislative purpose can. At that level of
abstraction, there can be little disagreement.

burdens are determined to be undue. In the
absence of fit between the means (requiring
admitting privileges) and the ends (ensuring
women's health), I am left to conclude that,
viewed objectively, there is an invidious
purpose at play. I recall these familiar
principles to make plain that while the effects
prong of "undue burden" does the work here,
an examination of Casey's legislative
purpose reaches the same end. Act 620 was
enacted to frustrate a woman's right to
choose.

Despite judicial struggle with Casey, it must
be acknowledged that the Court redefined,
but did not abandon those basic principles. It
moved away from the analytical construct of
tiered scrutiny to "undue burden" but left
intact examination of purpose by deploy of
the familiar doctrinal tool of ends and means,
allowing courts to identify legislative efforts
to frustrate a woman's autonomy—her right
to choose. As the misfit of means and ends
grows so also does the permissible inference
that the state's invocation of legitimate ends
is disingenuous, that the statute is instead
"designed to strike at the right itself." While
everyone agrees that promoting women's
health is a legitimate goal, Act 620 does not
further that purpose. Here the means need not
be judged normatively, but rather present as
a practice the efficacy of which is
determinable empirically: the data make
plain that the requirement of admitting
privileges to the end of women's health
cannot be defended. For as the claimed
benefits of Act 620 are objectively
determinable to be virtually nil, so the

That the Supreme Court found it necessary so
recently to remind this court that a rational
basis test, appropriate in review of state
economic regulation, cannot be deployed to
review regulation of a protected personal
liberty is only confirming that when abortion
shows up, application of the rules of law
grows opaque, a phenomenon not unique to
this court. Today's case is not a close call by
either path offered by Casey. The opinion of
my colleagues, with respect, ought not stand.
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“Supreme Court on 5-to-4 vote blocks restrictive Louisiana abortion law”
The Washington Post
Robert Barnes
February 7, 2019
Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr. joined with
the Supreme Court’s liberals Thursday night
to block a Louisiana law that opponents say
would close most of the state’s abortion
clinics and leave it with only one doctor
eligible to perform the procedure.

45-day grace period would have given time
to settle that question.
“The parties have offered, in essence,
competing predictions”
about
whether
several doctors can obtain privileges,
Kavanaugh wrote.

The justices may yet consider whether the
2014 law — requiring doctors at abortion
clinics to have admitting privileges at nearby
hospitals — unduly burdens women’s access
to abortion. The Louisiana law has never
been enforced, and the Supreme Court in
2016 found a nearly identical Texas law to be
unconstitutional.

“If we denied the stay, that question could be
readily and quickly answered without
disturbing the status quo or causing harm to
the parties or the affected women, and
without this court’s further involvement.”
Justices Clarence Thomas, Samuel A. Alito
Jr. and Neil M. Gorsuch would have allowed
the law to go into effect, but they did not join
Kavanaugh’s dissent.

“The Supreme Court has stepped in under the
wire to protect the rights of Louisiana
women,” said Nancy Northup, president and
CEO of the Center for Reproductive Rights,
which represented the law’s challengers.

But the abortion providers in their briefs had
said just the prospect that the law would go
into effect was already affecting services.

“The three clinics left in Louisiana can stay
open while we ask the Supreme Court to hear
our case. This should be an easy case — all
that’s needed is a straightforward application
of the court’s own precedent.”

“Scheduled medical procedures are being
cancelled, physicians and clinic staff are
preparing to be out of work, and patients
seeking to exercise their constitutional right
to abortion are being turned away or sent to
other states,” their brief stated.

The court’s four most conservative
members would have allowed the law to take
effect. Justice Brett M. Kavanaugh said there
was a dispute about whether the doctors
could obtain admitting privileges, and that a

The majority, as is custom, did not give a
reason for granting the stay. But it seems
likely the full court will now grant the case a
full briefing and review, and perhaps
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reexamine its earlier decision, which was
made by a very different Supreme Court.

Those three have been joined by President
Trump’s choices, Gorsuch and Kavanaugh,
both of whom were supported by antiabortion
activists who said they hoped that the court’s
new conservative majority might one day
overturn the fundamental right to abortion the
court advanced in Roe v. Wade.

In the court’s 2016 decision, it said the
admitting-privileges requirement “provides
few, if any, health benefits for women, poses
a substantial obstacle to women seeking
abortions, and constitutes an ‘undue burden’
on their constitutional right to do so.”

The doctors and clinics who challenged the
Louisiana law said allowing it to go into
effect would provide a way for states to
undermine the right to abortion without
overturning Roe.

Hospitalization after an abortion is rare, all
sides agree, and the lack of admitting
privileges by the doctor who performed the
procedure is not a bar to the woman getting
needed medical care.

At stake “is not just the constitutional rights
of Louisiana women to abortion access,”
wrote Julie Rikelman and Travis J. Tu of the
Center for Reproductive Rights.

But last fall, a panel of the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the 5th Circuit upheld the
Louisiana law in a 2-to-1 vote, finding factual
distinctions between how the restriction
played out in Texas and Louisiana. The full
court, considered one of the most
conservative of the regional appeals courts,
voted not to reconsider the panel’s decision.

“The Fifth Circuit panel majority’s decision
undermines the rule of law by flouting
binding precedent from this Court. Such a
ruling has implications for the country and
the judicial system as a whole.”

Dissenting judges said their colleagues in the
majority ignored requirements set out in the
Supreme Court’s 2016 decision and seemed
intent on giving the high court reason to
reconsider that precedent, called Whole
Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt.

Judge Jerry E. Smith, writing for the twomember appeals court majority, said that the
court complied with the Supreme Court’s
decision in Whole Woman’s Health by taking
a painstakingly close look at the details.
“Unlike in Texas, the [Louisiana law] does
not impose a substantial burden on a large
fraction of women,” he concluded.

The Whole Woman’s Health decision was the
court’s most important one on abortion in a
quarter-century. But it was decided by an
eight-member Supreme Court in the wake of
conservative Justice Antonin Scalia’s death.

He said the closing of some clinics in
Louisiana, as opposed to Texas, would not
dramatically increase driving distances, and
that it was easier for doctors in Louisiana to
obtain admitting privileges. The “vast
majority” of the six doctors who performed
abortions in Louisiana “largely sat on their

Justice Anthony M. Kennedy joined the
court’s liberals to strike down the Texas
provisions. Roberts, Thomas and Alito
dissented.
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hands” instead of working hard to procure the
credential, Smith wrote.

Hospitalization occurs in only 0.05 percent of
abortions in the first trimester and
approximately 1 percent in the second
trimester, the challengers said. Hospital care,
when needed, is provided regardless of
whether the doctor performing the abortion
has admitting privileges.

He concluded that “at most, only 30 percent
of women” seeking abortions in Louisiana
would be affected.
“The record here indicates that the admittingprivileges requirement performs a real, and
previously
unaddressed,
credentialing
function that promotes the well-being of
women seeking abortion,” Smith wrote.

The appeals court rejected a district judge’s
finding that the law would affect about 70
percent of women seeking abortions in the
state. After a trial, that judge found that two
of the remaining three abortion clinics in the
state would have to close because they would
not have a doctor who could obtain admitting
privileges.

Still, he acknowledged, the benefits are “not
huge.” In a footnote, Smith wrote that “the
state did not provide any instance in which a
worse result occurred because the patient’s
abortion doctor did not possess admitting
privileges.”

The only remaining clinic with an eligible
doctor would be in New Orleans, the district
court said, and would be incapable of
meeting the demand of approximately 10,000
abortions.

Dissenting judges and the challengers said it
was a fundamental mistake to approve a law
that imposes any burden on a woman’s right
to an abortion when it provides no
corresponding benefit for the woman’s
health.

The case is June Medical Services v. Gee.
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“Supreme Court Blocks Louisiana Abortion Law”
The New York Times
Adam Liptak
February 7, 2019
The Supreme Court on Thursday blocked a
Louisiana law that its opponents say could
have left the state with only one doctor in a
single clinic authorized to provide abortions.

2016, voting to uphold a Texas law
essentially identical to the one at issue in
Thursday’s case.
Abortion rights advocates welcomed the
court’s order, which came around 9:30 p.m.,
only hours before the law was to go into
effect.

The vote was 5 to 4, with Chief Justice John
G. Roberts Jr. joining the court’s fourmember liberal wing to form a majority. That
coalition underscored the pivotal position the
chief justice has assumed after the departure
last year of Justice Anthony M. Kennedy,
who used to hold the crucial vote in many
closely divided cases, including ones
concerning abortion.

“The Supreme Court has stepped in under the
wire to protect the rights of Louisiana
women,” Nancy Northup, the president of the
Center for Reproductive Rights, said in a
statement. “The three clinics left in Louisiana
can stay open while we ask the Supreme
Court to hear our case. This should be an easy
case — all that’s needed is a straightforward
application of the court’s own precedent.”

The court’s brief order gave no reasons, and
its action — a temporary stay — did not end
the case. The court is likely to hear a
challenge to the law on the merits in its next
term, which starts in October.

Chief Justice Roberts’s overall voting record
has been conservative, and this was not the
first time in recent months he has
disappointed some of his usual allies. In
December, he joined the court’s fourmember liberal wing — Justices Ruth Bader
Ginsburg, Stephen G. Breyer, Sonia
Sotomayor and Elena Kagan — to reject a
request from the Trump administration in a
case that could upend decades of asylum
policy.

Justices Clarence Thomas, Samuel A. Alito
Jr., Neil M. Gorsuch and Brett M. Kavanaugh
said they would have denied the stay. Only
Justice Kavanaugh published a dissent,
taking a middle position that acknowledged
the key precedent and said he would have
preferred more information on the precise
effect of the law.
For Chief Justice Roberts, it was something
of a turnaround, at least for now. He dissented
in the court’s last major abortion case in

That same month, he drew sharp criticism
from three conservative colleagues for voting
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to deny review in two cases on efforts to stop
payments to Planned Parenthood. But Chief
Justice Roberts joined the court’s four
conservative members on Thursday night in
a 5-to-4 ruling allowing the execution of a
Muslim inmate in Alabama whose request for
his imam to be present was denied by prison
officials.

consider whether the claimed benefits of laws
putting restrictions on abortion outweigh the
burdens they placed on the constitutional
right to the procedure.
There was no evidence that the Texas law’s
admitting-privileges requirement “would
have helped even one woman obtain better
treatment,” Justice Breyer wrote. But there
was good evidence, he added, that the
requirement caused the number of abortion
clinics in Texas to drop to 20 from 40.

Chief Justice Roberts has voted to sustain
other laws restricting abortion. And his vote
to grant a stay on Thursday, in other words,
does not mean he will vote to strike down the
Louisiana law when the case returns to the
court.

The vote in the 2016 decision was 5 to 3, with
Justice Kennedy in the majority. The case
was decided by an eight-member court after
the death of Justice Antonin Scalia that
February.

The court is likely to confront other abortion
cases, too, as several state legislatures have
recently enacted laws that seem calculated to
try to force the Supreme Court to consider
overruling Roe v. Wade, the 1973 decision
that established a constitutional right to
abortion.

Justice Kavanaugh replaced Justice Kennedy
last fall, shifting the Supreme Court to the
right. Around the same time, a divided threejudge panel of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in New Orleans,
reversed Judge deGravelles’s decision and
upheld the Louisiana law, saying its benefits
outweighed the burdens it imposed.

The Louisiana law, enacted in 2014, requires
doctors performing abortions to have
admitting privileges at nearby hospitals. In
2017, Judge John W. deGravelles of the
Federal District Court in Baton Rouge struck
down the law, saying that such doctors were
often unable to obtain admitting privileges
for reasons unrelated to their competence and
that the law created an undue burden on
women’s constitutional right to abortion.

“Unlike Texas, Louisiana presents some
evidence of a minimal benefit,” Judge Jerry
E. Smith wrote for the majority. In particular,
he
wrote,
“the
admitting-privileges
requirement performs a real, and previously
unaddressed, credentialing function that
promotes the well-being of women seeking
abortion.”

The law, Judge deGravelles ruled, was
essentially identical to one from Texas that
the Supreme Court struck down in a 2016
decision, Whole Woman’s Health v.
Hellerstedt. Justice Breyer, writing for the
majority in that decision, said courts must

He added that the Louisiana law “does not
impose a substantial burden on a large
fraction of women.” Judge Smith faulted
doctors seeking to provide abortions in the
state for not trying hard enough to obtain
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admitting privileges and said abortions would
remain available after the law went into
effect.

panel majority and the dissenters — agrees is
medically unnecessary,” the challengers
wrote in their application in the case, June
Medical Services v. Gee, No. 18A774.

In dissent, Judge Patrick E. Higginbotham
wrote that the majority’s ruling was
impossible to reconcile with the Supreme
Court’s 2016 decision in the Texas case and
with its landmark 1992 ruling in Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, which banned states
from placing an “undue burden” on the
constitutional right to abortion.

One doctor at one clinic cannot possibly meet
the needs of approximately 10,000 women
who seek abortion services in Louisiana each
year,” they wrote. “Some of these women
will attempt self-managed abortions, seek out
unlicensed or unsafe abortions or be
compelled to carry an unwanted pregnancy to
term.”

“I fail to see,” Judge Higginbotham wrote,
“how a statute with no medical benefit that is
likely to restrict access to abortion can be
considered anything but ʻundue.’”

Lawyers for the state responded that the law
would be administered in a cautious way,
with no immediate changes. The challengers
were wrong, the state said, to assert that
“Louisiana
abortion
providers
will
immediately be forced to cease operations,
with dire consequences.” The law will take
effect, the state’s lawyers said, as part of “a
sensitive regulatory process that should begin
in an orderly way.”

The full Fifth Circuit refused to rehear the
case by a 9-to-6 vote. In dissent, Judge
Stephen A. Higginson wrote that the
Louisiana law was “equivalent in structure,
purpose and effect to the Texas law”
invalidated by the Supreme Court in 2016.
“I am unconvinced that any justice of the
Supreme Court who decided Whole
Woman’s Health would endorse our
opinion,” Judge Higginson wrote. “The
majority would not, and I respectfully
suggest that the dissenters might not either.”

The challengers disputed that, saying that
doctors without admitting privileges would
risk immediate civil, criminal and
professional liability if they performed
abortions after the law became effective.

The clinic and doctors challenging the law
filed an emergency application in the
Supreme Court asking it to block the law
while they pursued an appeal.

“Given the number and severity of the law’s
penalties, no clinic or doctor without
admitting privileges will continue to provide
abortions” once the law becomes
enforceable, they wrote. “Irreparable harm to
women in Louisiana, therefore, is imminent.”

“Louisiana is poised to deny women their
constitutional right to access safe and legal
abortion with an admitting- privileges
requirement that every judge in the
proceedings below — the District Court, the

In his dissent on Thursday, Justice
Kavanaugh said he would have provisionally
denied the stay to let the factual questions be
sorted out. Notably, he said that the Texas
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decision was “the governing precedent for
purposes of this stay application.”

“By contrast, if the three doctors cannot
obtain admitting privileges,” Justice
Kavanaugh wrote, “then one or two of the
three clinics would not be able to continue
providing abortions. If so, then even the state
acknowledges that the new law might be
deemed to impose an undue burden for
purposes of Whole Woman’s Health.”

The Fifth Circuit, he wrote, had predicted that
the four doctors who provide abortions at
three clinics could obtain admitting
privileges. There was no dispute as to one of
the doctors, he wrote, leaving questions about
three of them.

The right solution, he wrote, would have been
to deny the stay and let the challengers return
to court if the doctors could not obtain
privileges.

If those doctors can obtain privileges, Justice
Kavanaugh wrote, “the new law would not
impose an undue burden” under the Texas
decision.
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“Abortion Case provides an unexpected quick test for Supreme Court
conservatives”
The Washington Post
Robert Barnes
January 31, 2019
Abortion providers in Louisiana have asked
the Supreme Court for an emergency stay of
a state law they say would leave only one
doctor eligible to perform the procedure, an
unexpectedly quick test on the issue for the
court’s strengthened conservative majority.

Dissenting judges practically accused their
colleagues of trying to set up the Supreme
Court to reconsider its Texas decision, Whole
Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt , with one
saying the appeals court relied on “strength in
numbers rather than sound legal principles in
order to reach their desired result in this
specific case.”

The Louisiana law — passed in 2014 but
never allowed to go into effect — requires
any physician providing abortion services to
have admitting privileges at a hospital within
30 miles of the procedure.

Another said the majority had simply ignored
the Supreme Court precedent.
“I am unconvinced that any justice of the
Supreme Court who decided Whole Woman’s
Health would endorse our opinion,” Judge
Stephen A. Higginson wrote in his dissent.

Even Louisiana acknowledges that the
requirement is virtually identical to a Texas
law that the Supreme Court voted 5 to 3 to
strike down in 2016. The court said the
admitting privilege requirement, along with
additional standards for clinics, “provides
few, if any, health benefits for women, poses
a substantial obstacle to women seeking
abortions, and constitutes an ‘undue burden’
on their constitutional right to do so.”

“The majority would not, and I respectfully
suggest that the dissenters might not either.
As Justice [Clarence] Thomas wrote, ‘unless
the Court abides by one set of rules to
adjudicate constitutional rights, it will
continue reducing constitutional law to
policy-driven value judgments until the last
shreds of its legitimacy disappear.’ ”

But a panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the 5th Circuit upheld the Louisiana law in a
2-to-1 vote, finding factual distinctions
between how the restriction played out in
Texas and Louisiana. The full court,
considered one of the most conservative of
the regional appeals courts, voted not to
reconsider that decision.

Higginson’s theory will be put to the test
quickly. The law is scheduled to go into
effect Feb. 4 unless the Supreme Court
intervenes.
The Whole Woman’s Health decision was the
court’s most important one on abortion in a
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quarter-century. But it was decided by a very
different Supreme Court, in the wake of the
death of conservative Justice Antonin Scalia.

aggressively to enforce the challenged law,
potentially shutting down abortion clinics
overnight,” Louisiana Attorney General Jeff
Landry wrote. “But that is not correct.
Louisiana envisions a regulatory process that
begins, logically, with collecting information
from Louisiana’s abortion clinics and their
doctors.”

Justice Anthony M. Kennedy joined the
court’s liberals to strike down the Texas
provisions. Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr.,
Justice Samuel A. Alito Jr. and Thomas were
in dissent.

Judge Jerry E. Smith, writing for the twomember appeals court majority, said that he
was bound by the Supreme Court’s decision
in Whole Woman’s Health, but that included
taking a painstaking look at the details.

But those three have since been joined by
President Trump’s choices, Justice Neil M.
Gorsuch and Brett M. Kavanaugh, both of
whom were supported by antiabortion
activists who said they hoped that the new
court majority might one day overturn the
fundamental right to abortion the court
advanced in Roe v. Wade.

“Unlike in Texas, the [Louisiana law] does
not impose a substantial burden on a large
fraction of women,” he concluded.

Jennifer Dalven, director of the American
Civil Liberties Union’s Reproductive
Freedom Project, said laws like Louisiana’s
provide a way to sharply limit the availability
of abortion without taking on the precedent
of Roe.

He said the closing of some clinics in
Louisiana, as opposed to Texas, would not
dramatically increase driving distances, and
that it was easier for doctors in Louisiana to
procure admitting privileges. He said that “at
most, only 30 percent of women” seeking
abortions in Louisiana would be affected.

“If the Supreme Court lets a law like this take
effect, it sends a very dangerous signal to
state legislators” that the way to limit
abortion is to pass restrictive laws on the
operation of clinics and doctors who provide
the service.

“The record here indicates that the admittingprivileges requirement performs a real, and
previously
unaddressed,
credentialing
function that promotes the wellbeing of
women seeking abortion,” he wrote.

But Louisiana tells the Supreme Court that
the challengers have not pointed to any
mistakes in the fact-specific majority
opinion, and that allowing the law to go into
effect would not create an emergency that
warrants the high court’s intervention.

Still, he acknowledged, the benefits are “not
huge.” In a footnote, he wrote that “the state
did not provide any instance in which a worse
result occurred because the patient’s abortion
doctor did not possess admitting privileges.”
Challengers of the law contend that is
because abortions performed in Louisiana
clinics seldom result in hospitalization: only

“All of Plaintiffs’ claims of irreparable harm
rest on the premise that Louisiana will move
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0.05 percent for abortions in the first
trimester and approximately 1 percent in the
second trimester. Hospital care when needed
is provided regardless of whether the doctor
performing the abortion has admitting
privileges.

The Supreme Court seems to have taken a
low-key approach to this term, after an
unwelcome moment in the political spotlight
during the partisan brawl over Kavanaugh’s
nomination.
But cases such as this one often forces its
hand. The court is not being asked to consider
the merits of the case just now, but whether
the law should be put in place while it is
appealed.

The panel rejected a lower court’s finding
that the law would affect about 70 percent of
women seeking abortions in the state. After a
trial, that judge found that two of the
remaining three abortion clinics in the state
would have to close because they would not
have a doctor who could obtain admitting
privileges.

What it decides about the stay will be closely
watched by both sides. Abortion rights
supporters will view a decision to allow the
law to go into effect, as Northup indicated, as
a troubling sign that the court is no longer
willing to stand by its precedent in the Texas
case, decided less than three years ago.

The only remaining clinic would “be unable
to meet the annual demand for roughly
10,000 abortions in the state.”
“The 5th Circuit brazenly ignored recent U.S.
Supreme Court precedent squarely on point,”
said Nancy Northup, president and CEO of
the Center for Reproductive Rights, which is
representing the challengers and also
successfully fought the Texas law. “There is
no way this law can stand under the Supreme
Court ruling in Whole Woman’s Health.”

Those opposed to abortion, on the other hand,
would be disappointed by a Supreme Court
reinforced with conservatives stepping in to
stop a law that an appeals court has approved.
The case is June Medical Services v. Gee.
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“A Temporary Win for Abortion Rights”
The Atlantic
Garrett Epps
February 10, 2019
Late Thursday night, the Court put a
Louisiana abortion statute on hold. The 5–4
order in June Medical Services v. Gee has
been perceived as a victory for abortion
rights—but I’m not sure it is. The stay is
purely to allow the Court to decide whether
to hear the case. And the Court’s four solid
conservatives voted to allow the law to take
effect right away, even though it runs directly
contrary to the Court’s most recent abortion
decision. Chief Justice John Roberts voted to
stay the law; but this does not mean he will
vote to strike it down.

“undue burden” on a pregnant woman’s
constitutional right to have an abortion.
A federal district court in Louisiana
considered the Louisiana law in light of
the Hellerstedt decision, and struck it down.
In seven pages of Kafkaesque factual
findings, the court detailed the current
providers’ futile efforts to get admitting
privileges—which were blocked for reasons
that had little to do with competency and
much to do with deep-red Louisiana’s
opposition to abortions. Of the six current
providers, it found, Act 620 would put four
completely out of business, and restrict one
to performing abortions at only one of the two
locations where he currently practices. The
sixth doctor, the court found, would simply
stop performing abortions if that happened,
out of “a well-founded concern for his
personal safety.” If Act 620 took effect, the
court concluded, “approximately 70 percent
of the women in Louisiana seeking an
abortion” would be unable to get one in the
state.

If Thursday’s order was a win for abortion
rights at all, it was a minor and probably
temporary one.
June Medical Services is a challenge to
Louisiana Act 620, which requires abortion
providers in the state to have “admitting
privileges” at a licensed hospital within 30
miles of the clinic at which they practice.
That precise requirement in a Texas statute
had been struck down in Whole Woman’s
Health v. Hellerstedt. In that 2016 case, a
district court found that the “privileges”
requirement provided no genuine health
benefit to pregnant women. However,
combined with a strict set of physical
regulations for clinics, it would in fact cause
the closure of most of the state’s licensed
abortion clinics; thus, it constituted an

But then a strange thing happened: The U.S.
Court of Appeals decided that the district
judge just didn’t understand the facts, and
ruled that Act 620 could go into effect.
The court-of-appeals decision is one of the
most remarkable federal opinions I have ever
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read. To understand why, let’s look at the
basic rules for the federal court system. The
system has three levels. District courts
conduct trials, hear testimony, sift evidence,
and “find” facts. Then they apply court-ofappeals and Supreme Court precedent to
those facts, and render a judgment. Courts of
appeals,
except
in
very
unusual
circumstances, do not “find” facts. Instead,
they ask whether the trial court correctly
applied the law to the facts it found. To
decide that, they apply Supreme Court
precedent, and, if there is none, precedent
from the appeals courts. After the appeals
court decides, the Supreme Court can step in
if it thinks the lower courts got it wrong.

And even if some of the doctors were
eliminated, the others could just work a few
more hours a week and everything would be
tickety-boo for the women seeking abortions.
As a result, the Fifth Circuit said, the case
in June Medical Services is totes different
from the identical case of Hellerstedt. And
thus it is totes constitutional too.
It’s hard to believe that the Fifth Circuit’s
opinion was even intended to pass the
straight-face test. There are two reasons for
that suspicion. First, the Fifth Circuit
decision was written by Judge Jerry E. Smith.
Smith, a Ronald Reagan appointee, during
his three decades on the bench has displayed
some tendencies toward assuming an
authority not strictly warranted by his
commission.

To repeat: Trial courts “find” the facts;
appeals courts primarily decide the law.
Appeals courts cannot set aside factual
findings unless the trial judge committed
“clear error.” Even if an appeals panel is
“convinced that had it been sitting as the trier
of fact, it would have weighed the evidence
differently,’’ the Supreme Court has said, it
should not second-guess the trial judge unless
it has “a definite and firm conviction that a
mistake has been committed.”

Smith was the author of a 1996 affirmativeaction case called Hopwood v. University of
Texas. In that case, he wrote for a majority
that a previous Supreme Court case, Regents
of the University of California v. Bakke, was
no longer binding in the Fifth Circuit. The
Supreme Court had not said so, but Smith
thought the decision was a bad one; he didn’t
think the Supreme Court liked it either and
thought it was about time the high court
reversed it. (The Supreme Court, in fact, later
reaffirmed Bakke.) Smith’s self-confidence
verged on megalomania in 2012 when he
ordered the attorney general of the United
States to write him a letter explaining
political comments by President Barack
Obama about a case that was not before
Smith’s court, and to which Obama was not a
party.

But the Fifth Circuit in essence decided that
the trial judge had been wrong about virtually
every factual question in the case. Whatever
might have been the case in Texas, in
Louisiana there were hitherto unsuspected
benefits to the “admitting privileges”
requirement. As for the doctors who hadn’t
gotten admitting privileges, they were lying.
They had, the appeals court decided, “sat on
their hands” and probably really could get
admitting privileges somewhere, if they just
got off their lazy behind and gave it a real try.
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So we might call Smith’s judicial philosophy
freewheeling—or, to be more precise,
lawless.
In
his June
Medical
Services opinion, he in essence overruled the
Supreme
Court’s
decision
in Hellerstedt. That level of hubris is
probably explained by the true difference
between Hellerstedt
and June
Medical
Services.

After the temporary stay of Act 620, the
Court has a few choices. It could issue an
unsigned opinion saying that Hellerstedt—
only three years old—is still the law. It could
also grant full-scale review and ask the
parties to argue whether it should
reconsider Hellerstedt. That would suggest a
cavalier view of precedent, but at least the
Court would be leveling with the country.

The facts on the ground in Louisiana and
Texas are roughly the same, but the facts on
the ground of the Supreme Court are not.
That is to say: Justice Anthony Kennedy,
who provided the fifth vote in Hellerstedt, is
no longer on the Court. His seat is now filled
by Justice Brett Kavanaugh.

The worst choice would be to engage with
Smith’s claim that Act 620 is somehow
different from the Texas law. Finely parsing
nonsense leads to nonsensical law. But I
suspect that Kavanaugh is not the only
conservative on the Court who would like to
take that route. Bogus factual distinctions
offer an appealing way of getting rid
of Hellerstedt—and
then Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, and then Roe v. Wade.

The message of the Smith opinion is: We’ve
got the votes now. Hellerstedt, and
then Planned Parenthood v. Casey, and then
Roe v. Wade, are finished. I can write any
nonsense in this opinion and you can’t do
anything about it.

The key vote on Thursday’s order was that of
Roberts. He dissented in Hellerstedt,
which suggests that he believes admittingprivilege requirements are fine, regardless of
their impact. Does he respect precedent
enough to, in effect, rule against his beliefs?
More likely, his inner struggle is only about
expediency and timing. Is this a politic time
for the Court to reconsider its precedents
frankly? Would it be better for the Court to
stand by its precedents for a decent interval
before making the foreordained assault
on Roe and Casey? Or should the Court take
the easy route suggested by Kavanaugh, and
undo abortion rights while pretending it’s
doing nothing of the sort?

Is he right? Kavanaugh’s dissent may be the
real news here. He notes the supposed factual
discrepancy and suggests that the court
should just allow the law to go into effect.
The lazy doctors could try again to get
admitting privileges. The state has promised
not to enforce Act 620 “aggressively,” he
says, so no one will be hurt.
His argument, in essence, is: Trust a
government regulator with your rights. What
could go wrong? This is, let’s say, an
uncharacteristic argument for a conservative.
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“When Judges Defy the Supreme Court”
The New York Times
Linda Greenhouse
February 14, 2019
No, I wasn’t surprised last week, as most
people apparently were, when Chief Justice
John Roberts cast the deciding fifth vote to
preserve access to abortion in Louisiana for
at least a little while longer. In fact, I had
predicted it (and I have witnesses).

The court is the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, based in New
Orleans and covering Texas and Mississippi
along with Louisiana. Not surprisingly given
its territory, it has been the location of
numerous legal battles over abortion. The
Trump administration has been spectacularly
successful in filling seats on the Fifth Circuit.
Five of the 16 active judges are Trump
appointees. That places the Fifth Circuit at
the leading edge of the coming wave
of Trump judges (sorry, Chief Justice
Roberts, I’m afraid that’s what they are), so
it’s important to understand what is going on
there.

Why? Not because I think the chief justice
has developed a soft spot in his heart for the
right to abortion. He has not. Not because he
wants to minimize the Supreme Court’s role
as a combatant in the culture wars. I think he
does, but that’s not the point.
Rather, circumstances compelled the chief
justice to stand up to a stunning act of judicial
defiance.

The Louisiana law at issue, June Medical
Services v. Gee, was enacted in 2014 as the
Unsafe Abortion Protection Act. It requires
doctors who perform abortions to have
admitting privileges at a hospital within 30
miles of the location where they practice.

The phrase summons the image of Gov.
George Wallace standing in the schoolhouse
door. What Chief Justice Roberts had on his
hands was something less tangible but
equally threatening to the rule of law: not
defiance of judges but defiance by judges.

If this sounds familiar, it’s because it is.
Texas had passed the same law, part of the
legislative arsenal amassed by a leading antiabortion organization, Americans United for
Life. These laws are enacted with the
knowledge that doctors who perform
abortions can almost never get admitting
privileges, either because of objections to
abortion by the hospital or the surrounding
community or because so few abortion

The voluminous commentary on what
happened at the court last week has for the
most part not fully conveyed the blatant
nature of the lower court’s decision, on which
the Supreme Court put a temporary hold to
afford the plaintiffs — an abortion clinic and
its doctors — the chance to file a formal
appeal.

798

patients ever need hospitalization that the
doctors can’t meet the minimum number of
hospital admissions that some credentialing
committees require. (It’s 50 per year in the
case of one Louisiana hospital, while the
doctors involved in the case went years
without needing to hospitalize a single
abortion patient.) The whole point of these
laws is to destroy the abortion infrastructure
— in the name of protecting women’s health.

meet the needless admitting privileges
requirement.
Judge John W. deGravelles of Federal
District Court in Baton Rouge applied the
reasoning of Whole Woman’s Health in
issuing
a permanent
injunction against
Louisiana’s identical law. His ruling
followed a six-day trial at which he took
testimony on the sustained but fruitless
efforts by the doctors to get admitting
privileges; evidence on this point takes up 14
of the 63 pages of his opinion, issued in April
2017. Observing that it “provides no benefits
to women and is an inapt remedy for a
problem that does not exist,” Judge
deGravelles concluded that this law, like the
Texas law, placed an undue burden on
women’s access to abortion.

The Texas law, upheld by the Fifth
Circuit, succeeded in closing half the
abortion clinics in the state before the
Supreme Court declared it unconstitutional
in Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt,
decided in June 2016 by a vote of 5 to
3. While the Louisiana law was being
drafted, one anti-abortion leader in the state
observed in an email to the bill’s sponsor that
the Texas law was having “tremendous
success in closing abortion clinics and
restricting abortion access.” In signing the
bill into law, Gov. Bobby Jindal declared it
part of the effort “to make Louisiana the most
pro-life state in the nation.”

The
Fifth
Circuit’s
2-to-1 decision
overturning that ruling is a breathtaking piece
of work. “We are of course bound by Whole
Woman’s Health’s holdings, announced in a
case with a substantially similar statute but
greatly dissimilar facts and geography,”
Judge Jerry Smith wrote for himself and
Judge Edith Clement. What can that sentence
— indeed, that premise — possibly mean?
That Whole Woman’s Health concerned
Texas while this case was about Louisiana?
That’s like saying that the Supreme Court’s
decision
in Obergefell
v.
Hodges, recognizing a constitutional right to
same-sex marriage, applied only to male
couples and not to lesbians because it was a
male couple who brought the case. (It’s worth
noting that in the immediate aftermath of
Whole Woman’s Health, the Alabama
attorney general dropped the state’s appeal of
its admitting privileges law, which had been

Justice Stephen Breyer’s majority opinion in
Whole Woman’s Health was a pointed
rebuke to the Fifth Circuit for failing to
subject the Texas law to adequate scrutiny.
The appeals court had simply deferred to the
Legislature’s claimed objective of protecting
women’s health and had in fact barred any
consideration of whether the law would
actually do so. In fact, Justice Breyer wrote,
the law conveyed minimal if any health
benefit and would actually harm women by
forcing longer waits and more crowded
conditions in the remaining clinics that could
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struck down in Federal District Court. “While
I disagree with the high court’s decision,
there is no good faith argument that
Alabama’s law remains constitutional in light
of the Supreme Court ruling,” was the state’s
lawyer’s honest appraisal of the situation.)

the plaintiffs, represented by the Center for
Reproductive Rights, file their formal
Supreme Court appeal and the state gets the
chance to respond.
While it takes the votes of five justices, a
majority of the court, to grant a stay, as it did
in this instance, adding a case to the court’s
docket for a decision on the merits requires
only four votes. It’s highly likely the court
will grant review; if it doesn’t, the stay
dissolves automatically and the law takes
effect.

The Fifth Circuit’s contorted explanation for
why the Supreme Court’s “close fact-bound
balancing analysis” in Whole Woman’s
Health wasn’t relevant to Louisiana
succeeded only in showing that Louisiana
women would in fact be worse off than the
women in Texas, where most major cities
still have at least one abortion clinic (many
Texas clinics did not reopen after the
Supreme Court’s ruling). The two judges
who formed the Fifth Circuit majority also
tried to show that the doctors could have
obtained admitting privileges if only they had
tried harder, a conclusion flatly refuted by the
findings at trial but embraced by Justice Brett
Kavanaugh in his opinion last week,
dissenting from the Supreme Court’s vote to
grant a stay of the Fifth Circuit’s decision.
Justice Kavanaugh said the doctors should
keep trying.

How will the Supreme Court decide the case?
Despite my boast at the start of this column,
I don’t claim omniscience about what comes
next. The chief justice voted to grant the stay,
in my estimation, because to have silently let
the Louisiana law take effect without
Supreme Court intervention would have been
to reward the defiance that I’ve described
here. When it comes to a full review on the
merits, it’s a different game.
Chief Justice Roberts was in dissent in Whole
Woman’s Health, along with Justices Samuel
Alito and Clarence Thomas (Justice Antonin
Scalia having died four months before). The
deciding vote in the majority was cast by
Justice Anthony Kennedy. Justice Kennedy’s
successor, Justice Kavanaugh, chose sides
last week. He might have provided some
cover for the chief justice, but chose not to.
We now know all we need to know about
him.

The dissenter on the Fifth Circuit panel,
Judge Patrick Higginbotham, dissected the
majority’s opinion and said the appeals court
was repeating the very mistakes for which the
Supreme Court had called it out in the Texas
case. When the full Fifth Circuit took up the
question of whether to rehear the case as a
full court, six judges said yes and nine said
no. Four of the nine were recent Trump
appointees (the fifth Trump appointee on the
court, Kyle Duncan, was recused). The law
was scheduled to take effect last week. It will
remain on hold for some months, as least, as

We still don’t know all we would like to
know about John Roberts, who remains an
ambiguous figure after more than 13 years at
the head of the American judicial system.
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With the lower courts moving rapidly even to
his right, and the Trump administration
beating at the Supreme Court’s door in one
high-profile case after another, Chief Justice
Roberts is entering a time of great testing,
both of himself and of the institution he

heads. Maybe his vote last week was a
harbinger. Maybe it will come to be seen as
an anomaly. In the space between those two
possibilities, the country waits, holding its
breath.
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“Supreme Court issues a go-slow signal in its first abortion decision of the year”
Los Angeles Times
David Savage
May 28, 2019
The Supreme Court handed down its first
abortion decision of the year on Tuesday,
with a mixed result that clearly signaled the
conservative majority is not ready to
reconsider the right to abortion set in Roe vs.
Wade.

a half-dozen conservative states have enacted
abortion bans this year.
But Tuesday’s outcome, after weeks of
internal debate, suggests that the justices are
inclined to move slowly and cautiously on the
abortion issue and that Chief Justice John G.
Roberts Jr. and his fellow conservatives
are not ready to directly confront abortion
rights, at least during a presidential election
year. Had the high court agreed to hear the
Indiana case, it would have been argued in
the fall and decided by June 2020.

By a 7-2 vote, the justices upheld an unusual
provision of an Indiana law that requires
clinics to bury or cremate the remains of a
fetus. This mostly symbolic rule does not
violate a woman’s right to choose abortion or
put an “undue burden” on those who do so,
the justices said in a brief, unsigned opinion.

The decision not to hear Indiana’s appeal
provides further evidence that the justices
will not be eager to consider the even
more sweeping abortion bans recently
adopted by Alabama and other conservative
states.

At the same time, the court, without a dissent,
rejected the state’s effort to revive a
significant restriction on abortion. The
justices left in place lower court rulings that
blocked an Indiana law that would make it
illegal for women to end a pregnancy because
of the race or gender of the fetus or if they
received a diagnosis of Down syndrome.

The spotlight has been on Kavanaugh. He
replaced Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, who
had joined with the court’s liberals, starting
in 1992, to uphold the right to abortion.
Neither Kavanaugh nor Justice Neil M.
Gorsuch wrote separately on Tuesday in
favor of hearing the Indiana case.

Since Justice Brett M. Kavanaugh won
confirmation, social conservatives have
hoped -- and many liberals have feared —
that the high court with two appointees of
President Trump would move to overturn the
1973 Roe decision, or at least significantly
limit abortion rights. With their eyes on that
possibility, Republican lawmakers in at least

Social conservatives suffered a second
setback on Tuesday, on another controversial
issue — the treatment of transgender
individuals. The justices refused to hear a

802

right-to-privacy challenge to the decision by
a Pennsylvania school district that allowed a
transgender student to use the boys’ locker
room. Lawyers for the Alliance Defending
Freedom sued on behalf of a high school boy
who said he “felt embarrassed” about
possibly seeing the other student in his
underwear.

efforts to limit abortion itself amount to an
“undue burden” on a woman’s right to choose
to end a pregnancy.
The fetal-remains law “does not implicate
our cases applying the undue burden test to
abortion regulations,” they wrote.
Lower courts had struck down Indiana’s law
as unconstitutional under Roe vs. Wade.
Under that decision, a woman and her doctor,
not the state, have the right to choose whether
to end an early or midterm pregnancy.

Two lower courts rejected the suit, and the
justices said they would not hear the case of
Doe vs. Boyertown Area School District.
Asaf Orr, an attorney for the Transgender
Youth Project, called the court’s action “a
major victory for transgender youth and their
families.”

The Indiana law, adopted in 2016 and signed
by then-Gov. Mike Pence, sought to prohibit
abortions entirely in some situations.

“The vast majority of people in this country
support equal treatment of all students,
including those who are transgender,” Orr
said.

Its “non-discrimination” provision said
“Indiana does not allow a fetus to be aborted
solely because of the fetus’s race, color,
national origin, ancestry, sex, or diagnosis or
potential diagnosis of the fetus having Down
syndrome or any other disability.”

Since early January, the justices had debated
Indiana’s appeal in Box vs. Planned
Parenthood during their weekly conferences.
Only four justices would have needed to vote
to grant review of Indiana’s appeal for the
court to hear arguments on it. Instead, the
justices denied the state’s case with no
registered dissents.

The law had a narrow exemption for a lethal
condition that “will with reasonable certainty
result in the death of the child not more than
three months after the child’s birth.”
A federal judge in Indiana and the U.S. 7th
Circuit Court of Appeals in Chicago blocked
the entire law from taking effect and ruled it
was unconstitutional, saying that the
“nondiscrimination” provision violated Roe
vs. Wade and that the fetal-remains part of
the law had no legitimate purpose.

At the same time, the justices voted 7-2 to
uphold the fetal-remains part of Indiana’s
law, an issue they had not previously ruled
on. Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Sonia
Sotomayor dissented.
In upholding that portion of the law, the
justices in the majority said that states can
legitimately regulate the burial of fetal
remains. But they noted that their ruling did
not alter previous decisions on whether state

Last year, the 7th Circuit split 4-4 on whether
to reconsider that ruling. The dissenters
included Judges Amy Coney Barrett from
Indiana and Diane Sykes from Wisconsin,
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both of whom were considered by Trump for
a Supreme Court nomination.

is limited, the law is part of a larger trend of
state laws designed to stigmatize and drive
abortion care of out of reach,” said Jennifer
Dalven,
director
of
the
ACLU’s
Reproductive Freedom Project.

Indiana appealed to the Supreme Court in
October, a week after Kavanaugh was sworn
in.

An antiabortion group, Students for Life of
America, said the court got it “half-right” in
the Indiana case.

In siding with the the lower courts on the
main part of the law, the justices wrote that
the decision not to hear Indiana’s appeal
“expresses no view on the merits” of the
issue, “whether Indiana may prohibit the
knowing provision of sex-, race- and
disability-selective abortions by abortion
providers.”

“The justices got it right that aborted infants
need to be buried and cremated respectfully
as they are human beings, not trash,” said
Kristan Hawkins, the group’s president.
Carol Tobias, president of the National Right
to Life Committee, said her group “applauds
Justice Thomas for using this opportunity to
expose Planned Parenthood’s eugenic legacy
and for highlighting the need to protect
unborn children from being exterminated
based on their race, sex or level of disability.”

That issue has so far only been considered by
one appellate court, the 7th Circuit, and the
justices said they would wait until other
appeals courts have looked at similar laws
before jumping in to consider it.
Justice Clarence Thomas, writing for himself,
said in a 20-page opinion that the court “will
soon need to confront the constitutionality of
laws like Indiana’s” because of “the potential
for abortion to become a tool of eugenic
manipulation.”

The justices are still likely to consider some
aspects of abortion law in the months ahead.
This month, the court has been considering
another appeal from Indiana. This one seeks
to revive a regulation that would require
women to undergo an ultrasound test and
then wait at least 18 hours before having an
abortion.

“From the beginning, birth control and
abortion were promoted as a means of
effectuating eugenics,” he wrote, in an
unusual, lengthy attack on early supporters of
women’s access to contraception and
abortion.

The 7th Circuit blocked that law on the
grounds it would put an undue burden on
low-income women who had to travel hours
to reach an abortion facility and stay there for
two days.

ACLU lawyers who had sued to block the
Indiana law called the outcome a “mixed
ruling.”

The justices are likely to take up a Louisiana
law that would require abortion facilities to
have a doctor on their staff who has admitting
privileges at a nearby hospital. In February,

The high court “let another unwarranted
restriction on abortion stand. While the ruling
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the court, with Chief Justice Roberts in the
majority, issued a 5-4 order to block that law
from taking effect while the high court
weighs an appeal.

The justices seem likely not to grant review
of that case, June Medical Services vs. Gee,
until the fall. That, in turn, means a decision
would probably not come before June 2020.
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“New Louisiana anti-abortion law on hold as doctors challenge recent court ruling”
The Advocate
Mark Ballard
October 8, 2018
Enforcement
of
new
anti-abortion
restrictions will have to wait as the physicians
who challenged Act 620’s constitutionality
asked for a review of an appellate court
decision upholding the law.

finding that a virtually identical Texas law
had unconstitutionally created a “substantial
obstacle” to the right of abortion.
Wednesday was the deadline for the five
doctors in the challenge to request a
rehearing, which stops the state from
enforcing the law beginning Oct. 18.

The doctors argue in June Medical Services,
et al., v. Dr. Rebekah Gee, et al., that
requiring them to have admitting privileges at
a hospital within 30 miles of the abortion
clinic would likely require two of the state's
three facilities to close and leave only one
doctor with the proper credentials to perform
the medical procedure that ends pregnancies.

“Our priority here is to keep clinics open,”
T.J. Tu, who recently took over the legal team
representing the Louisiana doctors, said in an
interview last week while the lawyers for the
New York-based Center for Reproductive
Rights were considering their options.

They want the 16 members of the 5th U.S.
Circuit Court of Appeals to review the split
decision by a three-judge panel before
allowing the state to enforce the law.

“A woman’s constitutional right to access
abortion is on the verge of extinction and
that's not hyperbole. That is a reality,” he
said.

Two of three 5th Circuit judges on the panel
– Jerry Smith, of Houston, and Edith Brown
Clement, of New Orleans – found Sept. 26
that Louisiana's Unsafe Abortion Protection
Act, Act 620 of 2014, didn’t cause an undue
burden on women largely because the
physicians didn’t try too hard to get hospital
admitting privileges.

The Center claims the 2-1 panel’s decision
violated Supreme Court precedent.
State officials, who last week weren’t sure
how to go about applying the law, won’t have
to worry about enforcement for many months
more.
The Louisiana Department of Health is
responsible for licensing facilities and
ensuring compliance. Generally, physicians
with admitting privileges must submit a letter
from the hospital saying so.

The third judge, Patrick Higginbotham of
Austin, scolded his colleagues for retrying
the facts of the case and essentially
overturning a 2016 U.S. Supreme Court
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Is that what would happen in this case?

followed the Supreme Court’s reasoning to
find the Louisiana law likewise was
unconstitutional.

“The procedure will be determined by the
lawyers with the A.G., who have been
involved in the litigation,” LDH press office
wrote in an email.

But Louisiana is not Texas, Smith wrote in
his 45-page majority opinion.

Over at the Attorney General’s Office, the
press office in an email pointed to Attorney
General Jeff Landry’s earlier statement
praising the 5th Circuit’s decision and stating
that administering the law is up to the
Louisiana Department of Health.

When Act 620 was signed by then Gov.
Bobby Jindal, Louisiana had five abortion
clinics and six doctors. Two of the clinics
have since closed.
Because of the numbers – three abortion
clinics and about five physicians – the panel’s
majority felt they could drill down into the
difficulties each physician had in obtaining
privileges, which is at the heart of the
Supreme Court’s decision.

State Rep. Katrina Jackson, D-Monroe,
introduced the bill that would become Act
620 as a way of protecting women’s health by
ensuring if anything went wrong during the
termination procedure, a hospital would be
on call. “If you are going to perform
abortions in the state of Louisiana, you’re
going to do so in a safe environment and in a
safe manner that offers women the optimal
protection and care of their bodies,” she said
in March 2014.

What they said they found was that the
process wasn’t that onerous. Only one doctor
“put forth a good-faith effort.” Three others
likely could have obtained the privileges had
they not “largely sat on their hands,” Smith
wrote.
Higginbotham wrote in his dissent that the
panel majority had no business retrying the
facts of the case – that’s the job of the district
court. Appellate courts decide if the law was
applied accurately.

The legislation largely tracked the wording of
a bill that Texas made a law in 2013.
The U.S. Supreme Court overturned the
Texas law in June 2016 because so many
Lone Star doctors couldn’t obtain admitting
privileges that all but eight of 40 clinics
closed. The difficulty obtaining privileges,
long drives and long wait times at the
remaining clinics created an undue burden,
the high court ruled in what many called the
most significant abortion decision in a
generation.

“The divergence between the findings of the
district court and the majority is striking—a
dissonance in findings of fact inexplicable to
these eyes as I had not thought that abortion
cases were an exception to the coda that
appellate judges are not the triers of fact,”
Higginbotham wrote.
He also noted that abortions are a safe
procedure that require hospital care in less

After a six-day trial in 2017, U.S. District
Judge John deGravelles, of Baton Rouge,
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than 1 percent of the more complicated
pregnancies and nearly none at all when the
terminations happen early, as most do.

Five of the 16 members of the 5th U.S.
Circuit Court of Appeals were appointed by
Democrats. Among the other 11 is a judge,
Kyle Duncan of Baton Rouge, who when in
private practice represented the state in this
case.

All three of the panel judges were nominated
by Republican presidents, are in their 70s,
and have often been mentioned during their
long careers as candidates when openings
occurred on the U.S. Supreme Court.
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“Supreme Court Will Not Hear Bid to Revive Alabama Abortion Ban”
The New York Times
Adam Liptak
June 28, 2019
The Supreme Court on Friday turned down
an appeal asking it to revive an Alabama law
that would have banned the procedure used in
the vast majority of second-trimester
abortions.

“Although the law is a procedure ʻban,’” the
state told the Supreme Court, “its only
practical requirement is that a doctor kill the
unborn child through a medically appropriate
procedure before removing the unborn
child’s body from the woman.”

As is their custom, the justices gave no
reasons for declining to hear the case. Justice
Clarence Thomas issued a concurring
opinion that called the procedure gruesome
and unconstitutional. “This case serves as a
stark reminder,” he wrote, “that our abortion
jurisprudence has spiraled out of control.”

The state proposed three methods of
terminating fetal life before extraction:
injecting potassium chloride into the fetus’s
heart, cutting the umbilical cord and injecting
digoxin, a heart-failure drug, into the
amniotic fluid. Lower courts ruled that these
methods were not safe, effective or available,
and they struck down the law as inconsistent
with Supreme Court precedent.

The procedure, known as dilation and
extraction, involves dilating the woman’s
cervix and removing the fetus in pieces.
Opponents
of
abortion
call
it
“dismemberment abortion.”

Quoting a 2016 Supreme Court decision,
Chief Judge Ed Carnes of the United States
Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit, in
Atlanta, said problems with “the fetal demise
methods — their attendant risks; their
technical difficulty; their untested nature; the
time and cost associated with performing
them; the lack of training opportunities; and
the inability to recruit experienced
practitioners to perform them — support the
conclusion that the act would ʻplace a
substantial obstacle in the path of a woman
seeking an abortion before the fetus attains
viability.’ ”

Justice Thomas adopted that terminology.
“The notion that anything in the Constitution
prevents states from passing laws prohibiting
the dismembering of a living child is
implausible,” he wrote.
The Alabama law, enacted in 2016, was
blocked by lower courts. It would have
affected 99 percent of abortions performed in
the state after 15 weeks.
In defending the law, Alabama officials said
it fell short of a complete prohibition.
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“So does the fact,” he added, “that every
court to consider the issue has ruled that laws
banning dismemberment abortions are
invalid and that fetal demise methods are not
a suitable workaround.”

The state’s constitution bars using
government money to aid schools affiliated
with churches. Three mothers who sought
scholarships from the state program to send
their children to a Christian school sued,
saying the state constitution violated
provisions of the United States Constitution
on religious freedom and equal protection.

Chief Judge Carnes’s opinion was notable for
its reluctance.
“Some Supreme Court justices have been of
the view that there is constitutional law and
then there is the aberration of constitutional
law relating to abortion,” Chief Judge Carnes
wrote for the majority. “If so, what we must
apply here is the aberration.”

The Montana Supreme Court rejected the
challenge and shut down the entire
scholarship program.
The case, Espinoza v. Montana Department
of Revenue, No. 18-1195, will give the
United States Supreme Court an opportunity
to explore the limits of its 2017 decision in
Trinity Lutheran Church v. Comer. That
decision said Missouri could not exclude
religious institutions from a state program to
make playgrounds safer even though the
state’s Constitution called for strict
separation of church and state

Eight other states have similar laws, Alabama
said in its brief seeking Supreme Court
review of the case, Harris v. West Alabama
Women’s Center, No. 18-837.
In another development on Friday, the court
agreed to decide whether Montana is free to
exclude religious schools from a state
scholarship program.
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“Supreme Court Sidesteps Abortion Question in Ruling on Indiana Law”
The New York Times
Adam Liptak
May 28, 2019
The Supreme Court on Tuesday sidestepped
part of a major abortion case, a new sign that
the court is not yet moving aggressively to
test the constitutional right to abortion
established in Roe v. Wade.

challenge Roe v. Wade. Such laws are being
enacted at a brisk pace, including one in
Alabama banning almost all abortions in the
state, without exceptions for rape and incest,
and others that bar the procedure after doctors
can detect what the measures call a “fetal
heartbeat,” which happens around six weeks
of pregnancy.

In an apparent compromise in a case from
Indiana, the justices turned down an appeal
that asked the court to reinstate a state law
banning abortions sought solely because of
the sex or disability of a fetus. But the court
upheld part of the same law requiring
abortion providers to bury or cremate fetal
remains.

The new laws are intended to give the
Supreme Court an opportunity to reconsider
Roe.
The court’s decision on Tuesday, issued
without briefing on the merits or oral
arguments, was unsigned and just three pages
long. The court stressed that its decision on
fetal remains was not a ruling about abortion
rights.

The case, Box v. Planned Parenthood of
Indiana and Kentucky, No. 18-483, had been
closely watched because it could have given
the Supreme Court its first chance to consider
the constitutionality of a state law restricting
abortion since Justice Brett M. Kavanaugh
replaced Justice Anthony M. Kennedy last
year.

In declining to hear an appeal on the law
banning abortions sought for specific
reasons, the court said it was expressing no
views on the constitutionality of such laws. A
split among lower courts is ordinarily
required for Supreme Court review, and in
this case, the court noted, there was no such
disagreement.

Justice Kennedy had been a cautious
supporter of abortion rights, while Justice
Kavanaugh’s limited record on the subject as
an appeals court judge suggested some
skepticism.

Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Sonia
Sotomayor said they would have denied
review of both issues in the case.

The modest move on Tuesday left for another
day the consideration of state laws limiting
abortion that were enacted, at least partly, to
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The Indiana law was enacted in 2016 and
signed by Gov. Mike Pence, now the vice
president. It prohibited all abortions, at any
time during a pregnancy, solely sought based
on the fetus’s sex, or because it had been
diagnosed with Down syndrome or “any
another disability,” listing conditions like
scoliosis, albinism, dwarfism and “physical
or mental disease.” The law also barred
abortions sought because of characteristics
like race or national origin.

obstacles in the way of women seeking them
before fetal viability. Judge William J. Bauer,
writing for the majority on the Seventh
Circuit, said that ruling doomed the law’s
restrictions.
“These provisions are far greater than a
substantial obstacle; they are absolute
prohibitions on abortions prior to viability,
which the Supreme Court has clearly held
cannot be imposed by the state,” he wrote in
the decision issued by the appeals panel.

The state law also imposed limits on the
disposal of fetal remains, though it allowed
mass cremations and did not impose any
restrictions on women who disposed of the
remains themselves.

Judge Daniel A. Manion voted with the
majority in that case, but did not adopt its
reasoning. “Indiana has a compelling interest
in attempting to prevent this type of private
eugenics,” he wrote. “But the fact remains
that Casey has plainly established an absolute
right to have an abortion before viability.”

A statement issued by Mr. Pence’s office on
Tuesday said he “commends the Supreme
Court for upholding a portion of Indiana law
that safeguards the sanctity of human life by
requiring that remains of aborted babies be
treated with respect and dignity.”

“That today’s outcome is compelled begs for
the Supreme Court to reconsider Roe and
Casey,” he wrote.
The Seventh Circuit panel had divided 2 to 1
on the part of the law concerning fetal
remains. Judge Bauer, writing for the
majority in that decision, said the distinctions
in the law were not rational, noting that it
allowed women to dispose of remains as they
saw fit but required abortion providers to
treat them largely as they did other human
remains.

“We remain hopeful,” the statement said,
“that at a later date the Supreme Court will
review one of numerous state laws across the
U.S. that bar abortion based on sex, race or
disability.”
A three-judge panel of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, in
Chicago, unanimously struck down the
provision limiting permissible reasons for
having an abortion, though one judge said he
did so reluctantly and only because he was
bound by Supreme Court precedent.

In dissent, Judge Manion wrote that Indiana
was entitled to insist on “the dignified and
humane disposal of the remains of unborn
children.”

In 1992, in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, the
Supreme Court ruled that states may not
prohibit abortions or place substantial

The full Seventh Circuit initially agreed to
rehear the panel’s ruling on the fetal remains
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provision but later announced that it had
deadlocked after a judge recused himself.

Lawyers for Planned Parenthood said the
provision governing fetal remains was not
rational.

Dissenting from the full court’s decision not
to rehear the case, Judge Frank H.
Easterbrook, joined by three other judges,
wrote that both parts of the panel’s decision
were misguided.

“Indiana claimed that it sought to treat
embryonic and fetal tissue like human
remains,” the group’s brief said. “But the
challenged statute permits a woman to
dispose of the tissue in whatever way she
chooses, so long as she takes it from the
medical facility when she departs.”

“Casey and other decisions hold that, until a
fetus is viable, a woman is entitled to decide
whether to bear a child,” he wrote of the
provision on permissible reasons. “But there
is a difference between ʻI don’t want a child’
and ʻI want a child, but only a male’ or ʻI
want only children whose genes predict
success in life.’”

In a 20-page concurring opinion on Tuesday,
Justice Clarence Thomas echoed and
amplified Judge Easterbrook’s dissent. The
Indiana law, Justice Thomas wrote, furthered
the state’s “compelling interest in preventing
abortion from becoming a tool of modernday eugenics.”

As for the fetal remains law, Judge
Easterbrook wrote that “the panel has held
invalid a statute that would be sustained had
it concerned the remains of cats or gerbils.”

“Whatever else might be said about Casey,”
Justice Thomas wrote, “it did not decide
whether the Constitution requires states to
allow eugenic abortions.”

In urging the Supreme Court to hear the case,
lawyers for the state said fetal remains were
worthy of respectful treatment.

In its brief opposing Supreme Court review,
Planned Parenthood said the restrictions on
permissible reasons also made no sense.
“Indiana’s view would lead to perverse
results,” the group’s brief said. “It would
mean that even though states cannot compel
a woman to continue a healthy pregnancy, it
could compel her against her will to continue
a pregnancy where it is virtually certain that
the child will die in infancy.”

“The fetal disposition provision expands on
long-established legal and cultural traditions
of recognizing the dignity and humanity of
the fetus,” the state’s brief said. It added that
advances in genetic testing and concerns
about sex-selective abortions justified the
provision restricting permissible reasons for
the procedure.
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